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CHAPr.ER I

INTRODUCTION
The decline of British influence in world affaire 1s one

ot the more pronounced political phe-n omena or modern ti:nes.
Over the past century key te-rritories subject to Br1 tish ·r ule
have been slipping loose from their imperial moorings at an ever

more rapid rate.

Those remaining subject to Br1tis·h authority·

grow pro.gressi vely more belligerent.

Iu his search for a-n understanding or this eclipse or

British sovereignty, the contemporary historian finds himself
groping through a network of complexly interrelated eocialt
political, economic, and psyc.hologica.l proc-e·sses.

other student

·or

One or an-

history has argued that specific instances

or groups of these processes are the mechanisms motivating the
c.olla·p se of the Br1 tish hegemony.

cited ·is that group

or

i~~luences

Among t!:lose mor-e con::only

intimately allied with

~r.d

stimulated by the progressive maturation of voting fr8nc·hise
reform movements within the United Kir~dom.

In effect, this

view argues that :franchise reforms introduc-ed radical changes
in i~perial attitudes in the United Kingdom and that these in

turn led to long-range t ·r ends pointed at the splintering of
the empire:~., the political decline of the landed ar1s·tocracy resulted in the creation of the Co~onweelth; or,

1

the rise or the Labor Perty cerr1ed with it
tully aimed at the deliberate discarding of

e ·..:~ee~:s·

a C!l!:lpB1gn

~•••ho 1• "'-.

!~~erial

.

•4

··~. <>I

•

It is the purpose or this study to exD~1r:e
.......
this "r~:u::.,nt.
Such an examination, it would seem, de~ands rtrst or ell ~ review

I

or

the more obvious factors concerned in the !~te~rAt1~n

and disintegration or the British empire.

~ Oll.~
~ ••

Th1 s rev 1 I"!'"

,

I

provide a context within which s t)eci.:fic franchise re for:~!'\ w1 th1 r~

f

the United Kingdon can be rela·ted to other histor1ctll

I

I
I
~

l

P.ve.nt~
t~~

dis-

rr~~o6~d

thnt

contemporary with them but more specifically related to
integration of Britain's imperial hegemony.

It ie

these relationships should lead to an effective

b~91a

for

n~~~"~-

ing the relative truth or f'alsehood of' the ergu.TUent thAt rro-

gress1ve franchise rerorm has been one of the h1etor1cRl trends
largely contributory to the dismem·b ermen t or the

I;r1 t

Sinoe the analysis to be presented is 1n pert

ie!l

e:::.j'11 re •

cor.t1~~ent

upon a specialized un.d erstanding of the ter.:l e~ntre, 1 t woul~
appear necessary t o begin With a derin1tion
I.

o~

this

ter~.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

The establ1s~en~ o: vast
Emp.1 re ~ !. generalized term.
to have been one or the le~d1~g
political hegemonies appears
"~~ire~ 1~ e t~r.:
political motives or Western c1vilizat1o~.
11 such unions, b~t un!er
somewhat 1ndiscr1minate_l y appl1e d to 8
to be aepare~le into ~h~ee
careful scrutiny they would appea.r
egemony, or 1m~er1uo, the
d h
distinct types: l) the land-base

j

!

dominant political integration

or

encient c1v111zet1on8·

•

rather unstable transitional hegemony, or ":feud.o.l
)
em?1re"; ~nd
3
the mar·itime hegemony, or emoire, the dom1nan t :ror:l 1n moJ ern
history-. 1
Impe·rium.
--·---~~~-

or 1 an d - b esed hegemony.
--

Imp~rtum.

as

unjeretoo~

here, is a term accurately applied only to those agrarian
utisms previous to. the withering of Roman
rule.
·~

~b~ol

At v q r 1 ou s

stages in the imperium's growth political authority, which

w~s

ab.solute, rested in the hands of soo-e type of pr1 e~t -l-:1n~, :.J.on _
arch, or emperor who was both a demi-god or de1 ty 1ncerno.te
hls state's religion and the chief prie·s t of its usually
terian rites.

or

vei-~e

Originally, a "nuclear core" located in eone

favorably situated ~lluvial basin had provided the e~r1eulturel
foundation r.e-quisi te to -expansion, and this "core" h!id grl'ld:.Jally expanded into an imperium by the piecemeal conquest of

1 The generalizations here involved, though they ~ey wel~
apply to certain phases ot: Or-iental history, refer to ·.;·estern
civilization only. The Athenian and Phoen1c1en exper1:nents w~...leh

appear to be the principal exceptions to some erees of th1s
det:inition can be construed as no·t the dominant no11tteal forms
of' ancient times. T.hough. both were the cen.t ers
e:gperently
maritime hegemonies, neither was as successful nor as exten91ve
as the usual. historical tree. ti se implies since ne 1 ther he<1 too
successful a control of its colonies. Athens ~s5 but o~e o~ e
group of pet tv
w-arring t Greek .city-states 1 whose 1tenuous
.., _,
,, holciir.gs
are ge-n erally lumped together as the Athen an e!:l:" re. .D.a~ .... .a
Graecia, supposedly its chief colonial area, was eno~ter colle~
tion of petty Greek city-states anything but un~er Athe~1an
control. And'carthage certainlY wes not under the control cf
Tyre. It was a power in its own right and represented e threat
both to Magna Graecia end ri s1·ng Rome •

or

"1'"1

4

societies abutting its land rrontier.s.
'

\

The primitiveness

the core's technology had conditioned this- patter_n

and habit conbined with

relativ~l

- Y

5

.or

or

expansion.

1 ow technological growth

led to it·a continuation in la.t er imperial stages.

The con-

quest of land neighbors was a continuous :function or the core, 8

growth, end the armies carryin-g out this task were agents of
the state acting under d-eliberate orders.

Loot, the procure-

ment or slaves, and self-defense were some or the pr1no1pel
mot"ives behind these conquests.

Colonization, as understood

in modern times, was only a limited a gent of the "core's" expension end more or less under the tutelage of the stete.
Several imperiums tried to expand through the establishl1ent
of mar1 time colonte.s, but_ the 1r efforts do not a_ppear to have

been too suc.cessful.

Their relatively pr1m1 t1 ve technology and

communications .so compounded the problem

or

ruling mari-tt:n.e

colonies that sooner or .l ater the.se colonies :fell under the

fI

heel of competing imperi.ums adjoining their land perimeters:

I

~··Asia Minor falling to the Persians, or Uagna Graec1a

i

i
~
I
_I

capitulating to Rome.

Hence, even though the give-n i:nperium

might possess a navy, the historical context of its expansion
predicated that 1.ts military power _m ust rest pr-imarily in armies;

imperium was predominantly a lend power.

As a given "nuclear

core" expanded, it created an imperium by superimposing its
own abso'luti stic s·ocial, political, judicial' fis-cal • and other
The economic roundacontrols upon newly conquered territories.

l

tion ot "its domain was basically agrarian, and i'ts technology,

r

5

even though it m1gh t produce some monumental works, consis-ted
principally or handicrafts and animal power.

Slavery, but

one impetus to the pattern of continual conquest, was the
imper-ium's chiet' machinery.
Historical _context

at~~£!

empires.

Empires

suoh as that of the British, on the other hand, even though
they possess certain traits in common with 1mper1ums, present
a rather- conclus.1 vely different picture.

They occur in a radic-

ally different and much later historical ma-trix.

At the time

of their appearance Western civilization was in the midst or
a trans-ition from_absolut-istic to representa-tive forms or government.

As

an integral p-h ase of t·h ts movement the unstable tran-

sitional hegemonies so much a part of life in the Middle Ages
were wi ther.ing away, and the petty principalities which composed them slowly were being combined to form modern centralized state.s.

The now tully matured capt talistic era w-as well

into its formative stages.

Having already reached the basic

patterns or industrialization, the whole civilization was heading toward the complexity, specialization, and interrelatedness of our present "age ot te-chnology."

In all walks of life

Western man•s intellectual orientation was progressing tron a
monistic to a pluralistic basis for decision, a change revealed
in the growth of such social, political, and judi-cial instruments as j-oint stock companies, oi tizen juries, voting franchises,

6

the sep-a ration ot gove

rnmental powers, the separation o~
church and state, the
bj
su ect1on ot the military to legislative controls, the establ-ishment or parliaments, pet 1 tiona
of' right rr-om c-i tizen pressure groups,. nations and ne tional
citizenship, guarantees of civil rights,~··

or

Though meny

these instruments had abortively appeared in imper1ums,

t -heir appearance had been con.tined almost exclusively to the
nuclear cores where their potential meaning was nullified by

absolute executive prerogatives.

~hus,

the imperium presents

a picture of cult-ural stagnation and autocratic controls while.

the empire suggests a picture of cul t ·ural flux end co-ntinual
adaptation.
~

charac-teristfc-s

£!

~

empire.

The introduction into

the his-torical con.t ext a-t the dawn of empire or the knowledge
that there were available for expropriation territories beyond
the European land mass, a knowledge following logically rroo
the "voyages ot discovery;" .set the stage for the birth or
-empires.

An empire is the cumul.at1 ve reaul t

or ·the maturation

ot historical trends present at the time or the rise of this
tYPe

or

political 1ntegrati.on acting upon the territories avail-

able _for expropriation.

In its expanding stages it is a rather

ind-iscriminate compos! tion o-r widely scattered land~ and peoples·
By maturity, however, in def'erence t -o strategic, d-e-nogrephtc'

economic , and other eo nsi dera ti o ns , this di s -tr1 but 1 on be c oce 8

7

far more select! ve, -even though oceans and the de-signs

or eoo-

pe:t1 tors continue to present a continuous ad.I!J.1n1strat1 ve prob _
lem.

Except in the oase of Russia, empires have been anything

but a continuous land mass, and naval power has thus had to be
the key military arm of their expansion.

Colonization has been

equally important and has in one sense been more dominant.

Ex-

pansion has .a s often been the result o-f the acqu1s1 t1 ve acts
ot

priva~e

citizens motivated by personal interests as it has

been the result
in

~aot,

at'

military campaigns- on the part or the state ;

military expansion has been ineffective unless allied

with or followed by colonizati-o n.

Politically, all these

ohareoteris-tics have resulted in something

or a duality in the-

administrative organization of the mature empire.

Though

representative government is typic-al of the mature nuclear core,
the government 1 t grants to subje-ct terri to_ries runs the gamut
from compromise-s about the- principles or rep.resentati ve government to managed levels of despotism.

Ultimately, such com-

promises in rule appear to be attributable to the 1.nterrelat1onships of several factors:

1) the role of colonization in

the growth pattern or empires_, 2) the existence or representative forms of government, 3) variations in the technological
potentials of the nuclear core and subject territories, 4) veri·
ations in the technological potentials of the leading imperial
oompeti tors, 5) variations in the "ba-lance of power" among the
leading nations of the world, 6) the eost•accounting nature
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or private enterprise, and 7) the 1ndtr~
.erent application or
adminis·trative techniques risin.ooo rrom ·" r~o 1 st" attitudes.

Acting together t ·hese :factors appear t 0 h eve e~prom18ed the
degree ot authority that could be exerc1 se d successfully at
any given time by an empire's. administrative center.
Mean1.ng

.2!

empire·

Empire, then, is a·u thor1 ty 11m1 te~

in various ways and dependent upon complexly
f'luences.

At best it means- the prerogative

single states

tnt~rreleted

.£!:.

power

or

tn-

certain

.!£ command certain 11n1 ted acts £!_COUr8e.s

of

action~

the part o:r other states, territories, etc. which

they~

conquered, colonized, £!. otherwise control.

not an absolute author1 ty.

It is

Unlike the preroga t1 ves of 1rr.pe rium,

it does not imply the managing state's (nuclear c·ore's) absolute
ownership and control or lands ruled in its name, even though

it does exero·ise varying degrees or euthor1 ty ov·er eny one ot
them.

Geographically, the e~pira has a maritime d18tr1but1cn

while the imperium presents a solid land tae·ss.

Both rise fron

different political orientations, and the materiel base
empire is technological as opposed to the agrarian way
typical in the imperium.

o:
or· life

The t ·wo represent the· political solu-

tions ot different historical epochs, and where· the one • im-

perium, rose !rom. the conquest of esta.blished civ1lizet1cns
or relative equals, the other, the empire,

gre~

as its nuclear core colonized primitive areas no

first

or

~ilitery

ell

match ror it and later as the sane nuclear core ebscrted the
governmental prerogative-s of' other civil! 7e d societies that
were its technological inf'eriors. Granted these dtrrerences
the equa·tion

or

ancient and moC.ern pol1t1 co 1 h.egemon1es

the term emptre would seem erroneous.

,

~r.der

The two type ·s ere not

alike; in fact, the only trait they appear to have 1 n e c:::r..c r. 1 s
their inclusion under the term. political hegemo·ny •.

.Em~1re 18

the technologically oriented and politically 11m1t€d oer1t1me
hegemony ot recent history, and imperium is the land-bA.sed,

agrarian, political absolutism of the past.
Empire

~

.!!!.!

Brttish .hegemony.

Thus viewed, er.Ip1re

would seem to present a more ·precise defin1 tion of the nature
of British power than d-o es the normal loose usat,e of its- t:leen-

1ng,. and 1 t · is thi..s concept which is intended by tt:e term er.:-pire
as used in this study.

This study propose.s to point out that

the administrative center of' an empire:
dam:

i.e., the United Ki~g

is p-rimarily an administre..t1ve au.t hori ty end subject to

many che·c ks upon its· use o-r power.

Some of these. checlt.s rise

from those the edm1n1stra.t1 ve center would control.

Others r1 se

from the designs of competing edmin1s.tretive centers, desi.gns
whic-h may be military, economic, psychological, ~· •

They

derive also trom limitations inherent in the technological
The "treestructure and. material potential of the nuclear core.
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for-all" which has· disrupted the last ritty years or Chinese

history 1s one o~ the more obvious illustrations or these checks

and balances in action.

As usual in history, the final resolu-

tion. or this problem took a military turn.
Observations~ the foundation£! British_power.

Primecy

ot political authority can be maintained only as long as one is
able and willing to produce the military or police power necessary

tor 1 ts e-n forcement.

In respect to her mil1 tary proble·rn·s, Britain

has been more favored than most of' her competitors.

Her insularity has provided her a nearly impregnable bastion, 2 at least
until ·the recent advent of the submar-ine and air power.

Thanks·

to a fortuitous series of mineral deposits now approaching exhaustion, she has been able to maintain until quite recently her
deliberate effort to keep her primary position among the world's
foremost naval powers, 3 and she has been able to produce,. a lone
or in coalition with other powers, the armies nece.s sary· tor her

land campaigns.

Nevertheless, from the moment or ita inception

2 Ct • .Sir Halford J. Macl:inder, Britain and the Br1 t1.sh
Seaa (Oxrord: The Oxford University Press, l906J: CE: 1; or
~. Fawcett, A Political Geography of~ British Empire
(Boston: Ginn and Company, l933), ch. 8.

3 Ct. E. C. Ec.ke 1, ·c oal, Iron, and ·.var (New York :: Henry
Holt & co:: 1Q20}, chs. 1-~r a summary or-the role of mineral
depos1 ts, particularly coal, iron, lead, tin, et_c. , in the
success or British efforts. The exhaustion of~e United Kingdom's high-grade iron ore deposits (c. 191?) may yet underwrite
the complete collapse of the British empire.
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her 1mper-1el course has been precartou.sly balanced and her

material and m111 tary position have progress-1 vely declined-o
In a milieu of competing world powers, these gradual alter-

ations in her revered position have presented her administrators with almost insurmountable problems in regard to the government ot her more important- holdings.

Over the years her

attempts to solve these problems have produced such political
organ! za t ions and mechanisms as cro-wn co lon1 e s , dominio.ns ,

plebiscites, mandates, condominiums, and trusteeships, dominions be_ing by fe.r the most important in terms of diminishing
British power and the compass of this study.

Dominion.

The dominion is the result of attempts to

provide stability and equilibrium to the conflicting social,
politi-cal, and economic asp ira tiona struggling for recognition
in the relations between the United Kingdom and

th~

portant, usually Caucasian controlled, segments

or

more imits empire.

Though now used in somewhat distorted fashion by other world
power-s, the dominion is a political institution originally

developed to provi_de a solution to problema peculiar to the expanding British empire.

Initially, as -in the case

or

Canada, 4

4 cr. the British North America Act in Public General
Sta-t utes,Vol. II, pp. 5 tt.: 30 Victoria c.3 (London: H. M. Stationery Office ., Reprint), an act passed by Parliament in 1867.
The more signir1cant passages of this act may be round in
Carl Stephe-nson and Ge-orge F. Maroham, Sources of EnT11sh Con ..
sti tutional History {_New York: Harper &:. Bros. ,L'937 , p-p.'738 ff ••
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·1 t was a legal instrument re present1r-g

colony

~

.!h!

~ agreeme~t

United Y..ingdom under wh1ch

bet~een

~ or.of'ess~·<!

a

a

cotmnon allegiance -to --the c r own , the --~~colony wes brer.ted internal
autonomy, --and --the United Kingdo
- m reserved the riuht
~ ~

manner

atteirs.

.!!!:

_ conducted
nhi ch _the colony

ill

review

·1nternl'lt1.on"'l

Since that time, however.• ell th a t d omtnion hes coce

to mean is voluntary c o o perat 1 on under e conmon
the Crown.

or

This change is the end result of the

elle~iance

to

reco~ende.tions

5
of the Inter-imperia.l Coni'erence of 1926 end the enectme nt or
the Statute o~ Westminster (1931), 6 which legalize~ ita rindings.

Dom1n1.o n s. te tu s had been expected to -so 1 ve a numbe-r or

administrative problems which had cropped up durin~ the years
between 1750 a-nd 1867.

These had erupted from whet epoeers to

5 The records and re·c orni'l.endetions or this conference will
be found in their entirety in Vol. XI of the Perli.ementer P6t'ers
of Great Br·i ·tain for the year 1926 (London:
• Stet or.ery
Office, 1926)-. The most significant ste.te·m ent or the "Recoi:nendations" 1s th-e lest clause of Par. 1, sec. II, "Sta.tus or Great
Brita1nand the Dominions," which asserts that the dominions
together with Greet Br·itein "· •• ere autonotlous co::unun1t1es within
the British Empire, equal in status, in no wey subordl~ete to
one another in any aspect of their domestic or external er:t'61re,
though united by a common allegiance to the crown,. end freely
as.sooieted as members or the Br1 tish Corrnonwealth or Ne ttor.s ·"

6 Cf. Public General Acts (London: H. M. Stationery Of~1ce,
1932), 22-George V, c. 4: p. 13 f. t:or a copy or this stetute.
Whet little discussion ensued on this issue teo~ plece in Pe~- 5
11ement in 1930 end 1931. Cf. PerliementerY De oe te.s ( H .c · ilet · )
for those yeers. or particular note is the rect tEet this bill
was passed by ell dominion parliaments before being given cursorY
epprove1. 1n the u. K. Parliament I£!· 22 George V: v. 255, PP·
2626-2627).
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have been an almost inherent conrl1et between the basic
pa-tterns which had produced Britain's colonial ex-pension and

contemporaneous developments elsewhere in her iffipertal structure, such trends as the United Kingdon's growing gamble on
the technological revolution and world t-ade
~
, the dawning

limite ot British naval power, the problem or mounting strategic coste. the gradual but forseeable alteration or the
British position in a milieu or- co~peting world powers, and
perhaps in some measure, as many authorities would have one believe, the progressive maturation of repres-e ntative government
and voting franchi-s e re:form.
~franchise

T.he

re~orm ~ ~

historiographical problem.

possible effects of the spread o_f voting franch1 se pri vi ..

leges in the United Kingdom upon the course of the empire would

appear to have been treated 1n more -wishful 'fashi-o n than any
other aspect of British hist-o ry, particularly as reE:ards the
widely-held belief- that franchise reform and 1 ts diffused effects

profoundly influenced- the 1nper1a_l decline.
present themselves upon the acceptance

or

Certain questions

this view.

Cen it

be proven, for instance, that British imperial policy was radically altered by changes in the orientations of Pari1ament following franchise reforms?

If observable and verifiable, wee

this radical change so _intimately allied w1 th the vote reform

movement as to preclude certain other intellectual end material
It would seem
agents a-s more contributory to itlper-1 al dec-ay?

14
that if evidence were available to show that the imperial dacline began before the introduction ·o t' franchis·e reforms • that
such symptoms of imperial retreat as the dyarchical structurein colonial government existed before the introduction of voting reform in the United Kingdon; then 1, one would ·ha·ve to look

e.lsewhere tor the seeds ot imperial di.s integration.

contention

or· this

It is the

study that such evidence does· exist and

can be verified, that certain observable influences combined
to sow the seeds of imperial decay previous to the advent

or

franchise rerorm and that these influences stimulated a policy
of imperial administration continued and developed since.

Orienta-tion ..2!, :e_roofs.

In order properly to assess

such evidence as apparently does exist, certain gross material
aspects of the rise, development, and decline of British colonial po.w er will have to be reviewed.

As previously· stated, this

should provide a context within which franchise ref.orms can be
j

I

sensibly related to symptoms
asses.sed.

or

imperial decay and their effects

This analysis will end with the confused and terrible

years of World War II; for by then all major franchise reforms
had been enact·ed and the imminent collapse of the British
hegemony had been exposed.
The voting franchise:

a· deftni t1on$. For the purposes

of this study voting :franchise may be defined
guaranteed right to exnress one's voice,

!!!1,

~

the legalll

end desires

15
about the manner in which

~

is to be governed through

~

used .2!, !!:!,! elect! ve and represen·tati ve processes. Though the

concern here will center about franchise changes in the United
Kingdom, it is worthy of remark that all dominion bills and
most imperial legislation subsequent to the first dominion
bill (the North .America Act of 1867) grant .some type of voting
franchise in subject lands.

Such grants, however, have had

little direct eff'ect upon the actions of the "home" Parliament
in other imperial matters bec-ause they are symptoms of imperial

decay rather than causes,_ the .e nd result of d:isintegre ting influences- r :e ther then their stimulus.
Keeping these preliminary definitions and idees in mind,
this sur-vey begins.

CP-APrER I"I
GEOGRAPHY OF BBITISH EXPMlSION
An empire 1s a ge ograp hi c as ~ell as e pol1t1e~l

That or the British proves no exception to this rule.
composed ot more than one hundred

distributed.

me~

~n~tty.

It 18

b er parts which ere widely

They are located in some or the most well-known

a.s wel·l as some o-r the more remote ereaa of the world.

In order

to establish and maintain its inf'luence over these ere"'s, Brttntn
has had to develop and keep accessible broad avenues or

cation with them.

co~uni-

This is a .geographic e·s well es o r.ltl1tctry

problem.
Geographic and geopolitical rectors condl t1on1n r.~ Prt tt ~h
The inf'luence

expansion.

o~

geography upon the expansion

England is best understood in terms

tors:

or

or

sever·al condittontr.e !"'o-

1) the resources and geographic locations

o~ t~e

dtscovered lands and markets which England end her

newly

Europe~n

competitors wished to expropriate, a rae tor which cc;,bined· wt th
geopolitical relations among these co::1pet1 tors cond1 t1onf!d the
emergence

or

warfare;

2} the m1l.itary advantages inherent 1n Britain's in-

naval power as the pri~ary weapon or 1nternati~r.Al

sular location; 3) the role or colonization in the develo~=ent

ot expropriated territories; end 4) the totslized con~ext c!

Britain's relations with her imperial

11

competitors
throughout the period or he.r imperial re 1gn.

~ .2! ~ impertel

!

~~1 e~!o~!es

I::P::::\:::v:p:::i::s•::: ;::e:::~P::e: ::·::::e:n (:~::,:~~)~).
The opentng oc ;';nel or.!•"

1

"France, Ho.llen.d , and England were her e h 1 e r conpe t 1-t 0 r 9

j'

i

sure;e.

I

•

Cr.e

by one over the next two-and-one-half centuries ( 1 :,5n -1Bl!: ).

England, through a series o"f wars and alliances, succe~·!rfully

undertook the. elimination of the others.

The wars sr.~ .feu.,..~~ t n!~!

the peace treaties which "followed provide a record

satisfactorily she complete-d this task.

o~

Spa·in, Holl'lnd ,.

France were stripped of the more importAnt of their
gains.l

j~ot

ho•

nr~ <i

1~~er1"1

Naval end military successes, however, are but oc~ ph~ae

of Britain's efforts.

r~

remained ror colonization to make

effective her expropriations, since the best the veunted no·.-y

could do was bar competitors

~
~rom

them·, 1t could not

dev~lo~

the=.

1 For more detaile-d accounts of the wers e.nd tre" t1.,e •1 t~
R s ley Ex~~ns1on or F.n~l~~d
these powers, cr. Sir John • ee . '
. s c ErTU..-e r"ro:-:1 !Rle=-. c
(London: The Macmillan Co., 1 883 ), Jo~~). ·J. ",,.. 111;,;. Dart':er,
to Empi.re (London: Chatto & ~indus, 19
Londo~: S=:ith, ::l:!er,
The Rise and Decline ~ ~ *~~¥e~~~n~~b!rt ·G. Albion, A E1~t:J:ey
& co:-;-T906T; end Walter r...
~
1946)
£! the Hri tish Empire (Boston: Ginn & C0 ·'
·
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lli two arms£! territorial exproor1at1on.·2 Britain's
military campaigns against her European rivals and her colonization were intimately allied forces and appear to have been
the- two ch"ief agencies of Bri t1sh expansion, even though they
emerged from sonewhat different, sonet1mes eo1nc1dent conbinations ot social forces~

Until 1815, Britain's military cam-

paigns generally appear to have been precipitated by overt acts
of the Crown or 1 t ·s agents, 5 though Parliament through 1 t ·a control of the royal purse sooner or later round itself involved
in all of them.

Colonization. on the other hand, was largely

the result ot private initiative, providing a convenient outlet r ·o r social. demographic, and economic forces bursting their

2 The views expressed in this paragraph are 1nt·e rpretations of data to be found in ·the sources quoted 1mned1ately
above or in the bibliography. In referring to Britain's campaigns ·a gainst the Netherlands, for exam:tile, Bark-er, £E.• £!.!•,
points out that by 1630 " ••• the Netherlands had become the workshop of the world, the traders of the world, end the world's
colonizers and planters." (p. 143)~ By 1634 they " •.• had some
34,850 ships carrying on commerce all over the world." (p. 145).
"The En811sh observed the progress of Dutch commerce with envy."
(p. 509). "The King, the Court 1 the mercantile interests and
the people were eager to attack the Dutch, end, as there was no
just cause, a cause had to be created." {p. 311). The British
began plundering Dutch holdings end attacking Dutch shipping
on the high sees. New Netherlands was captured end the "·. •. Bordeaux fleet was intercepted ••• and 1~0 ships brought into
England and condemned as lawful prizes." {p. 313 ff.). Seeley,
2Q• e1t., points out the successful use of the same tactics
against both the Spanish end the French-~
3 The campaigns in north America ere here viewed as the
reflection or struggles elsewhere.

--

restraints in the "home 1 slands."

B o th agencies,

:!":cweve--

struggling toward their 1nd1 vidual goals rused into

•~

•~

. ,

~

e1~~le

force directed toward t ·he common end or s-Up;J lau t1 t¥: the au thority of Britain's European rivals in Asia end the

~ew ~orl~.

Constancy of m111tarz effort (1553-lBle).

t.er

Dur1r:r-~

initial period of expansion, 1558-1815, ur
u
1 ta1n wes contlcuslly
at war with other European powers.

Th e constancy

o~

tary effort is reflected in the followinR table or

th1~

c111-

full-~cnle

wars. 4
Snei.n

In years, British wars against:

Fr"no·e

g

4~

::!4
~

~

~

49
37

1558-164-9
1650-1763
1764-1815

Hollend

17

l03

29

On tne surface this table suggests that during e perio~ .or

..... .,
•

oJ .

years (1558-1815), from the crowning of Elizabeth I to the Congress of Vienna, Britain (first England end later the United

Kingdom} spent about 30% of her ti:ne involved "in •ers e1:1~1!
territorial, strate-gic, or economic gains.

In thi!! ., ho•ev'!r,

the table is misleading because it does not teke

1r.~o eccc~nt

the sequential rather then simultaneous occurrence o!

4

Condensed from

h

k

e wor s

0 ~~

Tohn

~

s. c.

f

!

;
I

l

sc~e o~

Bri~ge. _o~. _cit ••

and Q,uincy Wright, A Studl, 21, ~, 2 vols. ( Chiest;o:
University of' Chicago Press, 1942).
t

Plt

Tt.e

l

these conflicts, nor does it take into co&s1derat1o~ eueh
belligerent circumstanoes as the never-ending proe-ess or ir::.per1al attrition represented b y permissive piracy under "letters

of marque," certain unavoidable but violent

sea

car:tJle.1en 8

which erupted when maraudi ng Br 1t1 sh fleets encounterej

tho~e

of' -other powers or vice vers.a, end other minor colonial ekirt:lishes which would bring the time percentage up to

so~eth1ng

in

the neighborhood of 85%.
Motives and results ot conti-nuous conflict.

I n p;er.ere_,
,

this continuous conflict was aimed not only et the exrropr1n t1on
of more territories and -the r-emoval ot c-ompeti tore; 1 t ?t-n s e i~e~

or

also at improving the quality and defensibility or the whole

the imperial structure.

Surinam (Dutch Gu.1-ena) , for

e7.ex:::ple

1

a relatively worthless tropical area, was traded to the Dutch tn
exchange ror New _N ethe_rlands which had been recaptured by the

Dutch shortly after the Duke- of York's celebrated raid.

5

Th1e

too often ignored trade cen hardly be considered uni~portent cr
an accident, for it rather conveniently gave tte Br1t1eh un1n-

t .e rrup'ted control of the American coastline :rrom .Caine to Ylor1de •
T-he acqu1si tion of Gibraltar r.as no accident e1 tber.

Jo-hn F1 8 ke The Dutch and ~ueker Colonies 1n ~'"'!:e .ric~ 1
'
V 1 I
-243-t~4
2 vol. (Boston: Houghton-Iar:r11n -c o. , ~ -00) , o
• PP ·
- •
and Vol. II, pp. 1-5, ror the course ot this contro~ersy.
5 Cf

i

Control of

•

Gib-raltar meant strategic adv

t·

an .ages.

21
Though w·rested rro::. the·

Spanish by a combined B-ri t1 sh end Dutch

fleet, it was ft Er1t18~
garrison whic.h occupied 1 t, thus g1 ving Bri tair. c ..... ntrol
v
or r.avel
and merchant traf:t'1c in the Med1 terrane an.
The net .b enef1 ts or
this 1n1 tiel phase or expansion were: 1) the· TYnite"
'l'
....
. . . s. 1n,.: t!oi:l

gained strategic control in the Atlantic Basi~, the ~editerr~-

nean Basin, the Australasian Basin.• and t~l•.. e Chin•o

~>ens--1n

other

words, strategic control of the world's seas, and 2) 1t p~ir.ed
colonial control 1n such -a reas ot the globe as canada, Indie
Burma·, and Malaya. Further , 1 t remove d ~pan,
... 1
FrancP., ar.d

8.

Holla-nd, once and for all, as threats to British colonial ex-

pansion, though 1t did not reQove them as threats to British

power on the "continent."
Expansion

the end

or

~

retreat.

the great surge

or

The Congres-s of Vienna oar ked
the British expansionist movement.

Subsequent to that time the mil1 tary ca:mpa·1 gns of the t"ni ted

Kingdom, except for iso.leted f'lurr1es in Asia end Af.rice, were

primarily defensive and strategic, concerned with the t~o-fcld
p·r ablem.. of stabilizing the "continent" and defending co.lcniel

life-11ne.s.

True, the African campaigns did give Britain sotle

strategic control&, particularly in South and East Afrte~, e~d
•

..

colonization did make ef'fective her control in ~ustralesiP- en~

•j

other areas; but these developments alter very little the teet

f

f

that the United Kingdom has Bpent the major portion cf its

... .,

£..-..

energies from 1815 to the present time locke~

"' in a t1 tente

strategic struggle aimed at consolidating and
imperial gains already made.

preserv1r.g

t~oae

On the one hand the United K1r.g-

dam had continually to be concerned with stab111z1n~ poltttcel
arrangements on the "continent," while on the other it ha~ to
be concerned with the internal stability And nrotectton or col-

This meant a defensive problem or ve~t pro-

onial holdings.

portions because it meant that Britain hed to interfere in
revolutions on the continent and ~ontain as they ecerged the
global amb1 tions or Russia, Germany,. Italy, end Japr1n. Bri te1n

had not only to anticipate these problems, she had to cont~in
their eff·e cts else control in her .colonial areas mipht be di:e-

rupted.

The one depended upon the other and vice

ver~a;

they

were part and parc·el of' an over-sll defen·s i ve problem. 6
Geographi-c b-asis of Br1 tish strategy.

This adoption of

a de-fensive posture was en end result o.f problems inherent 1n

the broad, indiscriminate geographic structure of tte existing
empire.

Britain needed time to develop end consolidate colonial

admin1stret1on in those territories acquired previous to 1815.
Naval and merchant communications· had to be developed ar.d pro-

te·c ted.

Such needs placed the enp1re in e prime-rily defensive

situation.

Campaigns resulting 1.n acquisition entereC: er·ter

u
t er ma n , -td
A centur~ or
Gooch and J ~- H. B. ~.las
1"'1 'end
-· • • .
'
d
• Allen and Unwin L • ·• ~ 1
Br1 tis-h Fo·r eign Pol1cz .(Lor; on. . ,.,. .
e 1878 _1919 tor e more

6 C'f

G

B

G. B. Gooch, A Histor;x: £f. ~od-ern .tt.~ur 0 P ,
complete account of these struggles.
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1815~

the Boer War, for exa~ple; were generAlly the unwAnted

fruit of the overt acts or private cit1zen&j official br1t~1n
)

appeared desirous or avoiding them et all costs.
consolidation were the o:ft'1c1el concerns.

neranse

8 nd

E:xpans.1 on w~s ur:.dor-

taken only- for strategic or economic reesons end only U :..en uncter

i
'

progress! vely more limited political instruments.

I

I

~

Focusing ~ geographic problem.

Concern witt defer.zse

rises principally from the distribution of the sub_ject lnnds

of- the empire.

The United Kingdom is not contiguouo to the

lands it administers.

i

!
,

Lying just off the Europe en lend

~~ss.

it is separated :rrom 1 ts subject areas by oceans, cocpe t. 1n~

I

;

'f

The t ·erri tories 1 t a<!:w1n1 ste r~,

powers, and hostile oul tures.

unlike the .s ubject a-reas of a Rome, Persepolis _, or other 1:nper1al center o~ the past, are exclaves, 7 Areas tar recoYe~

from end in no way abutting its national borders.

This 18 e

factor of' profound strat·eg1o importance·
Cornparati ve geograp h ·1 c d1:str1but1on of _en encipnt
The subj~ct lends of the Ro~en
imperium. and ~modern empire.
:;

'

ly the prOViLCe Cf tte
7 The term exclave, more p~o~~rem hasize the ele=ent of
_p olitical geographer, is her~ ~~~al unit~.._ W1 th tt.e e-x-ception
interru,pted geography and po
the subject land of mod-err. e~
of recent Russian acquisitio~s,the vicinity or their s~1n1stre
p1res are not even remotelY n
and antagon1st1c cultural
t ·ive centers. Oceans, hostile pow~r~heir adlainistretive cecter,
patterns inte_rvene between them a;~s of 1 ts 11:1perial s t ·ruct'l:.re •
even though they are integral P

1

Imperium.,

8

for instance, wer-e one continuous geog_r~;>h1c mas:5

radiating out from the impe.r .ial center at Rome.
Mediterranean provided one

or

Though the

its principal avenues

or

co~

municetion, this imperium could be traversed without once
crossing truly a lien terri tory or open water, .b ot·h exposed
areas in routes of communication and defense;· they are decided
strategic problems.

Rome's land mass was radial and her rule

uninterrupted to its perimeters.

Her military end adminis-

trative supply routes were primarily land routes and her supply
lines relatively short and unexposed.

An enemy movin g 1nw<Jrd

from her perimeter was presented with a progressively more
stubborn. d·e f'ense.

The further in he moved the more clos·ely

did he approach the thickly populated centers where great.er

defensive forces could be brought to bear against him end more
defensive measures be taken.

Obviously, Rome was predo~1n

antly a land power; hence, her naval needs were minimal An~
s 9
·
·
h er expose d areas on 1 y a.t h er Perimeter

The Br1 tish em ~ 1re.

8 Rome is here used as a prototype. Whet is said or
Rome is in general true of most of the ancient imperiums.
Sir Halford J. Maokinder, Democratic Ideel.s ~
c
1919) chs 3 ·a nd
"'or
Reality (New York: Henry Holt &. 0 • 'A l!ackinde; 11rotlY oba fuller expos1 tion of this the~ sci th: !.Iediterra:ne.en. Enemies
serves, Roman land power ou tfla e
, ·terms
Her rsdie 1 cess
were tree to attack, but only on Rome 8 inwa;d !rom. the thinly
lef·t but one recourse for attack • m~vi~gof production end popu6
garrisoned perimet·e r toward theddcei~i 0 ~ 81 inward mile cost the
8
lation. The wresting of each
upolY lines shortened
attacker progressively more dearly; Roman o~ld~ be brough:t to
while his lengt.hene_d and grea-ter ri~rc~~I:l~ had sppa·r ently dis-inbear against him. It was onlYt 8
~ the marauding designs
tegra ted from w1 thin that she e 11· · 0
of her enemi.e s, t ·h e barbarians •
9 Ct'

.......;•

4
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however, can hardly be said· to be so fortunately

arranged.
Even the most superficial appraisal of global geography ser~es

to render this glaringly evident.

Its exposed areas lie be-

tween ita tiny administrative center, the United Kingdom, end
f
f

the great mas·ses which ere 1 ts subject territories.

J

!

Origins. ~ Bri tatn ·•s imperial di-stribution.

Basically.

-this distribution stems from two sources: 1) the fact that the
United Ki"ngdom is composed of islands, end 2} that the lends

opene-d by the "Age of Exploration and Discovery" were accessible only by maritime routes.

Britain~ because it is separated

from the European mainland and dependent upon the surrounding
seas tor much or its diet, early developed a strong naval tredit1cn and the crafts and skills necessary for the· building and

maintenance o:r a strong naval fleet.

The sea also served the

Rri tish islands as a de1"ens1.ve bastion, protecting t ·hem from
would-be conquerors on the European mainland.

Not since William

the Conqueror ( 1066 A.D.) have they been successfully inveded.lJ
10 The 1 deas synthesized in thi.s paragraph and several
those f"ollowing are tor most part adaoted from t .he works of
Sir Halford J. Meckinder, oo. cit., and Britain and the Er1t1sh
Seas (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 1906, partiCularly t
chap. 1; and c. B. Fawcett, A Political Geography£!~ Britis 1
Empire (Boston: Ginn&. c·o .' !933) ., particularly chapters B, 9 t
end 10. All three works deal with geopolitical significance of
Britain's unioue geographic position, and all find it important.
Neither· Mackinder nor Fawcett, however, attach to it quite
the wide signirieanee that it is given here. Both seem to c~n
sider naval power end geographic advantage as sone.thing ax~r ted
from resources and technology upon which their use is pre ca
•

or

26

This nearly impregnable is-lend pos1 t1on 1s one of the greatest strengths

or

the ea-rly empire, but it is also, because

of certain complicating rectors, one of its principal weakj

j

J ~
:. ·I

f:

l

nesses in modern times.

However this may be, the daT.n

or

i

I
.I

. J

·t .

I
I

Britain's imperial surge in the century following the Columbian
voyages was coincident with the full emergence of navel power
as the primary weapon or international warfare.

Access to the

newly discovered lands and defense of them was predicated upon
the development of na·val power.

England possessed the re-

sources r-equisite to this end .and employed them to the optimum.
The fact that her insu1-a ri ty outflanked the naval ambitions
of the European mainland merely served to strengthen her position; her real advantage lay in her technology and resources.
Technological advantage combined with insularity helped her
rid the seas ot the Spanish Armada (.1588) and freed .her of
the last serious threat of invasion from the c-ontinent

unt1.1

modern times when she had lost much of her technological
advantage. 11 Defeat of the Armada in the closing years of the
sixteenth century, however, had left her free to employ her

mushrooming naval power to the expropriation end development
or the ·newly discovered colonial are-as.

r

!

11 It is worthy of note here that, aside from this
Spanish f'ailure, not since 1066 A.D. ha·s eny continental power
seriouslY considered the invasion of Britain and attempted to
carry 1 t out.
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The British pattern or strategic geographz.

As Britain

expanded, s-he developed_ a pattern of consistently inclu-ding in
the holdings she acquired su-c h strategically valuable locations
as islands, capes, and port sites for development into naval
strongholds or bases.

Those acquired in the Vfest Indies _, ror

example, served both to outflank Spanish holdings ·tn South

America end to protect English colonies in North America.
Singapore, Gibraltar, and the Cape of Good Hope ere other ex-

amples._ The potentially weak line any given one of them might

one day represent was of ·no importance so long as British fleets
could be built to control the exposed ocean supply route-s .
I

Ij
I

I
!

.I

As

long as British navel power reigned supreme, there would be no
threat of invasion hanging over these strongholds.

Wherever

the British have colonized, this defensive pattern has been followed, end it appears to have erisen from the average Britisher's
awareness or the peculiarly fo_rtui tous s ·trategic value ot hishomel_a nd' s insularity • 12

For defense purposes, he has attempted

to reproduce this- advantage wh_e rever he has expanded about the

gl-obe.

12 Cf.the well-known writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
This is oneot the principal threads which ho-l ds together his
rambling dissertations on the role ot British see power in
modern history; .!.:.!.·, The Influence £! ~ Power Upon His-to_ry
1600-1783 {Boston: Litt!e, Brown, and c~., 191?), PP• 29-35.

~"Achilles Heel" ~British strateg;r.

By 1781,

however, the nexus of a startling weakness in the British de:tensive deployment appears to have lain expo.sed to her r1 vals ,
even though the overwhelming nat.ure o·t- con temporary Bri tleh
sea power barred any of them :rrom taking advantage of the
knowledge at that t1me. 13 The progress of the war in America

had focused attention on this weakne·ss, ror it had impressed
upon the world-at-large the tact that the totalized social,

political, e-c onomic, indust·r ial, and demographic potential
at the immediate eonmand of the United Kingdom could r.ot sup-

port the logis·t ·t.cal ef'f'ort necessa·r y to the successful conclusion of

large-soa~e

land invasions at Britein's naval peri-

meters, even though her "Union Jac.k" might lord 1 t over th·e

seas.

This was in part a geographic problem and in pert a

result ot the f'aot that Western oiv111zat1on had not yet

d-e veloped the resources, arts, and machinery necessary tor
1mplementt·ng t:he technique of full-s·cale sea-borne inv-a sicns
by combir.ed m111 t ·e .ry forces • 14

13

cr.

It was also in part

8

result

immediatelY below and pp. 26!., 102f.,

14 The United States appears to be the only net1on ·in
d ~ the industrial and mineral remodern history po_s sesse _o kind of m111 tary development ., and
sources necessary for this
ly fifteen short years ago.
she arrived at its realizat 1 on on

l
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or what can only be calle-d- Britain's happenstance practice o-r
discouraging the development of manufacturing industries 1n
.her colonial areas.

Though deliberate, this neglect of colonial

industrial deve~opmen t appears to be one of those courses which
arise from circumstanne rather than malice.

Mercantili-sm ·the
t

prevailing economic philosophy at the dawn -of British expansion,
encouraged the development -of manufactures and r1n1sh1ng industries at home and the sea-r ch for resources abr-o ad.

Concen-

tration upon internal industrial development had little effect
upon the empire during its formative years, but in later years
it meant that the manuractures upon which Brittsh military
might depend were separated from the raw resources which went
into them.

As the complexity of the "imperial structure increased,

so did the weight ot this factor, particularly in military planning.

Military authorities. became more and more aware of the

fact that any power that could suo.cessfully delay -external resourc.es- from a-rriving at the factories in the United Kingdom
would have the who 1 e imperial structure in a de-f ensive quandary.
Britain's awareness of her strategic weakness.

British

military conduct since 1781 lends substance to this argument.Only -onoe (the abortive conflict. with the

u.s.

in 1812) in the

period from the end of the American Revolution until World I
did the British., warrins alone, conmi t to battle against
civilized societ.ies on foreign shores tull .. scale land armies

30

unless they had land bas&s contiguous to the areas they were
1nvad1ng. 15

At these bases Dritish for-ces could build up

v.a st material sup_ply bet'ore contacting en enemy.

8

Even against

relatively primitive and retarded states. the same rule was followed, e.g. • the oempa·igns in India, South Afric.a _, and the·
Sudan.
The strategie-logistical-taoticel function
graphic matrix;
tegic planner.

the eentrel

~ographio

or· the

geo-

---

problem of the stra-

The reasoning underlying this coordinated

military .concept appears obvious and sound.

After all, by

1815 imperial administrators were confronted with the enormous
problem of insuring the protection

o~

some 80,000 miles of ex-

posed ocean supply routes lying between manufacturing industries
in the United Kingdom end the resource centers and markets 1n
the subject territories of the empire.

16

In a context of com-

peting world powers, this has never been a small problem.

Britain's rivals have. never quite given up.

They hav·e h-arrassed

British authority wherever and whenever possible..

They have

15 Such c.ampaigns as that in the Crimea are here excluded.
This rather puzzling conflict wa·s undertaken in alliance with
France. British planners we.re willing to negotiate an end to
this conflict as soon as Napoleon III made obvious his w~n1ng
interest, even though sevastopol had already fallen. Britain's
only .g ain appears to have been a dela.y 1·n Russian naval development.
16 Cf. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order
of Sea Power, (Princeton: The Uni ver.si ty Press, 1943"'J: "Ch.
and"2'"""for a more detailed examination of British navel strategy.

r
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been only too aware or the Uni-ted Kingdom's del_icate grip
upon the empire.

They have been quite well aware or the log-1s-

t .ical weakness inherent in the separation of ra.w resources
and manufacturing industries • and they have a-lso been aware

ot suah ot-h er f'a c tors, yet to be considered , as the 11:n1 t 6
ot naval power (a tactical weakness) and the dependence or
the United .Kingdom upon outside sources for the bulk or ita
food.

As long as her major holdings have remained quiescent,

Britain has found manageable the d11"t1cult1-es inherent 1n

these conditions.

Tractable colonial relations have lett her

free to deploy: her naval for:ces so as to pro·tect her colonial
resources and :fend off her rivals, -b ut revolt in major colonie-s
--indigenous or instigated by foreign rivals--or the invasion
of a large, new terri to-ry has at times radically altered
Britain's control o:r her strategic situation.

Major segments

of the fleet have had t ·o be l-ocalized to c-ontrol supply ·r outes
to a given invasion point.

This has tended to expose- both

colonies -a nd undeveloped clatms to competitors ever hovering
in the background waiting for the opportunity to pounce.
Revolts have allowed Britain's colonists and rivals, or her

rivals alone, to combine against .her at her most vulnerable
paints as happe-n ed in the case of the revel t in the .American
colonies.

The tardiness

or

t-he- British fleet at Yorktown and

such viotori.e s as were e-n joyed by America's puny and infant
naval forces were the fruits ot a strategic deployment which
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saw the British navy spread over Asian , ~·edit
..._
erranee.n, Korth
Atlantic, and West Indian waters.

From this tactical st~le-

m.ate and from the War of' 1812, Br1 ta1n learned that she could
use her t'le·et to protect her colonial developments or to tend
ot'f' her competitors. but that she could not dtatribu te 1 t

as to successfully war with both at the same time.

80

She

observed also that the problem was doubly co~plicsted by the
s1.ze and speed of available transport, the stab111 ty

or· the

continent, end the location or her raw re.so.urces and mBnu-

facturing industries.

By 1815 Britain was well awa.re of the

fact that neither she nor any other major power at that

ti~e

possessed the resources ne-cessary for the control of her vest
domain under any other than non-belligerent circunstances
unless her major colonies chose voluntarily to

rule as she wished to impose.
The compromis·ing ~·

sub~it

to such

1?

British statesmen he ve et all

times since the American revolt realistically appraised these

conditions laid down by the geography of the vast world sees
and thereby have controlled their more disrupting tendenc 1es ·
The somewhat vulnerable sea life-line has contributed to
British willingness to compromise intra-imperial problems
and has helped along w1 th other rae tors yet to be discussed

1? Cf. pp. 120-194.

I

I

to produce the present distribution or ? r1t1sh

hold!:: ..:s.

'!'!':.1s

select distribution has not al~ays been

. r
so, or, 631de fro= e
few strategic strongholds, no _pe.r·ticu~ar planning te evidenced
in Britain's patterns

or territoria-l acquisition.

~::.~1 j

The

o.r 1 t y ·

of territories acquired appear to have been taken as a catter of

Their acquisition ·was a .i:ned at 11 eakeni.n~

expediency.

petltor by stripping his holdings or
cial or strategic r .ival.
development
.!
J

J
I

J

removin~ hi~

85

..

8

co!'lco ;-..: ;~

r-

Colonization, the real key to the

or

these acqu.1 red terri tortes, a p pears to ·hnve been
something or an accidental de.velopment • 18 By 1815 the rnther

will-nilly character or British expansion hAd resulted 1n

~

loose, somewhat disorganized emyire whose member parts were

strewn indiscriminately over the face of the eRrth.

I

11

Sone

attempts had already been made to consolidate their administration, but most of the consolidation has taken place slnoe
1815.

Units unwieldy or .recalc1 trant in one wa:r cr o.nother

have had to be pac1ried, controlled, stabilized, or CAst l oose.
All administrative arrangements made have had to co~ply with
the fundamental verities
economic. situation.

or

the British strategic end socio-

They had also to be predicated upon cer-

tain material and c.ul tural t'actors whose sum totnl 8 ct ing
reat degree underlies both
upon this strategic situation to a g
These oater1el ecd cultbe rise and decline of British power.
or the following d1scuss1on.
tural f'actors are the substance
18

.2.!•

.PP. 44-49.

l

CHAPI'ER III
SELECTED so-c iOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC , DEMOGRAPHIC,

POLITI-CAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE

RISE AND DECLINE OF THE BRITISH :E:l!PIRE
I •

CRUCIAL ELEMEN:rs IN THE RISE OF 'l'HE BRITISH ID!PIRE
At the outset, this s-tudy grants to the English their

somewhat obvious imperial ambition, though the point at which
1 t appeared and the degr-e e of' deliberateness involv-ed in 1 ts
appearance may -be open to some question.

The disputability or

these matt.ers rises largely :from how one views the particular
influence o:f several insensibly blending and interrelated historical trends.

The first

o~

these is the growth and matur-

ation o'f industrialization in Engla-nd.
of the Columbian discoveries.

The sec·ond is the new-s

The third results from the in-

flue-n ce o'f industrialization and the Columbian discoveries
combined w1 th Spanish threats to the soverei-gnty of the Br1 tish
home islands.

The fourth is the effect of British naval

successes a gainst Spain and other .imperial competitors.

And

the fifth trend rises rron the particular courses and atti tude·a
o'f essentially antagonistic social groups acting upoL the
opportunities presented or stimulated by the effects of t -he
other four.
~ growth

.2!

industrialization. The industrialization

of England appears to have begun with the maturation of the

domestic system during th

35

e period or the Hundred Yeer'e Wer

( 1347-1453). Toward the cl ose

or this

industrialization appear to have been
ot the factory system.l

per-iod the seeds or

germ1na t -ed 1n the birth

Together, these developcents bred er.d

stimulated the acceleration or the ftinclosure" movements
encouraged the growth 0 ~ towns and cities, end 1ntroJucec1
first symptoms of the e ven t ua1 decline of agrarian

the

cer.~ers.

Manufacturing stimulated the development o-r re~uler prectiees

and c-h annels of trad.e, solidified the mone.y--ag-e ays tem • and
n

conditioned the emergence of mercantilism as the dominant
economic philosophy.

Mercantilism in turn encourap,ed the

search tor and development of new markets overseas, thus stlmulating naval development.
I

!i

J

Mercantilism,
threat.

~

Columbian discoveries, an::! ~ SnP.nts·h

Continental markets appear to have been developed first;

1 The view presented here is in esreernent ~ith thet proposed by Lewis -Mumford, Technics and Civilization (1;e':t' York:
Harcourt, Brace, & Co., l934). I t l s l.!u."':lford's view in this
definitive treatise that factory system and industrial revolution ere synonymous teres and that the movement cocmonly
referred to as the "industrial revoluticn" is really., oore
accurately speaking, a technologi-cal revolution. It 1e !~urord 's
view tha-t - industrialization began with the ~erge-nce o~ t:-.e
racto-.ry system which introduc-ed the u-s e o: cechanicel power
and the specialization or manufacturing or proa~ct1ve functions. Special.izat1on or :runction was part and parcel o~ tt:.e
development of timed operational production and st1~ulated
the gradual substitution of machine work tor hand labor. The
technological revolution began w1 th the me-chenic~l 1n7e~t1cns
which increased the use of mechanical power, advanced specialization of function, and almost completely eliminated r.end
production.

35
t following thei·r

saturation, the facts or the c·o lumbian

discoveries, and the emergence and quell.ing of the Spanish
threat, the search for new markets and resources reinforced
by

the emerging mercantilist philosophy was eredually channelled

int~

the development of the new areas as both markets end

sourced for raw mater1als. 2

As the age of exploration and

discovery "following t ·h e Columbian voyages .had matured ( 14921600), English naval power had rapidly expanded in response
to several stimuli:

1) the dawn of English nationalism, dom-

estic advanc·es in production, and the emergen-ce with them of
mercantilist yearnings;

.2) Spain's jealousy toward growing

English sea power and her threats to English sovereignty; -a nd
!3) the emergence at some point along the line in the. quelling
of the Spanish threa-t of official and popular desires to share

in the wealth that Spain and Portugal were looting trom their
impe-rta·l enterpri-s es, the first real symptom of a burgeoning
imperial .ambition.

These factors led to the building

or

publicly and privately financed naval craft, the ma jori.ty being

indiVidually owned .a nd financ-ed "privateers" to be used secretly under the Royal Seal to loot Spanish argosies the world

2 cr-. Johns. c. Bridge, :9..1!.· cit., Chaps. 1, 2;· or
John Seeley,~· cit.;· or the somewhat d1fterent views in
•
;r. R. Green, A. Short History £!: lli Engli.sh People (New York.

Harper

& Bros7, 18?9), pp. 251-278.
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This program proved very effective; ror, by 1588, ebout

over.

one century after its inauguration, it had succeeded in creat-

ing a naval force capable of crippling Spanish sea power and

plundering the Spanish empire at will.

The det·e at of' the

Spanish invasion f'leet, the "Invincible Armada," in 158"8, not

only removed the threat of invasion from English shores, but
it so seriously weakened Spain's grip upon her empire that it

opened up the newly discovered lands· to the inroads of other

powers.3
Grou,p

antagonisms~

imnerial ambttion. It is at this

point,. the scramble ror ·c olonial "footholds which followed the
defeat of the Armada, that British imperial ambition oomes to

fruition, and it is precisely at this point that its real
direction end meaning become lost in the aims of essentially
antagonistic social groups, each striving toward its separate
goale.

Parliament, a somewhat non-representative body, mer-

cantilistic. in orientation, the Crown, guardian ot hereditary

interests and prerogatives, and the "common citizens," struggling toward pluralism in government are the groups or their
Acting upon the situation left by ~he defeat of the

roci.4

3 Cf. Green,~· cit., pp. 396-421, or Ramsay Muir,
A Short History of the BXltish Commonwealth (New York:
Houghton, Mifflin-Co., 1935}, Vol. 1, pp. 370-384, 525-541.

4

c·r .

group roles.

infra, pp. 38-42, for a discussicn of these
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Armada, their competition appears to have created certain
developmental rorces which .had a common meeting ground in some
att·i tude toward the development or the newly dl s·covered lands

Each in 1 t ·s cone-entre tion u.por~ the aug ..

or their resources.

menting or its own particular interest in the new lands appears
to form one or· the interlocking and coincidentally struggling
elements or a movement identifiable as a dri v·e toward empire.
In truth, it would appear that the social forces of no other
naticn have ever worked more assiduously toward the construction of a political hegemony, even though each might be
ing toward a separate goal in t ·h e process.

By

striv~

the same token,

it would appear, the social forces of no other nation have
I

ever more seriously, if not blindly, s-et about the business

j

or

making it impossible to finish what it had set out to accomplish,
the construction

or

a political hegemony.

Contradictions~~

British empire:

~

patterns of construction

stat.e ment

~ ~

problem.

of~

A sensible

explanation. or this contradiction leads this study into an
examination

o~

the internal pressures behind English colonial

expanston, a·n analysis of the role of exte-r nal interferences
rising from diplomatic relations with competitors, a summation

ot the fundamen·tal attitudes and cultural patterns· of colonists
(whether English nationals or absorbed by conquest or other
means), and a briefing or the constantly changing matertal

and strategic aspects

or

the

certain geopol1 tical aspe-cts

British colonial s1tu~t1on.

or

British acquisitions have
ready been discussed, the next logical
step would ap~eer to
be -a n examination o:r the pressures_, internal end exte-rnal
I

end.

the patterns characteristi-c o-r British expans 1on.
I.I.

PRESSURES AND PATTERNS UNDERLYING COLONIZATION

Opening
the colonial a""rea s.
_
_

1or
1
.... ave

power • as t:'llreedy

discussed, wss the chief' agent in opening th-e newly discovered-

areas to .British colonization. Its role, however • contrary to
Mahan and others, 5 is not to be misunderstood. N-avAl power, in

fact, had only a limited versatility.

Though 1~ could open up

the new lands t _o Bri t1 sh designs, 1 t could not develop them e-nd
could only partially protect t -h ee..

5

To say that English interests

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influe_nce of Sea Po-we.r rt)n
Histort, Hi00-1783 (New Yo-r k .: ""Little, Br-own~ena-co., 19
1
pp. 1- 0, 25-90, propounds his strategic concepts. Sailor that
he is, he appears to overemphasize the ~alue of see power because he 'fails to consider the t 1) the ef fe c ti v ene s s of s-ea
power diminishes in proportion to its localization in defense
of land operations; 2) that it diminishes in proportion to just
how much Of its raw materials are separated from its ship·
building centers; 3) that it is not tt.e effective agent ot
colonization, only one of 1 ts de·f -e nses; an_d that 4) granted the
rest, its effectiveness in stretegic terms cen be m1n1rn1zed
by the designs of other powers, especially when it is ~lready
committed to some major defensive operation. The first conplicated by distance, and the second, progressively more pr~
naunced, are two of Britain's principal strategic weaknesses.
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were immediately aware ot this fact, however, is grossly to
misrepresent the case.

Awareness dawned gradually, and com-

bined with certain other facets end facts or contemporary
English li:f'·e 1 t oondi tioned the devel·o pment of "pr1 va te coloniz-ation" as the -c hief mechanism of Br-1 tieh expansion.
Bri t1sh colonization .! pattern .conditioned
ical matrix.

.£l

~

histor-

In the a.ssertion of claims which had followed

the defeat of the Arme da·, England, now the o verwhe lm1 ng sea
power, had the initial advantage, but official circules appear
to have been puzzled about just what to do at th.is stage of
expansion.

Parliament appears to have been little concerned

with the opportunities presented by the defeat of the Armada,
while the Crown's involvement was somewhat hapoenstance, being
stimulated by the visionary designs .of pri vet.e ci ti?ens.

Such

orficial policy as did come into being developed gradually.
The eventual resolution of the colonial problem had been suggested ~revious to the defeat of the Armada.

Before that time

there had been Raleigh and Gilbert's two unsuccessful attempts
at crolonizing 1n the New World.

Though official sanction had

been given these ventures J they had been privately :financed
and had literallY to be badgered out of an at first recalcitrant crown.

Raleigh, after ell, had visions of a new and

greater Engla·nd rounded upon private colonization, an England
in which colonists would be left pretty much to governing
themselves and would enjoY the same pr·i vi leges as citizens in
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in the home islands; in ract~ as Ralei€~ would tave it, they
v'>'ould enjoy

tar more..

Obviously, this visionary .dreec co u!.C.

not have been too palatable to the absolute prero£at 1 ve.s or
monarchy; but, since no other means could be found to establish

the foo.tholds in the New ·.7orld a-p parently desir·ed by the Crown,
permission was reluctantly granted.

Though these attempts· at

colonization tailed, they appear to have set a precedent teken
up some years later in suc-cessful inroads into t ·he Eew World

1

and they also appear to have developed in the Crown a desire
and a plan about just how the c·r own could restructure 1 ts waning absolutism and ·authority through colonies in the Ar:.:ericfls

and elsewhere.

The Crown's legal p.olicy developed gradually.

Following the first colonial failures and the defeat of the
Armada there appears to have been a lull of two decades in
British attempts at colonization.

Bath

Parli~ent

and Crown

seem to have had no set policy about whet could ·b e done w! th

British opportunities in the now open areas in

~sla

and the

New World, but the continued insistence of pri ve·t .e petitioners appears to have provided them with a solution they would
one day regret.

Based upon the precedent set by the Baleif',h

affair, the parade of Royal Colonial Charters began with those
granted the East India Company in 1601 and the We.~t Indio

Company in 160?. 6
6 Cf'. Ric-hard .H akluyt, Princ~Ja 1 1~a vigatlons, 12 v~ls.
(Glasgow:][akluyt Society, 1903-190o , Vol. B, p.l? f. ~ 0 8
copy of the Letters Patent to Sir Hun~~fe~ Gi~~;r!'c~~de~sat1on
Stephenson and March am, op. cit· • P •
·1
o:f the Charter to the East India Coo?any ·

i
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J

Nexus ~ Eressures behind English co·loni zet1on.

(

A n\.;.::1.-

ber ot !'actors appear to have conspired to br"ing to pass this
particular solution or the prdblen or what ~0 do with the lands

now available for ex_propriation rrom Spanish claim, but each is
one way or another related to the aims or competing social
forces or institutions in the hOI!le islands.

Among the tActc.rs

of greatest influence were the limited versatility

or

naval

power, trou.b les between Cr.own and Parliemen t, the -sources -and
solvency of the Royal Treasury, d1srupt1 ve soc·ial forces seeth-

lng under the s-u rrace or English life, and expending industry's
need for new and vaster trade outlets.

Examining the points

ot orientation of England's three great social forces sheds
same light on just how they were effective.

Factors influencing

£!

~

lands.

~

royal

~

to ·R 9rd

!!:!!

dev~lop:tent

The Crown had to take many factors tnto eccount.

Naval power obviously had 1 ts limits.

"Though 1 t might fend ort

rivals from the new areas, it would be hard put to do anything
more than establish forts as colonies, forts which would put en
additional burden on a nea-rly insolvent Royal Treasury.

l.;avsl

colonies would expend monies rrom the treasury rather than
increase its revenue.

on

the

ot~er hand,

the particular solu-

tion of:fered by pr·ivate pet1 tioners might promote a substBntial
increase in the Royal Revenue _, since the chief fount or the
royal purs·e independent o-r Parl.iament was reeeipts· froo cue tom's,

re-ceipts which might be tremendously expended under the proposed

c1t1zen-financ~d

and controlled program o-r development.

Royal grants could also be used t o r e d eem certain
financial obligations:

o~

the rcy!l

e • g ., the P ennsy 1 venia grant; thereby

improving the fiscal position of the Crown.

Adc1n1strst!ve

pos1 tions which would a-rise as these areas were developed.
could be used to reward deserving subjects; the staffing or
administrative units would open up a host

o~

new government

sinecures for dis tri but·ion, particularly e.nong the c m:L."tloner
sons

or

aristocrats or those aristocrats whose families h6d

long since s-quandered the family -estates.

Last but not leRst,

these lands could be used to rid England of some o~ its more

rabid religious and political dissenters.

All these sdvants~es

would bolster the tenure of the Crown and increase its ef~eot1veness against Parliamentary inroads into its authority.
Parliament•s

!!!! ££

colonization.

Parliament's view

of the opportunities inherent in colonization was one of e-lmost
complete ne-glect at this stage of expan-sion.

Aside from e.

somewhat intermittent interest in Nevi.g ation Acts, the Puritan
Interre.gnum excepted, Parliament pref-erred to let the direction
or legal precedent take its course until the middle of the

-e .ighteenth -century.

8

This was _probably because Parlienent ' t ry was the problem
paramount concern during the seventeenth cen u
the crown. ~here
of wresting internal political contra 1 f ron
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was also the not too a-pparent in:rluence inherent in the t'sct
j
I

!

j

that the interests of individual members or Parliament were
pretty much identified with those of

~eroantile

and other

citizen groups involved in the expansionist movenent.
Commoner~·

Crown

£a

colonization.

Ordinary c1t17.ens,

however, viewed the new opportunities with a somewhat different eye.

Merchant interest viewed them as a potentially

v~st

new market end source or raw materials. even though the Crown
might have its eye on customs receipts and naval strategy.
Religious and political dissenters viewed them as a sate heven,

while the Cro-wn a·nd Parliament viewed them afl a place hapJ1ly
available for the banishment of troublesome elements.
citizens envisioned in the new lands the possibility or
free of many

or

Other
A

life

the social, po-litical, end economic restric-

tions to be round at home, though they would find that,

administration being the problem it is, they had borrowed but

a t ·emporary respite.

Almost all alike saw the possib111 ty or

acquiring land and propertY o~ their own, en eventuality al-

most impossible at home.

This lure appegrs to have been partie-

':""'""Oners who had been displaced
ularlY strong among tho-se Co ~~
by the enclosure £t commons (es oppo&ed to the enclosure of
7
wastelands which appears to have displaced no one).
in G Talbot Griffith, Ponuletion
• d
Ca~bridge Unlversity
Problems of~~£! Malth~I (ionl~n~he discussion ot the work
?ress, 1926), p. 170 t., par cu ar
of Professors Slater and aonner .•
?

cr.

the discussion
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They viewed the new lands, particularly those in North Americ·e..
if they could f"ind the means to get to them, as places in
which a true "son o·:r the soil" could acquire land of his own
from which to eke an honest ~
~~n•s 11vi.ng.a These and many
other commoners· would, if necessary, contract themselv.ea into
years or bonded serv.i tude merely to pay their passage cos.ts.
J

Here the Crown was somewhat in accord with popular desire-s .
Since 1t also desired the development of the new lands, it
the possibility

or

acquiring one•s own land proved a lure to

the potential colonist, s.o be it.

This the Crown view.e d as

8 The true force of the enclosures and the attendant
lure o.f free l ·and are rather difficult to assess with any substantial accuracy, certain contradictory facts having to be
take.n int·o account. On the one hand, it is comnon knowledge
that 1 t was rathe·r d1f ficul t, if not impossible, for the average commoner to acquire land once the enclosures had begun.
·H a.ll and Albion,££· ·c it., p. 480 tt., end Wi.lhelm Dibelius,
Englan·d (London: .Jonathan Cape) !1!· give conflicting accounts
of the number of English landholders in the 17th century, but
a fair estimate is that in 1688 there were 1?~,000 landholders
in England in a population of 5,000,000. By 1784, ther.e were
1,000,000 in a population which had mushroomed to 23,000,000.
Even more surprising is the fact that in that same year, 1784,
250,000 ci.t1zens owned nine-tenths of' the land, while 4,200
of that number owned half or it. Griffith, ££• ~., pp. 1701?9, on the other hand, shows that despite tne periodic acceleration of enclosures in the period from 1450-1845 the number
of families making their living from the· soil continued to
1ncreas.e from t ·he time the enclosures began. Only after 1845
does the agrarian base of England begin to reveal a decline
in the number or .families involve-d and a truly significant
decline as the principal source of British 1ncone. These facts
obviously contradict one another, so the reader will have to
assess to eaeh his own particular estimate of its importance.

I
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certainlymore to its advantage than the actions of that
group 1t had bred by its own writs in the struggle against
Spain, a lawless tribe who.• bowing to adventure's " siren call , "
often contused their curiosity about exotic la-nds

w1 th

the

right to "freeboot."
The seeds 2£ emoire.

No more motley a group of social

forces was ev·er more eager to act u_pon the possibil1 ties inherent in a global situation.

Each was eager and desirous to

develop in a menner of its own c·hoosing certain of t ·he ne" lands
or commercial poss1bil1 ties end resources.

For·ce and direction

was needed to weld them together, else they should endlessly
work a·t cross-purposes.

This rorce and direction, though not

too readi.ly discernible, appears to have originated from
citizen groups guided. by the Crown and was finally conmandeered
by Parliament.

It was the Crown that worked out the charter

system which gave direction to the grow.ing ·internal drive ror
expansion and unintentionally laid down one of the bases of
future legalistic and revolutionary conflict.

It was also the

crown that reserv.e d to itself--apparently deli·ber·ately! --certain preroga.ti ves that would sooner or lat-er lead to attempts

to centralize the political administration of colonial areas
and thus form a world empire.

Here the Crown was apparently

quite successfully attempting to use the energies of others
to accomplish 1 ts own purposes:

the fend.ing-off of PerliamenThe

tary inroads end the bolstering of its fiseal position.
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or

Crown's control of the charter &ystem is the focal point

the imperial ·ambition which burst· upon the world or the sev~n

teenth century.
Constructing a political hegemony.

Once given direction

1mper1 al amb 1 tion held f'ull sway, but regard 1 e s s

0

r wh1 c·h dire e-

tion it took 1 t was the Royal Seal ·which directed 1 t, implemented it, and gave 1t legal status.

military conflict or piracy
of other powers.

ai~ed

The direction might be

at checking the expansion

It misht be the chartering or a particular

trading group which desired to ga1·n exclusive control
given ·market. ar·e a.

or

Or it might likely be the desire or

8
8

given

social group to gain excl-usive control of land for· coloni.zing
purposes.

Regardless of what direction it was, the group con-

cerned was without authority to act until chartered by Royal
Writ.

The Royal Seal was used in all cases both to fo.cus and

satisfy the desires of' England's thre·e great socio-pol1 tieal

forces:

Crown, Parliament, and the common citizen or citizen-

trader-colonist.

Though the point of view

o~ each group might

stem from different premises, e-sch conve.rged at the collll!lon goal
of imperial expansion because each needed the fruits of expan-

sion to accomplish its particular ends.

Only the Crown was

aware of the tact that· 1 t had preempte-d the author! ty to direct
the impatient tmperial forces, but as awareness grew the
•o coalesce into e single force
citizen groups involved ten d e d ~

4.9

because they built up a desire to keep governmental interference, whether from Crown or Parliament, at a minimum.

This

development, however, is somewhat ahead or the story.

The real

point at issue here is the r.e ct that 1 t was the Crown which. had
worked out the most er!"-e ctive and satisfactory solut.ion -to be
found to negate the conrlicts inherent in the drives or the
se-veral imperial forces_..

The use or "letters or marque,"

grants,_ and chart-ers which defined the rights, duties, and
privileges of the expansionist r ·o rces in question were quite
without precedent for the purposes they were used until the
Crown preempted and developed such uses.

Royal England may

have envisioned in such an assumption or- authority the poss1b111 ty of escepi.ng Parliamentary encroachments upon its power

through the creation of a political hegemony remote rrom
Parliamentary control, an beg.emony which might provide both
monies and power for its own use.

That such e pur~ose railed

of accomplishment is or little moment, for the fact still
remains that it was the Crown which gave direction to the
conflicting desires for expansion.

The Crown's probable pur-

pose in encouraging i!!lperial expans·ion served only to complicate and make well nigh impossible the establishment of
a centralized colonial authority once Parliament had begun
to strip it or all semblance of power.

III.

P.ATTERNS OF ENGLISH E."{PANSION ( 1500-1367)

_Patterns 2!. expansion.

Once given autho.ri t .y under the

Royal Seal the forces o~ English expansion developed se~er 8 1

techniques or patterns of growth, though m111tery power
an integral meohani.sm of ell

or them.

w~s

One pattern involved

exploration followed by a simultaneous process or col.on1ze.t1on

and neutralization or decimation of natives when found.

Natives

were contained by a combination of military force end the
individual efforts

or

trader-colonist groups, the greater

part of the military effort more

oft~n

coming from the letter.

British North Americ-a is the principal example of this .p attern,
though French intrigue with the Indians periodically· compli·
cateQ its operation.

The next pattern involved a-n initial

phas-e of m.1li tary conquest which wrested !'rom othe.r powers

localities they had already carried through the explorat1oncolonizat1on-nautralizat1on phase.

Areas so conquered were

then .subjected to a-d m.in.istrati ve centro ls whioh were a com-bination o-r already established procedures and regulations
desired by British conquerors to encourage colonization by

British citizens and

traders~

French, Spanish, end Dutch hold-

ings in North America, part1culerly New York and Canada, are
good illustrations of this technique.

Another· teehnique
Infiltration was
involved infiltration by trad14g groups.
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generally followed by a period of

1~tr1gue

a gainst elready

exis-ting native governments and trading groups representing

other European powers.

A combication or mercenaries ·h ired

by the trading companies _, some plain adve-nture.rs

1

and occa-

sional segments of His Majesty•·s forae.s then carried out
piecemeal acts of conquest a.gatnst the native rulers.

The

conquered ruler was generally allowed to keep his position
and titles, or someone ., a native, was substituted in his· place

and an administrative group DJ.Bde up o·r officials hired by the

trading company was set up to rule the area through the "princer
an indirect ·c.ontrol.

The prince was left pretty much to rule

his subjects as· he chose so l .o ng as he no longer interfered
·with the prerogatives desired by the trading company.

India

and the early infiltration or the Straits Settlements are
obvious examples or this pattern.

Still another technique

involved t ·he conquest of" strategic locations, e1 ther ·by conquering the native_s or wresting them from the control of some

othe.r European power, and following this conquest with the
9
establishment of a m111 tary governme-n t. G1braltar and other

9 Though Gibraltar is not really en island, but a part
of the Iberian Peninsula, it is for strategic purposes considered an island because it has almost all or the advantages of
insularitY· It is, however, connected to the Iberian land
mass by an extremely narrow isthmus.
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en-d other strateg-i c islands or capes ere good examples of this
pattern.

A final technique involved infiltration by traderst

particularly in island lo-cations, followed by conquest in the

name

o~

the Crown, followed by little interruption 1n the

native government, the existing ruler merely taking on the
I

additional burden of ruling his subjects in the name

J

or

the

J

j Crown and thereby insur-i ng protection of the traders. The
Tonga Islands and others exemplify this pattern which differs,

I
I
I

I

I
j

but not too greatly, from its relative technique used in the

case of India.lO
Roles of government and citizens in the early patterns

of British expansion.

Throughout all these patterns certain

roles and elements are evident.

In every case, though in vary-

ing combinations, Crown, Parliament, and citizenry, social
forces whose existence would one day prove antagonistic to the
administration

or

goal of expansion.

en empire, worked together -toward the common
Expansion and colonization generelly

depri v.e d na·ttves of lands whi.c h at a later date ·might "morally
be con-s idered: their property; but, since- Bri te.in possessed the

military power, particularly the naval s.t rength, requisite to
their acqu1s1 tion, the- question in the early years of the empire

10 cr. C. E. Carrington, The British Oversees (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1950) whic~s something of an exposition
of this thesis on techniques of British expansion ~
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was or little importance .. Naval p·ower could not really develop
these la·nds, and such land power as was needed was as often
supp.lied by private in1 tiati ve as by establ1 shed governmental

forces. Though the Royal Seal was the key to all action,
development ot the new territories was largely the fruit or

the e.f:forts or private ci t1zen groups and so was the establish-

ment

or

t.errttoriel defenses.

Except for the passage

or

the

Navigation Act·s, Parliament was lert pretty much out of this
stage

or

development.
IV.

EMPIRE AS .AN AININISTRATIVE PROBLEM

Focusing an administra-tive proble.m.

As territories con-

tinued to be absorbed, certain new elements were introduced
into the British expansionist
p.roblem was created.

or

~vement

The heart

or

and an administrative

the problem lay in the types

territories absor-bed, the manner, state, a-n d sequence in

which they were absorbed, and the degree end manner of their

assimilation desired by the Crown, Parliament, and citizenry.
This was no small administrative problem,_ and. it had to be

solved as the territories were being acquired and developed.
Origins £!_ e.x pand.ing British. holdings.

A brief look at

some of the typ.es of ·territories gained provides some idea of
the enormity ot this administrative problem and the mechanisms
used in attempts to solve it.

North American colonies, for
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I

I
j instance represented several social traditions in the British
ji

historical picture and various types of legal 1.nstruments

' carrying the Royal Seal.

-o the-r North American terri tortes

wrested from the control of competing European powers

represen~d

somewhat different cultures and institutions ouite alien to
those of the British.

New York, Dutch in origin, presented the

problem or a-lien allegiance end such unfamiliar social traditions as the patroon system.

Canada, particularly Quebec,

presented the problem of an "-u npopular" religion, Roman Catholicism, and a certainly alien tradition of civil law based
on the Roman Corpus.

In the East the conduct of trading com-

panies had been such that some- effort had to be -made to satisfy
their desires while s-till satisfying those or the government.
All these factors had to be brought into some compromise amenable to the functions of the established socio-political and
economic instit-Utions- of the United Kingdom, els-e- administration of them would end in horri-ble confusion.

In other W-o rds,

all these acquisitions and developments had to be brought
to heel under some centralized administrative agency.
Effeot of hapnenstance origin of colonization.
was a problem which had developed step by s_tep.

This

Originally,

largely because it could see no better means to protect its own
particular -interests and make effec-t ive its claim to territories
then available tor expropriation from an humbled Spain, Royal
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Engla-nd had acceded to the request·s or pr·i vate pe,t1 t1.oners in
regard to the development or the new .lands end contemplated
channels or trade.

Parliament almost totally ignored this phase

or development except to pass Navigation Aots which were aimed
more a.t encouraging continued naval developme·nt at home end
satisfying mercantilist and. industri-al interests than they were

at encouraging infant developments 1n the col.on1ea.

In follow-

ing tt...eir separate· courses, however, both had stumbled into
sanot.i oning· the construction or a. pol1t·1cal hegemony without

really heing aware. or the remit·toations of their ecti:Ona.

The

generosity of obart.era granted pote.ntial colonizers end traders·
beers mute testimony in this regard, 11 and so do subsequent

attempts of both Parliament and Crown to abrogate certain or
the charter rights in their efforts to superimpose a centralized administrative control on coloni-es already e .s tabl1ahed
end those being aoquired. 12
Growing -awareness

£[~administrative

problem: mechan-

isms developed in the administration of Bri t .1 sh hold1nes

11 cr. Hakluyt, ££~£!!.,Vol. 8, for a view of some or
these charters and patents.
12 dr. infra, pp ... 39-46, 62 f., 65 .. '?2, et ~ . . cr. elso
H. L. Osgooa, The Americall Colonies in the Seventeenth ~ntury,
3 Vol.s. {New York: The Macmillan Co., HW4-190?), Vol. 3, for
an exposition of the etiology of attempts to abrogate thesie
quite the v 1 ew g ven
che.r·ters. Osgood, however, does not take
elat1vel~ successful.
here. He ·believe-s the attempts were r
.,

~
I
,.
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.!

{1500-1867).

Even by the time o'f the Restoration _(1660) the

limited e..xpansion England had undergone had created 1n govern-

ment circles en awareness
A

COI:mli

or

a growing administrative problem.

ttee or the Pri v.y Counc-il was organized to administer

colonial holdings, mostly those in North America.
1

' :

By 1695

this comni ttee had given way to the newly created Board

.or

Trade

and Plantations, mercantilistic in orientation. whose object
was t .o unity th-e administration or established and expanding
colonial -holdings.

The eighteenth century saw the creation,

-abolishment, and re-creation o-r e Colonial o:rr1ce and Secretaryship.

The same century (1784). saw the establishment or a separ-

ate Board ot Control ro·r India. Revolt in America served to bre~k
up the Board of Trade and led, in 1801, to the final establishment of a fUll-blown Colonial Office, still separate from the
admini-stration or India, and later, in 1925, to be separated

from the administration of dominions, which had since been
developed.

Thetr administ.ra t1on, to be discussed later, was

g1 ven f'or the mos·t part to- a Dominions Office create-d by an
act o:f Parliament.

The India Of_f ice Act of 1858 superseded

the earlier e-stablished Board of Control ror India and was
somewhat _modified in 1919.

In @Bneral, these were the prin-

cipal depar~ents created in attempts to unify administration
and establish consistent controls throughout British hold1ngs.

13 Cf. infra, p-p. 94-118.

13

~
'.
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Parliament's role in ~ estab.l1sbrn.ent
colonial administration.

.2! unified

A number of reasons may be advanced

for the order Of development and the courses of action followed
by these depar·tment·s .

The first ot these would be that Parlia-

ment neglected the administration of Bri t ·ish holdings • aside
from the Pu.r1 tan Interregnum, until 1695,. a short w·h tle aft·er
it had: stripped the Crown or most or its authority.

Until l6g·5

the Privy Council of the Crown, mercantilistic in orientation
and absolutistic, was the chief fount o-r co·l .o nial ad.-rn.1nistrat1on.

a conditi-o n of authority which pretty much gave s-ubstance to the
Crown • a subsequent claim to rule and .dominion o·ver the colonies.
Even at't.er 1695 Parli_ament appeared 11 ttle concerned with t ·he
administration and assimilation

or

just pr eeeding the American Revolt..

colonies until the pertod
Admin! s tra t 1 on of the

colonies was left exclusively- in the hands of a Colonial
Secretary buried somewhere on Downing street and all but ignored
by- Parliament.

A second reason would be the example or the

American Revolution which pointed out to British administrators
and the ~orld-ot-large the "Achilles heel" of British military
might and to other colonials- the ant·agonisms inherent in the

structure of British rule.

In regard to this latter point, the

.Americans l:Bd demonstrated to the whole empire the tact that

the crown and Parli~ent could be maneuvered into positions so
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totally at odds as to renQer them almost ineffect1ve.l4

A

third reason, one most singularly Br1 tis-h , would be ·the lege.l-

1st1c foundation of British expansion, a practice initiated by
the- Crow-n but inhere-n t in preceding internal developments which
had re so 1 ved some of the di ff'erenc-e a between Crown and c 1 t 1 zenry.

Internal influences behin_d legalistic implementation E.!_
Brit is-h _expansion.

In an over-all vie-w, this study can present

but brief accounting for the legalistic element in British -expansion.

The impetus behind the legal instrumentation of

colonies specifically British in origin appears obvious enough,
but the nature, even the very existence, of the type

o:f

decree

or legislatio.n setting the rule over areas -w rested from other

powers, native or European, is a matter of somewhat more oomplexity and obscurity.

·Taking first things first, several

traditions and influences combined to produce the agreements
and laws setting the rule over specifically British colonies.
The most obvious to any student of British history is the strong

common-law tradition of t -he English people: a tradition often

referred to as- "an irrational reverence for the law."

Its

i _n tluence is particularl-y evi-dent in the ac-tive struggle over
civil rights coincident with England's imperial beginnings.
The struggles between common-law courts- end the Crown, Parliament
I,

I

14 Of~ infra, p. 63 f., particularly Note 18.
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and the Crown, end citizens end Parliament over such procee-dings as those or the Star Chamber a·nd Court of the North, James
I' s ( 1603--1 625) attempts to "legislate by procla:!l·a t1on, and the
social forces behind and the results

or· the Interregnum c-e r-

tainly did not pass without their influence.

..Another influence

is to be found in the already mentioned imperial acts of Elizabeth

I ( 1158-160"3 ), acts whose very existence indicate the cro"n' s
desire to steer clear

or

Parliamentary pi t!alls and e-stablish

' .

the primacy of 1 ts own authority in subsequent colonial deve1op-

ments.

,.. I

These acts also exhibit the traditional distrust be-

tween commoner and aristocrat, reflect the social changes Accompanying Elizabeth's reign, and set -a tradition which, s1 nee 1 t

had not seen fit to contest it, Parliament would one day find
unpalatable.
Raleigh's

Elizabeth's chartering under the Royal Seal

unsuccess~ul

:i

or

attempt at colonizing in the New World

. :l
:I"!

and the exclusive charter she granted the East India Company

(31 Decenber 1600) quite evidently set the precedent in law.
..

From that time forward, Parliame-nt failing to enter exceptions

~1

'

to its authority, it was the Crown or its agents which must be
petitioned if one wished to trade in or develop the new lends.

As matters stood, Elizabeth's acts implied that all British
acquisitions, whether legal (by right 'of exploration and diawere the clelm
covery) or extra-lege l ( war f are and Peace t reat~)
~

or property Of the Crown and to be- dispensed with as the Crown

.,

'

~--
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saw f1t. 15

It would be some time before Parliament would enter
exceptions to this cla~.l6
Inf'luence.s behind legal 1nstrumente.t1on
holdings.

£! ceotured

Accounting for the pacification or conquered European

developments in the new l -a nds, however, presents a sorne.w hat.
different problem and sends one into a maze of conplexly 1nterrela ted forces--social, political., economic, psychological, end.

strategic--constantly in the process of modifying and altering
·the·ir highly. unstable relationships.

In each spec1f1 c case e

good acc.ounting can be g1 ven, though no two colonial .govern-

ments are in any sense identical.

The one thing all have tn

common is that they represent the particular resolution

or

e

three-way struggle between Crown., Pa.rl1ament .• and citizenry
(.Engl1 sh and absorbed) ove·r the p rero gat 1 ve s or rule to be

allowed each in a milieu of competing world social, political.

and economic powers that wished to contest English authority
in general.

Rule developed ror New York, for example, com-

promised the privileges desired by Dutch nationals ., asserted

the primacy of the Crow.n, and largely and deliberately improv-ed

15 Cf Richard Hakluyt oo. cit., Vol. 8. Parliament's
failure to c~ntest the royal prerogatives implied in Letters
Patent and Charters is a legal admission of this .claim.
16 Cf. infra, pp. 61 t · , ~ se.oo •
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the British strategic situation in North .Aoe ·r ica.

The Quebec
Act ( 1774}, ta.king another example,. though maneuve.red by the

Crown was largely the result or both the Crown's and Perliement's desire to mollify French Catholics and neutralize

canada

in event or further disturbances in the Thirteen Colonies.
It also stands out, though the Crown hardly expected this,
one

or Parliament's earliest successes in wresting

88

political

control or colonial affairs from the grasp of the Crown.

The

North America Act (186?), on the other hand, resulted fron e
co!Ilbination of the following ractors:

1) memor 1e s

or le sso·n s

learned from failure to quell the American Revolt or succeed in
the War

or 1812;· 2) a change in the

economic orients t1on of the

British people who had given up mercantilism in favor or lAissez
faire capitalism; 3) the resulting changes this al tera·t1on
economic orientation had

institu~ed

in the House of

or

Co~~ons

and its citizen makeup; 4} changes 1n the British strategic
picture; 5) a desire on the pert of the "new" Parliament to
reduce the

burden~ome

costs of administering an empire wh1oh

apparently did not bring to Britain the benefits of empire
(in this they may have been mistaken); and 6) a desire to
maintain and augment the economic and social arrangements
already established between Canada and the United Kingdom,
arrangements continuallY being di srup t e d by flurries

disorder.

The act of Parliament (1?.8 4) settir..g

or

c1~11

the Board
of c·o ntrol for India is a still different exacple. It .served
U:;>

. .- .....•E-.!

both to placate the interests or a

duly chartered rights and to

avo

1d

fl
trading company possessing
a stagg ering m111 tary prob-

lem possibly beyond Britain's capabilities.

The India Act

(1858} merely served to 1
mprove Parliament··' s author! ty in the
17
same arrangements.
The Crown ~ ~ symbol of' aut.hor1 ty.
changes there threads one

or

Through all these

the outstonding facts of British

colonial expansion, the acceptance

or

the principle that ell

terrftor1es acquired by exploration, c~lon1zat1on, conouest, or
combinations of all three were to be claimed in the name of' t ·he

Crown and in the formative years of the empire developed f'or the
most part by private citizen groups acting under specific
legal instruments carrying the Imperial Seal. This practice ot
claiming and developing new holdings under the eeg1.s

or

the

Crown has never been discarded by the B.ri tish, even though e.ctual.
administrative power in the colonies rully pes.ses into the hands
of' Parliament- subsequent to the American Revo·lt.

Alleg1enee of

colonials is always to the Crown, symbol of authority, even
though the Crown bas 11 ttle legal or political control over ·a ny
of them.

Problems raised

£Z

~ ~

£!

legal 1nstrucentat1on.

Legal "instruments have always served to define ·the rights of
I

17 C:f. intra, pp. 141-]45.

'
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Crown, Perl fament, ·and colonial developers, whether English or
the absorbed natio·nals or other powers.

Parliament's failure

to challenge the claims implicit in early royal grants and
charters until much too late appears to have laid the aeeds of
a tradition which effectively preserved the tenure of the Crown
and endlessly confused future attempts a creating an i:n.peria·l
adm.inistra t1on once its need had become apparent to all a-nd
sundry.

In fact., early Parliamentary behavior promoted a

situation Which, as it matured, allowed dissatisfied colonials
to use a "defeated" Crown as a club with which to smash existI;

ing a dmi.ni strati ve rela ti.onship s between the government at home
and those in specific colonies.
it is true, may have

ste~ed

Parliament • s lack of challenge _,

from ·the fact that the Crown was,

at the opening of the imperial drive, still a considerably
forceful authority, but the fact nevertheless remains that its
:failure· to enter exceptions to the i;nplied significance of the
Royal Seal appears to have laid one of the more importa-nt cornerstones o:f future colonial struggles ror self-determination.
In fact, much of the conflict over the prerogatives of various
governmental institutions which has preceded Britain's loss of
control over many of its holdings, particularly those of
Ca-u casian origin, has been of a legalistic nature and appears
to have been rooted in the shadowy definition of the roles of

\

\

Crown and Parliament in colonial affairs.

Colonials, partic-

ularly those in Caucasian areas, were continually proposing

n
I ::1
~ l;

l
'
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differing

1nterpr~tat1ons

of both the substantive and adjec-

tive legal aspect·s of grants, charters, proprietorships, and
the civil and legal status of colonial subjects under the
British Constttut1on. 18 One need but look to t·he events which

! :

transpired in the Thirteen Colonies, the Ionian Islands, and
Canada to observe the precedent setting examples and to observe
that tmperially-minded England was eventually willing to settle
.,

for whatever prerogatives it could impose and enforce a.t any

.\
I

gi.ven time.

\

By the time of the Union of South Africa Act

.,
'I

!
i ·,

l ·:

18 It should be noted here that t .he Brit ish Constitution

is not a single document, but rather a long tr.adi tion of organic
common law, a tradition subjected to continuous modification in
efforts to .keep 1 ts conce.p ts abreast of the particular soc1ohistorical milieu in which any given accumulation of it operates.
As such it is a very flexible instrument. It should also carefully be noted that wherever Bri ta"in has round areas in which to
expand its nationals have. migrated to them, carrying w-ith them.
such aspects of home culture and traditlons· as they ·r espected,
particular1y an abiding regard ror home laws end their rights.
under them and an .abiding regard for the rights contained in
the charters implementing the·ir colonizing efforts. Is 1t any
wonder then that the basis of subsequent struggles between
colo~iels and the home government should often be rooted in the
interpretation of legal issues doubly complicated by factors of
chronology? On the one hand, recalcitrant colonials, professing
al1egiance to a · "shackled Crown," would claim all rights traditionally held or recently acq.u.ired by home citizens; yet, w1 th
considerable effrontery t .hey would deny Parli·a ment the sam-e
authority over them that it had over· home citizens. On the
other hand, it is no wonder that both Parliament and Crown would
do their best. to limit colonials to their own interpretations
of ·the exact! tudes and contexts ·of the original legal instruments
and subsequent edicts and laws of Crown and Parliament aimed at
the establishment of centralized imperial controls. This kind
of legal dispute has often preceded or accompanied open rebellion

'

..

j~

.i
,.

:,i
\
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(1909) this willingness to compromise is altogether obvio~s.
The act is a very 11c1 ted poll tica·l instrument and ts the
beginning of Britain's usage ot progressively more limited
polit.ical instruments in the establishment or colonial controls over newly dominated areas.

18 in British colonies, particularly in the case

or ~he

American Revolt • . As Profe~sor S. E. Morrison. By Land and~
Sea (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 219-=233, part!cul .arly p. 221 f., indicates, the views of' the d1ss·at 1sf1ed
elements in the Aoerican colonies eppear to reflect resolved
and continuing struggles ·between the three protagonists At
home: Parliament • Crown, and ordinary c1 tize·nry. He observes
that Thomas Jefferson, well aware of the fact· that Parliament
had shorn the Royal House of its political prerogatives, submits his .,A Summary View of the Rights of l3ri tish .Anerics,"
..9...!...!. , t ·o George III ( 1 '760 -1820) whom he eddre sse s as "Chif' t
Magist·r ate of the Br1 tish Empire." He observes also the t this
poper denies absolutely the ri .ght of P aorliamen t to le g1s late
for the colonies which are. "bound. to the mother country only
by and through the Crown." The net efrect of this argument.,
which amounts to dominion status when combined with t ·he
·"Novanglus" papers !1.:..!• of Samuel Adams, won t t' use the pow.erless Crown as a club with which to gain concessions fron
Parl.iament, pla clng Parliament end Crown in attitudes from
which neither could make concessions without flatly admitting
the other's political supremacy in colonial af'fairs.
Parliament's pre·vailing ·philosophy, d.e spi te the fact that 1 t was
being maneuvered by the Cr.own, was predi.cated upon the estebl1sh:rn.ent of imperial controls under tts own bnnner, and so ·" as that
of the Crown which claimed prior rights~
This meant the subjug~tion of British nationals to restrictions· they would tolerate neither in the home milieu nor in that created by charter
guarantees and c.olonial precedents. All future B!,itish which
co l .o niels anpeer to have prof! ted by the ensuing ,ler in · · r
0
?arliamentary and Royal forces were bested partly be~ a ~se
5
a stretegic weakness, pertly because of hopeless div d~~~ded
within Parliament. and partly because of the bitterlY
purposes of Crown and Parliament.

:,
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V.

EARLY FAILURE IN ATTEMPI'S TO ESTABLISH A
UNIFIED AND PERMA!-:"ENT IMPERIAL ORDER

Origin ~ ~ 1'ailure to establish a unifi-ed 1~roer1al
order. Osgood•s 19 unparalleled study of the first two centuries of the North American development studies the first pro-

mounced -example of England's failure to establish a unified
imperial order.

It comprehensively exam:ines the complexion

of British expansion in that aree and records the etiology ot
the complete f't:ri-lure of Brit-ein's attempts to superimpose a
unified impe-r ial oxder or administration upon the rather diver·
gent, but sometimes similar systems its own governnental writs
had instituted in the Thirteen Colonies.

Both Crown and Parl1a-

ment want.ed a unified empire ruled by 1tselt' alone; but eech

had to be willing to settle tor what they could get.

There is

little need here to take up a lengthy survey of the process

whereby imperial desires were compromised, but certain t'acts
involved are germane to subsequent discussions.

Source of royal failure to establish 1mner1al controls.

19 Cf. Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
SeventeentnCentury (Vol. -3 of Imo-erial Beginninfs. 3 vOTs i
New York: The 1Iaom1llan Co., 1904-1907) ;_ Vols.
and 3 of
The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century. 4 vols.
(New York: The Columbia University Press, 1924).

I

I.
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Largely

88 8

result

or

Parliamentary neglect and a tradition o~

royal origin, Bri t1sh colonial administration wes in the he.nds
Of the Crown. until the latter h a lf o f t h e eigbteenth century.
During tha-t · per1o.d, as Osgood would have it, 20 the Crown hod to

some degree reasonably succeeded in superimposing upon about
hal:f its American colo·n ies a mercantilistic royal edmt-nistret1on

in place of the earlier charter guarantees.

These royal govern-

~
-~

.I

ments, however, because Parliament was of little help, ~ere

l

precariously established and authority constantly fluctuated
between Crown and inhabitants.

For example, the Domini-on of

New England established by· efforts ot the Crown collapsed following the Boston uprising of l6B9 and th~ old colonial govern-

ments were pretty much restored.
given a new charter

or

In fact, .Massachus-etts wes

rights ( 1691) ., even though 1 t accepted a

royal governor of limited power end a secretary for royal appointments along wi tb that c·h arter.

Rhode Island end Connecticut

escaped with their corporate charters intact.

New Jersey con-

I

tinually struggled ·b ack. to 1 ts _proprietary government. after
short bouts under roya-l reign.
same proces·s ( 1692-1694).

Pennsylvania went through the

Nowhere was the Crown entirely sue-

20 cr. H. L. Osgood, £E· cit._, end particularly his
"
essay, "The-classification of Colonial Governcents 1n America,
to be round 1n the American Historical Associetion Annual
Renorts, ·1 895 (Washine;ton: The Government Prir:ting Office,

I

'

!

1896), pp. 6·1.7-627.

.,
!•
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cessful in establishing unified imperial rule.

All through

th:e pe.riod from 1660-1 ?60 Crown and colonists were at loggerheads over prerogatives or rule.

The Crown was powerless with-

out help from Pa-rliament, and Parliament was in no mood to
help, being· concerned principally w1 th wresting internal poli tical control from the Crown. 21
Parliament •·s fl'lilure to establish imperial controls.
\

Parliament itself appears to have fared 11 ttle better in t ·he
matter of establishing unified imperial rule, being for the
most part concerned with controlling trade and manufactures
through the Navigation Acts during the period when the Crown held

I

;,
I

full sway.

Even then, when it did get into the act in

earnest~

!'
i.

the policy of the administrators charged with enforcing its

I

regulations was pretty much one of "salutary neglect," since
most were unenforceable becaus-e they entailed the employment of

I.

I

·~

naval :rorc.ea f'ar greater than England poss-essed end some, particularly those aimed at curbing the development of manufactures
in the colonies, were .rather short-sighted since the. colonies
were not yet ready or able to undertake such developments end
such enforcement as they were· given would later lead to a
strategic problem of staggering proportions.

For the most part

these regulations which stemmed from the dying merc.a nt111st
·21 C:f. H. L. Osgood, !h.! American Colonies.!!!, the
Vol. 3.

Seventeent~Centu£l,

.~
....

. ... . .·---..- . -· .
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philosophy were soon considered undesirable, but such as did
have their erreots so retarded the development of manufactures that they later le-d to the previously mentioned s trategic problem, the separation of raw materials and industries.
Be

that as it may, by the time Parliament had succeeded in

wresting internal political control from the Crown (1680-1?60),
it appears to have been too late for it to do anything about
the successrul establishment or unified imperial controls over
existing Caucasian units, though it might have succeeded had it
started earl·ier and presented a different economic a ttl tude.
Parliament later had some success in bringing under regulation
some of t ·he non-Caucasian colonial units, but success varied
from unit to unit, being dependent upon a host or variable ractors.22

Generally speaking, Parliament had an uphill battle

whioh has fina-lly in our own century brough it to the brink of
complete failure.

Though Parliament struggled mightily, the

Crown until the latter half of the ninet·e enth century was
hardly willing to be of any help to it in the imperial st.ruggle,
preferring to play off Parliament against the colonies in an
attempt to preserve its own waning prerogatives.

In the early

years of Parliamentary .interest in colonial development, the net
result or this situation was the Anerican Revolt, a lesson in
strategic politics whioh Parl1amant appears never to have for-

22

cr.

infra pp. 103-115, 196-200.

\I

I

gotten.

From that time forward

• depending upon the part1cul8r
set of' c.ircumstances • Parliament would placate the Caucasian

units

or

the empire while co.ncentreting its 1mper1·e l e!'f.o:rts

on those non-Caucasian .in origin; they woUld wrest control or

these. areas from the Crown and managing business grou·ps only t .o
have them f'inally slip gradually into self-determ1net1on or into
the orbi t .s of hostile powers as the British strategic, econoo1c,
social., and political _picture changed relative to the t or co:n-

peting world powers.
Colonists' role in Britain's fa-ilure to establish unified

1mner1al oo·ntrols.
matt.e r.

There is also the colonists' side of this

Probably the most overlooked point in this r -egard as

far as Ca·uca·sian un1 ts are conc-erned is that these colonies were

developing cultures and traditions quite alien to those in the
home land, even though t .heir governments m1gh t be .English 1n

or·igin.

Such social forces as the "11 berterian" trad.i t1.on and

the very isolation of these colonies froo the problems foremost:

at home supported the growth of a psychology essentially belligerent to the exercise oi' controls emana-ting from external
sources.

such forces bred also a jealous regard for the pre ·~

servation of civil rights and carried w1 th them the ~maries
of their dissenting origins.

Some colonies had been rounjed

primarilY es havens safe from persecu

ti ~n

"'

at home

·

Otters had

been rounded by corporate interests who woulj hardly wish to

\.
j

I

i

~. I

'i'O

surrender control

or

the tr.ade and pro"fi ts tor which they had

b.een founded , -even though. they m1 ght tra d.e s.ome me a s.ure

or

their

auto·nomy in return for British naval protection and rights es

home citizens.

As far as concerns- those Caucasian colonies

extant prior to t _he American Revel t, these factors combined w1 th
the foreign origin of some of them, an origin which looked forward to sharing in the pr1 vi leges- of government g-1 ven to some
other British holdings, tended to mesh into the creation

or

\

communi ties of inte_rest and cultures a a different as they were
geographically separate from that in the homeland. 2 ~

Often

-.
!~

these Caucasian developments, particularly in the East,_ would

i

take on a good deal or the coloration and attitudes or the cul-

tures they had absorbed politically.

As for the natives them-

,.
·,

selves, in these. Eastern and still later African and -other cul~.·

!'

tures, they would slowly begin to use the successful struggles

I.
I

of the Caucasian units as arguments in defense of their own

':\
!

I,_,

c-laims to self-determina-tion, though, as will be d1scusse.d

r

later,24 this eventuality is more complicated than simple argument.
,;

l
23 Cf. H. L. Osgood, ~ American Colonies in the
seventeentnCen tur~, Vols. -1 and 2; and The .Ar:lerican COI'on1es
1n the Eighteenth enturz, Vols. 2 and 4.
24

cr.

infra, pp. 103-115t 195-250.
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"'robl em~~ d ef1n1t1on. The fact
that the attitudes of these three groups t
s emmed from different
aims and premises is perh~ps the fulcrum
of the whole early imperial problem. As matter s s t oo d , the behavior of all three apparImperbw or empire:
-

.A

_

K

ently stemmed from essentially antagonistic pol1ticel at-titudes.
The Crown, aping historical monarchs in general and the Spanish
in particular, seems to have been bent upon the establishment or
an imoerium -consistent with the absolutistic· attitudes ot monarchy, ev.e n though. 1 t did make concessions 1n order to get
colonial development started.

Its attempts to abrog~te its own

charters and grants and its attitudes and decrees concerning
government in both the Thirteen Colonies and the East amply
attest to t ·his fact.

. I

On the other hand, Parliament's role

.

appears to have been a confused one, undoubtedly reflecting the
attitudes and conflicts inherent in its royalist-libertarian
makeup.

Parliament seems to have wanted to legislate

1~nerium,

a contradict ion in procedure which could lead only t.o conrusion
because it forced Parliament to tread a tight-rope betwe.en relative despotism 1n colonial policy and the relative radicalism evident in its attempts to establish pol1t1cel democracy at
home.

Its behavi-or 1n passing the five so-called "Intolerable

Acts" contrast·ed w1 th its vee illation in the. feoe of the
Amerie·en Revolt lends· credence to this view.
caught in its own contradictory proce~ures.

Parliament was here
Colonials also pre-

L

I

-;
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sented mixed attitudes developed from se-veral sources, but
most eventually ·tended toward the same goal, self-determination.

Though perhaps the largest segment ot colonials re--

.flected royalist etti tudes, the more vocif-e rous elements among

;

I:

them reflected both the struggle of the common citizenry at home

: ·,

~

:

in the direction of democracy and the drift ot Western civilizGeographic detachment trom

ation toward political pluralism.

' -

the homeland and indigenous influences in the colonies themselves

\

tended to drive o.olonis·t away trom the acceptance of direction
from the homeland where administrative attitudes reflected a
lack of understanding of both the cultures growing up in the
colonies end the problems, aims, and interests pe-culiar to them.
The majority of these atti"tudes were not particularly amenable
to manipul-a tio-n by either Parliament or Crown in view of their
a.tti tudes, a conflict of viewpoints which could only lead to
trouble and did.
-'I .
1

The compronise of em2ire:

The British maritime hegemony.

I.
I

From the viewpoints of the Crown, the Royalist segment of

I

Parliament, and "imperium, those British coloni-es prior to the

J

American Revolt which were Caucasian in origin had been left
to their own devices much too long.

Had Crown and Parliament

joined together to subject them to the prerogati-v-es of imperium
from the moments ot the.ir origins, the final reso1ution of
British expansion might have been a different a.tory; a-n imnerium.,

. ..
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though this point is highly speculative without re gard to
stra-tegic,_ economic, and other historical consideraticns, might
well have been established.
the case.

As events transpired, this was not

Imperial rule had to be superimposed upon systems

already in operation.

Not only was this true of the American

scene, but it was true of other colonial developments es well.
The turning point in B-ritish efforts to establish en 1m-:)er1um
appears to have been the American Revolt.

From that time for-

ward in history, B_ri tain has found herself in a continual
struggle to maintain such prerogatives of rule as she has been
able to impose- and enforce on even her most primitive areas.
The best she has been able to achieve is a very transient empire,
a maritime hegemony.

' ''

This is because she has had to fend off

one rival after another, one potent-ial revel t after the. other_.

:' '

.I ,

She has had to try to minimize such changes in he·r strategic

I,

or industrial potential as have altered her relative power

-,'

' -

"i

position..

By

1932 .she app-ears to have been ready to concede

that this might be a well-nigh 1mpos.s1ble task.
o~

I

!'

The Statu.t-e

Westainster admitted frankly that she could no longer attempt

I_

to force the issue with her Caucasian colonies end su ggeated
to t ·he watchful that 1 t was only a matter or time before she
would give in on the issues of rule over her non·Cauoasian
units.

The etiologY' of this admission and the accele.ra ted dis-

memberment of the empire are the substance of th& following
discussion.

I

t

lj'

l

t
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VI •

THE- AMERICAN REVOLT AS THE BEGINNWG OF
IMPERIAL RETREAT

Recapitulation of historical matrix.

In general, the
.:
I

turning point in British efforts to establish imperial rule may
be seen in the forces represented in the American Revolt, even
though their effects might not be openly evident until joined by
the forces of several other disrupting elements appe-er1ng tn the
events of the f'ollowine; century.

Earlier ( 1642--1660) the Pur1 tan

Revolt had signalled the rise of pressure groups 1n English
government and with them began the attempts ·to subst 1 tute the
p 1 urali sm o t" ind 1 vidual frane hi se for the .monism of monarchy.

Mercantili -s m was introduced as the- dominant _philosophy of col-

onial administration, and the seeds of capitalism were germinated in internal a-ffairs.

The rtGlorious Revolution" ( 1688)

pretty well :finished the internal preroga ti.ves of monarchy but

lert still unresolved the question of its authority in colonial
affairs.

Eighteenth century British history is pretty much the

-s tory of the- development of these social forces .combined w1 th a

global strategic struggle with Franoe.

The revolt of the nTh1r-

teen Colonies" 1-s a part and parcel of this context which not

only forc -ed the rerolution or some of its problems but contributed materially to its success.
Immediate signi.ficance £!_the .American Revolt.

The

\ •,
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immediate significance of the American Revolt lay in several

areas:

economic, strategic, and political.

First, 1 t s1gna1led

the turning point in the struggle between the waning forces of

mercantilism and those of risin-g capitalism (free enterprise),

which began its assumption or the dominant role.

Alo.ng with

capitalism came the r .i sa of the "sterling b) ook," and

or

8

-s ystem

balanced money exchange in colonial and international trade.

Balanced trade on at least a

tant ea:onom.i-c goal.
redeemed in gold.

~

pro quo basis became an impor-

\

Notes on unfavorable trade balanc-es were
Second, it battered into the consciousness

of the aver-age Bri.tish administrator an awareness of t .he exploitable antagonisms inherent in mixtures of imperial rule and represent·ative government.

In such a situation imperial rule would

ge.nerally have to be superimposed on existing structures by
force and revolt thus always threatened.

Third, the cultural

cl·tm:ate ot the revolt displayed from another viewpo-int the
l

"antagonism to

i~perialism"

'

inherent in the legal origins of

l:

many British colonies, part-icularly those peopled by migrants
from home who were potentially the technological equals of home-

land forces.

J

These antagonisms were- exploitable because of the

conflict between c-r own and Parliament over prerog-atives or rule

both a·t home and in the colonies.

Fourth, the actual military

conflict invol-ved in the revel t unintentionally expo sed to the

~

i

I

'

rest of the European world a basic strategic weakness in the

I

British military armor, though--taking into consideration the

I
I

l
i

IJ

L
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strength of the B-ritish navy--it is ·r eadily o·bservable that
other European powers were even more vulnerable at this point
if functioning alone, but not necessarily so if functioning in
combinations.

Nevertheless, the course or the revolt revealed

the fact that Britain's over-all logi stioal potential was not
sufficiently developed to handle the problem of land warfare
at her naval _perimeters against people of the same cultural background;

i.e., Caucasians; particularly, when British lend forces

,

were up against s.uch problem·s as exposed supply routes, raw
resources separated by these same supply routes from manuracturins centers, unfamiliar terrain, unfamili-a r battle tactics ,2 5

and the interfering designs of competing powers.

The likeli-

hoo-d or this latter point is revealed by the fact that .only
once since the American Revolt, the War of 1812, have the British
been caught in this strategic trap by their own vol1tion. 26 It
is worthy of remark in pa·s sing that in both ttese cas.es, the
i

.Americ·a-n Revel t and the War of 1812, it was commitments against
France elsewhere that appare-ntly render.ed ineffe·ative British
efforts against the American colonies.
25 Guerilla tactics were at that time unfamiliar to the

average Br1 tish commander or ·so.ldier of the line. Britain,
however, seems to have profited by then, since they were later
used agai.nst Napoleon's forces in Spain. They are typical of
the accounts given or Wellington's tactics in that area.

I
I

{
l

I

i/·

j

cr.

intra, pp. 153 .. 194, where this point is considered
in considerably more detail.
-26

j'
1. .

r
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Results or ~ American Revol-t.

Failure at quell.1ng -the

American Revolt appears to have instituted e permanent trend in
Bri ti.sh colonial affairs, di vid1ng colonia 1 un1 ts in to two gen-

eral c -a tegori-es:-

one, those colonized, peo-p led, and managed by

Caucasians (who may or may not have neutralized or decimated
nett ve populations:); and two, those peopled by non-Caucasians
but managed by Caucasians alone or combinations of Caucasian
ana native rule.

I.
II

Deferential treatment has been afforded

Caucasian colonies ever since the American debacle, while that
offered non-Caucasian units has varied considerably, degrees or
subjugation or control being dependent upon variable factors.
Both groups have been administered through t .he use of the
I

dyarchicel principle or colonial rule which emerge.d fol _lowlng

i

the .rev-o lution. 27

I
I

I

The r _i-se of the dyarchy was signalled by the

I

Irish Appeal-s Act {1783) and the Canadian Constitution Act
( 1791) , and its appli cat "ion, to be consid-e red later on, 28 var 1ed
a.s

applied to e-ither Caucasian or non-Caucasian holdings.

Before

going in to the applic-ation of d_yarchy, .however, certain post-

27 In general, dyarchy 1s joint rule. As regards British
colonial policies, it is that principle whereby colonies were
allowed varying degrl!es of inter.nal autonomy in exchange for
the homeland'·s control of their external affairs. The greatest
variation in ~he application of this principle is evidenced in
the non-Cauc-a sian colonies, that in the Caucasian units be1:ng
quite uniform.
~

28 Ct. infra, pp. 133-201.

.;

I

i

I
I

I

J
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revolutionary trends concerned with its development had ·best
be considered first.
VII •

These undergird the Bri t1sh decline.

SIGNIFI CAlIT TRENDS:

POST-REVOLUTIONARY

PERIOD TO YIORLD WAR II
MateriallY; rele ted

~

material trends.

·The problems

focused by the American Revolt were rurther complicated and
intensifie-d by several trends appearing in the following cen ...·
tury.

During this period there arose a growing, but perhaps

mistaken • awareness· on t .he part of Bri t1sh adm1nistra tors, whose
e·conomio orient-a tions suffered through rap"id changed, or the

staggering end mounting costs or

i~perial

intensified by the constantly chang ing

economic fortunes.

rule.

co~plexion

This was merely
of British

In the first half of the nineteenth century

(1800-1850), largely because of a fortuitous aeries or· mineral
depos1 ts and en 1n1 tiel advantage in the "Technolog1.cal Revolution," Britain enjoyed en unrivalled econocic position despite

periodic economic depressions.

Economic advantage also gave her

poli t leal advantage ., e 1nce it made her better able to handle the
cost or defeating compet1 tors ei-ther in trade or on the field
of

battle.

The end or the American Civil War, however, saw Britain

enter a period when her economic and political position relative

29 cr. infra, p. 96 for a discussion or this possibility
and comparethis w1 th the statiatica·l data, pp. 156-16? •

;

I
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to the balance or· power among her European and Asian oo·mpeti tors would be constantly ln flux and gradually deteriorate.
-

Largely as the result of discoveries or mineral deposits in nonBritish areas and the increasing pace and influence of the technological revolution,_ several _powers--among them the United
States, Ge·r many, and Japan--began making rapid inroads into
Britain's favored. economic position.

By 1goo the United States

and Germany had pretty well o·vertaken her 1ndustr1e.l might, and

Germany, Russia, and Japan were pos14g a constant threat to her

political position.

The advent or such technological advances

a·s the submarine and aircraft coupled w1 th the separation of

raw resources from manufacturing centers has intensified this
threat, rendering the empire ever more vulnerable.

Along with

this growing threat Brita·in has dropped from. tirst among the
world powers to a lesser economic and political posi t.1on.
Economic produo·tion in the United States,. Germany, and Russ.ia,
outstrips that in the United Kingdom.

In military and political

power, it is l .ikely that Britain would rank no higher than
fourth behind the United States, Russia, and China.

Coneommit-

ent with the·s e changes, there has developed two gradually worsening trends.

On the one hand, the rapid end progressive

change in the geographic distribution of populations in the
British empire has worked against the British, particularly the
percentage

or

the whole represented by the small population of

the .home islands.

On the other, the food and raw ma-terial

I

~

I ,
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supply problems have gradually worsened, picking up their
tempo of deterioration following the historic gamble on tree
trade, subsequent losses of markets to competitors, and the·
advent of threaten-Ing technological ad.vances such as the submarine.
by

The food supply problem has been further complicated

the course of' British investments abroad..

Recent wars have

pretty well decimated them.
Ef~ect1veness

of these trends.

Admittedly, the effec·

t1veness ot e..ny g:iven one of these trends has varied from time
to Ume ., depending upon its relationship to other factors and

the

supp~rt

flue-nces.

it may have received from various

complicatir~

in-

Within the compass of this study there can be pre-

sen ted ·but a brief su-rvey of the effects of these tre.nds, but
such elements as are consi:dered should serve to indicate, explain,
or substantiate the views presented concerning modes of rule
developed by British administrators and their willingness to
compromis-e.
Abstract£!~~~

agricultural problem (1?70-date).

To begin with, coincident with the American ·Revolt, several
startling· modifications were .introduce·d into the· workin.gs of
the mother country.

One was the avera-g e c1 tizen' s growing

awareness of the changes in the relationship to his government
and livelihood

or

the positions of hereditary aristocrat and

L
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c.erchant.

This is reflected b th 1
30
o
n S~ith's
classic study

o.f private enterprise ( 1776). ·a nd in the gradual rise
economists (1776-date}.

An

or

tte

h

ot er was the beginning, with Watt's

improvement of the steam engine, of the United Kingdom's total
gamble on the forces and machinery
ution.

31

or

the technological revol-

The net e.f i'ect of the first, the rise

or

the entre ...·

preneur, was gradually to raise to political eminence in the
House of c·omm.ons individuals whose eyes were as much up-on w.het
amounts to the ancestor or cost-accounting, particularly account-

ing the costs o-r imperial government, as they were on anythin-g
else ..

Along with them came the "little Englanders."

effect

or

the second, the gamble on ·t ·he :forces

Industrial Revolution t" was three-fol-d:

The net

or the "so-celled

1) e stimulation ot

the birth rate, 2) acceleration in the development or urban
centers concomitant with a ·progre-ssive, though relative, decline
in rural areas, and 3} a growing dependence upon outside sources

30 C"f. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations.
31 Watt's improvement of the steam engine resulted not so
much in an industrial revolution as in a technological revolution. England had already reached basic 1ndustriel1zat1on.
Factories were in existence, as were machines, but Watt introduced mechanical power as a replacetlent for water. power, ·treadles,
etc.. This led to technological improvements suc.h as vastly
different and more mobile machinery and a further substitution
.of machine power for hand power and hand operations.

L
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for the bulk or staple foods compounded later by e similar
dependence upon outside sources for the bulk of raw ma terial.s.
The

staggering~

problem.

The rapid decline or rur-a l

areas combined with explosive birth-rates in the expanding urban
areas soon bred a complete reliance upon 'foreign food sources-;
in fa-ct, " ••• in food supplies, she [the United Kingdom] ceased
to be self-supporting about 1830 ••• ". 32 The intensification of
the enclosure movements in the latter half or the eighteenth
end the f"irst half or the ninet-e enth centuries coc:l"bined w-1 th
the rising birth rate had stimulated agricultural production
end increased somewhat the domestic production .o f food, but
this success wa5 limited and had little retarding effect upon
rood

1~ports

bec-a use it failed to meet the risin-g demand for

food created by the concentrated explosion of the birth rete
in the urban centers. 33 Although agriculture is still far end

(London:

32 E. H. Carr, The Twent~ Year's Crisis, 1919·1939
!.facmillan and Co., l94 ), Chap. 8, p. 2~-

3 3 Cf. infra, P~ 83, Note 37. Note that it is the relative posi-tion of the rural areas which has declined. Food production has been increased to an opttoum, but it has never been
able to overtake the rise in birth rate of the eighteenth end
ninete-enth centuries, even though the population of the United
_Kingdom is now relatively stable. The loss of foreign investments in the last halt century has sharply focused this problem
in the mind or the average Britis-her. It has seriously
threatened his food supplies, at times reducir..g then to little
better then subsistence levels.
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away the single gre-atest domes-tic employer, 1 ts relet1 ve
economic end demographic positions have declined.

For the mo·st

part, this is beosuse the absolute number of urban births has
been rar greater then that in rural areas and because 1ndustry,34 since 1845, despite periodic economic depressions, has
absorbed most of the labor potentia-l represented by the population incr·e ese, there being an absolute 11m1 t to the number
that e·ven an 1ntenstf1ed agriculture could absorb.

Recent year.s

find but ? per cent of the home population directly involved
in domestic egr1culture, 35 as compared with 75 per cent in
17503 6 and 22 per cent in 1850. 37 Fifty per cent of the
British rood supply is now imported.
Food and economic geography.

These alterations in the

complexion of' the economic geography of the Un1 ted ·Kingdom he·ve

--

34 c~. Griffith, on. cit., PP~ 170-179.

-

35 J. Ru.ssell Smith,. and M. Ogden Ph.1111ps, Industr1e1
and Commercial Geography, 3rd ed. (New York: Henry Holt & Co.,
l946} t p. 425.

36
Hall and Albion, ££• cit., p. 479. This figure
appears to be somewhat high. cr. and compare with Griffith,
£2• £!!.,Chap. VII, particularly pp. 170-179.
37 Thi·a figure· represents a projection from tables and

me te·r isls to be round in Griff! th, ~· cit., Chap~- VII, pp .
.170-1?9, and may be in error as· much as 4 _per cent on the
pos1.t1 ve side; the percentage could be as 11 ttle as 18 per cent.
Griff! th also notes, p. 176, that t .he e-n closures did accomplish
their purpose for the short period of the American War, but
this has little· effect upon long range trend of progressive
food deficiency.

...
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had a progressively more telling e!'fect upon its rela-tions
with the member parts of its empire and with the world-atlarge.

They have certainly conditioned much of Britain's

behavior toward her colonial holdings, past and present • and

have had much to do with the pattern of British investments
abroad.

As· the

:food problem has grown more acute, more and

more British capital has flowed into areas from which Bri ta1n
can buy food.

The most recent example is the African experi·

ment, but for almost a ce-n tury and a .h alf--at least until the
world-wide depress.ion of the late 1920s--the Br1 tish bread bas-

ket has been her present and former colonia 1 holdings 1 part 1 c ularly the Uni.ted States and those Caucasian .areas now e-njoying
dominion status. 38

Millions

f'lowed into these areas.

or pounds of investment capital

Earnings from them were used to pur-

chase food and ra·w materials.

That oapite·l flowing into the

non ...caucasian holdings of the emptre was aimed princi_pally et

the development of the raw materials necess·ary ror the continued prosperity

or

the home industries.

38 This statement ·a nd those following in the next sec
represent an interpretation of information to be found in th tion
Statistical ..A.b s tract-s £!: the United Kingdom (London. H M ose
Stationery or:r1ce, C. 1821? - dat.e ) availaole at thls ·ti •
of the more ·not able revelation-s of these abstracts is thm.~ ·i One
moments or economic disturbance, the United Kingdom h
~
n
her trade inward upon the member parts or h.e r e~ ire as urned
particularly noticeable in the trade tables to b-~ f • dThi·s is
·pp. 162 ...165.
The food factor also helps ac·c oun
oun infra'
in Bri tis·h a:rf"a irs Of groups as the .Anti-Corn
fLor effectl veness
w eague ~nd others.

r.!

Patterns and QUrpos~s
or Briti s h i nve st_.ent~.
~
--......'----:::.....;,~ _

The

pattern of British investments appears to have been anything
but a haphazard a:rfair, at least not since the opening of the
nineteenth century.

Brit! s h 1 nvestments since thAt time appear

to have had a three-fold purpose.

First, they were aimed at

the acquisi tio.n o:r raw materials needed to keep home industries
Second, they were aimed at earning monies in ereae

in motion.

possessing surplus foods for export.

Third, they were aimed

at controlling the transport facilities so
tinued flow of these goods.

vit~l

to the con-

The potential food surpluses or

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in large measure account for
the amount of British capital invested in those areas end the
nature of the investment.s thems.elves.

Since 1830 Bri tein has

desperately needed increased food suppli.e·s to keep pace- w1 th
her exploding population.

The "1ndustriel-technological

revolution" was well into its maturing phases berore British
planner·s became .fully c.o gnizant of 1 t ,s implications.

By this

time (1840-1860) the information compiled 1n the Statistical
Abstra.cts was beginning to reveal a fearful dilemna to Br1 tish

planners.

Population shifts were well under way, technology

was maturing, agriculture had seriously lagged behind popula-tion growth, materiel resources were showing a relati-ve
decline in yield • and the ·united Kingdom was being r ·orced to
commit itselr to further industrialization and dependence u~on

world trade.

There was no other way to feed en expanding

,,I

)1 .-'

.. .,.
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population which had long since outgrown th& capacity or
available food producing racil1 ties, nor was there any other
way to keep functioning smoothly an economy whose raw resources
in their relationship to available markets &nd production
facilities were declining in productivity.

Is it any wonder,

then, that Bri ta,in would undertake her histor-ic gamble on world
trade?

What el.se could she do·?

Only in a free market could

she hope to o·btain needed foods and offset her other mate·r iel
deficiencies.

High tariff policies had to be discarded and

were.39
Effect. of economic seography £!! col.onial governments.
There seems little doubt that awareness of these problems has
conditioned and colored the differing types of ru·le which
oritain has established ov·er given units or the empire.

These

governments are neither noble nor ignoble b·ut have the virtue
of being eminently practical solutions of existing problems,
9roblems related not only to the United Kingdom itself but to
the whole empire and the political economy of the world in
general.

39 In this regard it is interesting to note for comparative purposes the growing sentiment toward lower· tar iff
pol.icies in the traditionally high tariff United States. This
sentiment has, with periodic lapses, r~en growing stronger over
the past thirty years. One. can expect tha·t 1 t will con t 1 nue
to do so as .A:m.erica exhaust·s her pri!llary mineral resource-s,
though she may be more fortunate than Britain in that she
should not have· the same food problem.
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VIII·.

GEOPOLITICS AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

Political economl, strategic politics, and colonial
administration.

For the British administrator the political

economy ot the world in general has never been a small problem,
nor has the problem of maintaining political controls over
colonies once they have been established.
Caucasian holdings, both the resource-s they

In the case of noncont~rined

and ·the

technologica-l 1nfer1or1 ty undergirdin-g their military weakness
have always presented a lure for the pote·nt1al aggressor.

These

resources might provide the potential aggressor with en opening
wedge into Britain's control of the "lion's share" of the
world market and place in his own hands co·ntrol of an economic
or industrial asset in which he was

de~icient.

British adminis-

trators have also ha-a to take into account the fact that
largely because of cultural tradi t.1 ons and ·p otential technological. equality Caucasian holdings have been fertile soil for
the act1v.1 ties of revolutionaries.

Disputed interpretations or

constitutional matters supported by the Bri t1sh adm.1n1etrator' ·s
hesitance about facing a conflict that could weaken Britain's
delicately balanced strategic grip have more than once laid
the rounda tion tor internal mac-hination and revolt in these
Caucasian units, as evi.d.e nced in the case of the Thirteen
Colonies and Canada.

There was the further problem or pro-

tecting the .home economy and there-b y· Britain's strategic
strength by protecting the in vestments hone ci t1zens had made·

~ --

---
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in colonies, foreign trade, and fore·ign lands,

8

problem

almost hopelessly complicated in the case of colonial holdings
by

matters of profit and loss and their relat-ionships to poten-

tial strategic advantages or difficulties.

All these problems

were further complicated by th.e potential de signs of hostile
powers.

Foreign instigation or intervention in areas of British

influ-ence or control has presented Brit ish a.dmin1 s tra tors with

·more than one problem in their ·efforts to maintain the unstable
prerogatives of empire.

Together with the previously-mentioned

internal course of the United Kingdom itself, these factors
served to create a single problem in terns of imperial rule.

Vulne.rability and colonial compromise.

Vulnerabil1 ty

to foreign assault, for instance, has certainly conditioned
·Britain's treatment of her non-Caucasian holdings as much as
has the matter of protection or her own nationals or their
investments.

They are but two facets of the same problem, the

protection of the mother country's paramount interests by continuing the existence of the colonial relationship because the
continued ar-t.iculation of the home economy is in some vi tal
way dependent upon it. Carrington's analysis of the progress of
British rule in Southeast Asia presents numerous examples in

40 Cf. C. E. Carrington, The British Overseas (Cambridge,
England: Tiie University Press, 19 50) , particularly the "Ar guments" which begin each division of th.1s study.

1
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point.

Original.ly, British interests entered this area in

order to take advantage of the "luxury trade," to supplant
Dutch and French interests as well as those. of Portugal and
Spain, and to obtain strategic advantages which insured protec-tion Of the luxury trade. British cep1 tal and management
'followed.

Economic development took place a-nd trade relations

were established.

A segment of the British economy became

dependent upon these arrangements.

To mov-e out after suc·h

growth had transpired would have been fo·o lhardy in the extreme,
since it would have left the area at the mercy of foreign
invaders and might well disrupt the precariously balanced
British economy and strategic power which by the last quarter
of the nineteenth century was almost totally dependent upon the
rubber, tin, oils, tea, etc. derived rrom investments in these
areas.

Arter all, the British had no guarantee that their

economic arrangements would persist once they had voluntarily
relinquished political .management of a given area.

Since 1830

Britain has been absolutely dependent upon trade for food
supplies, and since about 1880 she ·has become more and more
dependent upon outside resources for the basic o.p eretion or
her economy until now she almost totally dependent upo.n them.
Political oo·n trol of non-Caucasian colonies has been one .o f the
principal guarantees of the- acquisition of these necessities.
Abstract of British Economic interests in South€ast

~·

'

L ..--- -·

-.._

--- ---- . -

90

British economic interests i t southeest

Asia

(

nnd

thrcu ~ hout

non-Caucasian holdings ror that matter)
in the United Kingdom.
trends:

reflect eco~o~1c ctenr.es
In generel, they have reflected t~o

1) the continuation of the traditions or the luxury

trade, and 2) the gradually growing dependence or the ~nited
Kingdom upon outside resources and food, the letter trend betng
by rar the more important today-.

Ini t1ally, os already men-

tioned, British economic interests, prompted

by the

prorttB

obtainable from the spice and tea trade, had entered the luxury
trade in Southeast Asia.

Next came the develcpment of the op1un

trade and the introduction of rubber cultivetion.

Prcf1t

w~s

the principal lure at thts stage, and its motivation is reflected
in the- conduct o-r Bri t.i sh administra tive interests- in the

at the time.

~re~

As often as not, colonies were ecquired to cor.trol

the trade or rubber planting, though because ot o

strate~1e

element in all territorial preemptions these colonies were often
saddled with the costs of their own protection thrtu e h the
41
exaction ot "sums of tribute" from native interests.
Rub:er
cultivation, however, though originally promp ted by luxury
interests brought with it a new concern for edm1n1str~t1ve
planners.

The transplanting of rubber trees first discovere~ 1n

41 Ct. C. E .,Carr i ng t on, _
OD .cit
_ . , ·DD
- • 254 f., 4 02-·1C5,
416 f. , et seg.

I

j____ _

-

-

--~

Brazil rrom that area to London end thence, step by step,
rrom London to India, to Ceylon, end to the Fee! ere ted 1.~!11 ey
States involved British interests , pr 1 vate

a~~

public, in

~cn-

siderable expense and was prompted more by the value of rub b ~r

·a s a luxury item that it we s b.y the- ru ture indus tr1_, 1 uses to

which it might be put.

42

Rubber cultivation wes stert~d on

lands lying idle and was r1nenced rna1Lly by British

c~ ~ 1tnl.

As rubber grew in industrial importance, so did the vr:lue of
British administrative control of th.e areas tn wh1c·h 1t wna cul-

tiv-ated.

It was at this point, c. 1870, that the dt'rter.de

cf

technolog-ical and industr.ial developments coupled with the relAtiv-e inadequacy of home resources began to assert its domir."lnt

inrluence upon British policies in Southeezt Asia.

Eccr.on1c

interest was by this time a definite strategic 1r.te·re.st.

It

was also a definite demographic interest becP.use of the fOQd

supply problem.

continued trede meant adequate rood ·sup ~ liee

and the raw materiels necessary ror industrial producttor..
Granted these matters, the impos 1 t"icn of f'ree trnde up en Indi 6

which followed was a logical ste·p, 43 and so ~8s Eriteir. 'a

entrance into tin-mining in :Malaya·

44

Each move w!'ts e -str~te~ic

42 Cf. Smith and .Phillips,£..£.· cit.' 'Q p. lc 9 -17 F3 , fo:- the

developmentof the rubber i n dustry anc.ruober plan tin;;: ..
4.3 Cf. Carrington,££·.£...!_!., PP• 928-~40!4 f or the
developmentof British economic 1nteres·ts in Inc. ... c..•

44 Qt. Smith and Phillips,~· ~i;~'s;~t~~!!tf~;ie:or the
development of British mining interest

and economic necessity

Fo

exemple, as Cornish tin ~1nes tell
behind industrial demands, British interest in ex 1st 1 ng !.!altl.yl'!n
•

r

tin deposits began to quicken.

Until 1892, tin-minir.~ tn. thAt

area was almost exclusively in the hands or t .he Chinese, thou~:h
the British had some interest 1n a few compa.nies.

by 1 89 ~,

however, British i .nte·rests began to s·ee e real necessity ror
the use and control, it' possible, for greatly exp~ndel! tin

rn that

SUpplies.

year the first exclusively };ri t1Ar, cor::peny

began tin-mining in the !!ala yen peninsula. 45

Th1 s

W'l.S

f,..r from

control of' mining operations in that area, but the !lritish
the ·k -eys to eventual control:

h~d

money and special machinery.

T.he e-asily worked deposits were b·e ginninp; to decl1nP. 1·n productivity, world wide demands for tin were 1x.cre'ls1ng, and the

British had the machinery and know-how necessary ror work1tl£ the

vast remaining deposits-.

As these deposits declined in produc-

tivity, British control of' the machinery necesaery ror wcrk1nr,
the rema1t.der became the real means of ."3r1 tish central.

By H~20,

the British had acquired control of 36 per cent of the totsl
of the Malayan output which was twenty-five per ce~t

of the

world supply.4·8 By 19 3 9, combined with Dutch end Fre1:ch i-nterests,

the-y had through various purchases geir.ed control or s1xty-z:1ne

45 Smith. and Phillips,

--O!J.

c 1 t.

1

p • 214 •

-

46 Ibid.

L
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p·e r cent of the Malayan output. 47

Now, they control 1 t almost

exclusively, but it amounts only to about eight per cent of
the world ·supply, enough for British needs and 11 ttl.e more.
The Br1 tish eppe·ar deliberately to have set out t.o gain th1.s
control because they had to.

Only through political and

economic control of resources could they guarantee the oo nt-!nued
articulation of the home economy.
~

materials end their effects upon

.or non-Cauoas1en colonies.

~

administration

The story of tin end rubber is in

mi·c rocosm the key to an understanding of the persistence of
British controls in ·non-Caucasian areas.

In miniature these

two resources represent the whole food a-nd raw materia l.s quendary in which Britain finds itself.

Ever more persistently

Britain has been made aware -of the fact that she has to maintain
some type or control over these areas else her whole precariously articulated economy is in danger.

r ·t

is the only way she

can guarantee t ·h e continued flow of resources and· food ·to home
industries.

The need for some tYPe of colonial control to

guarantee a vital resource coupled with her strategic quandary
is the reason she has been willing to settle in the past half-

4 .7 Ibid. It may be of note that ninety per cent of the
world's supply of tin presently comes from Hritish a-nd Dutch
controlled companies on the Dutch-.held islands of Banka, Singkep,
and Billiton in the Malayan Archi_pelego, an area strategically
controlled by Singapore.

century for progressively more limited controls over newly
dominated areas.

·The "League" mandates are a case in point.

Britain needed these mandates to protect one resource or another
or fo.r strategic purpo·ses.

Control of these resources is the

v1 tal key to her nati·o nal existence e.nd, as shall be discussed
further on, 48 the reason ror the myriad range of governcental
instruments setting the rule over non-Caucasian colonies.
Caucasian colonies, economic "fu turea .," end colonial
administration.

The development of rule over Caucasian colonies,

on the other hand, presents e.n initially di.fferent picture, but
it ends in the same morass of food

inadequacies~

deficiencies, and strat·egic problems.

raw material

Looking beck to the

period between the .American Rev.ol t . and the North America Act,
it is readily observable that only a few of the Caucasian
colonies, the smallest, paid, though ell appear to have been
potentially useful.

Larger units such as North Ameri.oa and

Aue.tralasia did not pay and would not pay for so·me time, but
all appear to have been viewed by administrators and investors
as potentia-l breadbas·k ets and sources f'or raw materials::

in

fact, potential resources in many of them was the reason tor
their founding.

They were not yet developed industrially·,

and existing economic arrangements appear to have discouraged

48 Cf. infra, pp. 156-172 et ~·

r-- · -

any serious efforts in this direction.

As metallic

Rn~

otter

resources were discovered and developed, the path ot quickest
profit and least resistance appeared to have been to shtp the

raw materials to the ready

homelan~
"' ~

mar k e-t for process1nt,, the

most obvious course in the existing economic structure.

And

just as- expedient and obvious a course was follolfed by the home
capit-al flowing into these areas for investment.

Investn:ent

capital was channelled into agricultura1 development, Dining,

and transport, three areas in the

ex1st1n~

econot:1y in which

pro.fi t was all but guaranteed by existing and
demands.

-Though it might be argued that the

growinf~

home

princip~ls

con-

cerned--administrators, investors, and colonia ta --wer-e uno ware
of these matters, the existence of the Statistical AbstrActs

would indicate t -h e contrary.

The continuous and purposeful

modification of these compile tions suggest rather a mature
awareness both of the course of the British economy and a real-

istic appraisal of the value of colonies to the continuation of

that economy.

They suggest also that British edm1n1stretors

were well eware of the existing and po~ential weaknesses 1n the
fabric of co-ntrols they and their predecessors hed woven over
the caucasian colonies.

or

Administrators appear to heve been aware

t -h e fact that, though theY were not yet developed industrially,

the Caucasian areas were at the same cul-tural level e s the hooenuals
They were cerlend and po-tentia-l lY 1 ts t -ee h no 1 og leal e 'i
-·
tainly aware of the fact that, _g ranting ex1st1ng strategic con-

,.--- ·- .

d-1 t ·ions, one ot the lar.c-e s t

of the early Caucasian units, the
Thirteen Colonies, had with rore1gn id
a - proved a ntl1 te_ry
o

match for e:x;peditions sent :from the- hooeland and freed 1 tse lf
of all controls.

The arfair of the Thirteen Colonies end the

troubles in Canada also served to point out the teet ttet

because of cultural patterns similar to those in the ho~elend
the Caucas-ian units were always sitting on the thin ed,.--. e ot
revolt over constitutional matters, further 1ncrees1n~ the
costs or governing them -a nd thereby decreas"ing the reel be-nef1 ta

derived t'rom them.

C-a ucasian units frankly had little desire

to -share in the costs of their own defense, at least n.ot without constitutional guarantees,

~nd

they seemed equally reluc-

tant to assume this burden even with s-uch guaren tees.

The

conflicts inherent in this colonial s -ttuation gradually develcped
into a raging controversy at home as to just whet coulj be done
to

so~ve

them.

The ~-empire- view

6

On the one hand "ere the -groups

totally opposed to empire-, the chief and most vocif"erous of
which was the "little Englanders."

49

They

so~e~~at

shcrt-

cr
~the "little Er.glander's" princ1psl s~okes- · one o_
nd Discussions (London:
·men' John stuart Mill, Di ssertat 1 on sial I
, leo f - 1 ?9 _..,o::.
186'7)
Vol.
, PP•
·•
.. _... ,
Longmans, Green, & Co.,
, interesting facets of t .he "11 ttle
for his- view-s. One of the more
hest su oort seens to
Englander's'' views is that the;r ~;~u:l~;ther- t~~n the 11~er'!ls,
have come fron the landed ar1 5 " 00 - · Y 8 m""neble to dying r:er_sugO'esting that their views were more
cantilism rather then nascent capitalism.
49
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sightedly pointed out the fact th9t the administration or

Caucasian holdings appeared to be a losing proposition in
terms

or

trade returns. even though these areas were still

under development.

From this apparent lo.ss r ·a ctor they argued

that the financial burden entailed in the defense of these areas
was somewhat pointless.

Further, they added fuel to the heated

disputes about demands for self-determination in Caucasian areas.
~

empire-mar! time hegemony v.iew.

the groups composed
canny

or

or

On the other hend were

administ-rators and ir.vestors.

The more

the administrators {unless o·ne can believe that the

information available in the Stattstical Ab-strRcts was unused
and meant nothing) couli foresee the day--the food problem was

looming large--when these areas -would not only bring f"1nonc _t al

returns and- be self-_paying, but the day when they would be the

salvation

or

the home ec-onomy.

By 1849 the motur·ing s1 tuntion

of resource dependency bad forced a study of the s1 tua·tion in

Canada (the Durham .Report, 1839), the re~eel of the Cor-n Lews
(1846),. and the repeal ot the l~avigatton Acts (1A49), 911 eii:led

at insuring the stability of coloniel governnent end the continued f'_low of necessities- to the homeland.

Investor senti:Lent

was demanding relief from what it considered 1nequ1 table- costs,

but along with administrative interests it could roresee the
day when despite a "virtual autarky in several

1r~ustriel

produots _,"

50
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the Un1 ted Kingdom would 1 oak to these areas both

for the bulk Of her food su,pplies end the bul-k or her raw materials.

Both were already encoura ging further investment on the

basis of this belief.

In other words, they, administrators end

investors alike, could see the need for continued control of these
areas, but they also wished relief from what they considered to
be conditions under which they burdened themselves with an inequitable share of the costs involved.

Colonial clamor had to be

satisfied in the interests or governments 1 stab111 ty ,_ but not at
\

the- expense of making the particular colonial unit vulnerable
to

~urking

foreign assault.

The United Kingdom- w·a nted to be rid

ot. strategic costs, but it still needed the a -s surance of the
trade relations so vital to its national existence.

Stable

c1 vil condi tiona in colonial areas could be the only real a-ssurance of the -s e trade relations, end they would be better assured
it' the homeland could have- some control over their direct ton.
~

and responsible government:

legislative dyarchy in

~North

The maturat_1 on

.£!:.

the

America Act.

The compromise
worked out to solve the Caucasian problem was, as Howe 51 would
50 C:f. E. H. Ca-rr _t £1?.• cit., Chap. 8, for a discussion of
these factors. in their historical context ...
51 cr. in regard to this compromise, hereafter referred to
as the legiSlative dyerchy, the Durham Report (1839), sections of
which may be :found in Stephenson and Marcham, £E• cit., PP· 776
ff .- , or the entire report which may be foWld in the--british ~ ..
liamentary Papers, 1839, No. 5(London: H.M. Stat1oner's~Off1ce,
Reprint). In regard to Howe-, cf. his celebre ted and ~n.~..luen tia 1
letter to Lord .John Russell noted immedi-ately below, t . . ote 51.

g9

have it, "eminently British."

It was the compromise of ~r9nt-

ing the particular Caucasian untt

8

lorge
u
measure o!' 1nt.e rnal

autonomy in exchange r ·o r the United Kingdon's control or the
particular colony's roreign affairs, diplomatic And economic.
As Howe stated the matter in the case of caneda,52 responsible
government, " ••• the remedy pointed out. while it possesses the
merits of being eminently British--making them so respons .1 .ble--

1s the only cure tor those

[Canada's] evils short

or

er rnnt

quackery, the only secure foundation upon wh"ich the power

or

the crown ean be established on this continent [or in other

colonies~ EdJ ~ ~ ~ defy internal m2Ch1nAt1on nnd foreign
assault." (Italics,

E~)

Thus administered, Caucas18n colonies

could be saddled with the costs of their own internal edn1n1stration and part

or

the costs

or

their defense, end honelend

administrators could review decisions inimical to British interest·s and prevent sue h foreign agreements· as Vi\JUld con!'11c t with
the over-all stability of the im?eriel structure.

~he legis-

lative dyarcny created by the North America Act (1367) 53 is the

52 cr.. letter written from Halifax by Jose~h H~we, Pro~
inent c.it1zen of Nova .scotia, Britain's Secretery of ~t~te for
war and the Colonies from which this quotation is teken. This
letter may be round in Stephenson and Uarcha~, ££· ~., P· 7?9.
53· cr. Public General statutes, II, 5 f.: 30 71ctor1ae
c. 3 {London: H M stationery Office, n.d.). Other acts mentioned may be f~und in their appropriate locations in the same
source.
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first mature example of this compromise, which hed begun with
the Irish Appeals Act ( 1783) .• 54 Article III of this act expl1c:1 tly locates exec-utl"ve author! ty in the queen (by this time-,

1867, a captive of Parliament) in its opening statement:
executive government and authority

or

"The

and over Canada is hereby

declared to continue and be vested in the queen."

Article rv,

on the other hand, creates the legislature ·and lays the cornerstone of internal autonomy, though its last paragraph a .sserte

the right of royal review and veto, review end veto functioning
through the governor general, queen,_ e.nd Privy Council.

Art1cl.e

VI s·p ecifically enumerates the legislative rights reserved to
the colonies while implying the paramount authority of Britain

in external affairs.

This same pattern of government and

divi~

sion of power, the legislative dyarchy, was later followed in
the cases of Aust-ralia and New Zealand (1900), the Union of
South Africa (1909), and the Dominion of India· (19-46)7 though
India, largely because of Britain's imperial quanda..ry following
World Wars I" and II, was given a wider matter of choice.
Legislative dyarchl
administration

£!

~ ~

solution j£ the problem of the

Caucasian colonies.

This creation of the

doninion, or the establishment of the legislative dyarchy to
handle internal administration in colonies of Cauuasian origin,
1 t can be seen, h-ad the virtue or being .able to satisfy everyone

54

c.f . infra , p. 1·:33

f ·

\
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from the "little Englanders" and tho~ n ew 1 y-r 1 sen "private-

enterprisers" to the Canadians thenselves.

After ell, tt did

satisfy the "little Englanders" on the question
minetion.

0

r self-deter-

It did satisfy the Canadians, for the time beicg, on

the question -or constitutional guarantees.

It r,uieted the

nascent forces ot private enterprise in Parliament on the mntter
of the- costs- or imperial government, since Bri t .ain \Vould be

free of the costs of putting down revolts and be reliev-e d or a
\

goodly share of the costs of strategi-c defense in Nort-h ..:.. ner1ee.
tali tary planners -w ere also made much happier s-ince it relieved
t -hem or the problem of localizing navel forces end left th.em

free to distribute them for the protection of the trade rout-e s
so essential to British welfare.

The principles of this com-

pro:mi se also ser-ved_, inc !dentally., to deliver the coup de gr'3ce
to mercantilist forces in the British _government • t .hough they

did not alter one jot an essentially mercantilistic fector, the
food and raw materiels problem, in British government.
Potential failure

or

~legislative dyarc~y.

however, was not a- complete success.

The dyarchy

Had it satisfied all the

forces in conflict, there seems little doubt that Britein would
still be the world's foremost political and_military power.

The

distribution of the power potential inherent in this union or

colonies and homeland would have been well-nigh invincible.

The

United Kingdom would have been the heart or a lasting global

..i

....

102

hegemony.

Un:fortunately, the administration structured by the

legislative dyarchy could not bring this eventuality to fruition
because the deve.l op1ng his tori ca 1 picture would leave the United
Kingdom too vulnerable.

Though Canad.a and other areas would

enjoy the protection af'forded British subjects, it would only
be

~

matter o:r time until they were suffie!ently developed to

chafe under restrictions both in government a.nd upon the course
their economic development was- to take.
lead to demands for complete autonomy.

This would and did
Changes in the United

Kingdom's over-all economic picture led to a number of imperial
conferences in which the United Kingdom frankly wooed increased
trade relations with the member units of the empire.

The rise

of Germany, Russia, and Japan es military powers· led to a
corresponding decline in Britain favored military position:

in

fact, partially because or Britain inability to demand military
help from her colonies,. Germony in. World rlars I and II blatantly
exposed to the world-at-large the point at whic.h the mi.l1 tar;~r
might of the United Kingdom was most vulnerable, the matter of
food and raw material imports.

In both cases, had it not been

for the timely interference of the United States, Britain might
well have gone down to defeat; the British empire certainly
would have been dismembered.

World ~ar I also served to

decimate British investments in North America, thus tremendously
weakening the United Kingdom's normal economic position.

., , . .,. . __ ....
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Possibility

£!

~ empire parliament.

another side to the r.:L6tter.

There is also

At any time until 1880 under the-

legislative dyarchy, the United Kingdom m1£ht have c;ambled on
the first truly international government, an empire parliament,
and won out by persuading the Caucasian units of the wisdom of
this end.

Beyond 1880--certainly after ~orld War I--she had

reached the realm of no return.- The combine tion of ·pressures
upon the imperial structure- building up after the North America
Act reached a culmination in 1931 with the Statute- or -i lestm1nster.55 Under the dictates of this statute the United Kingdom
voluntarily relinquished all claim to governmental prerogatives
over her Caucasian units, with the exception of India, and including the non-Caucasian unit of Papua, a dominion administer-ed
jointly with Australia.
Modes of rule

amon~

non-Caucasian colonials.

This somewhat

deferenti-al treatment af'forded Caucasian units since the .American
Revolt may be contrasted with that offered non-Caucasian colonies.
Colcniel governments among non-Oa.ucasien colonies have varied
considerably, degrees of subjugation or control being dependent
55 Cf. Stephenson end Marcham, ~· £:!.!·., pp. 839-841, or
the PubliciGeneral Acts of the United Kingdom, 1932, p. 13 f.:
2.2 George V, c. 4, ~most s-ignific-ant provision of this ect
bei~g the statement " ••• that no law hereafter made by the parliament or the United Kingdom [sic] shall extend to any of the said
dominions aa part of the law of that dominicn otherTiise than at
the reauest and with the consent of that dominion ••• ". The
dominions referred to are Canada, Australia, New Zealand, .South
Africa, the Irish Free State, and 1-Jewfoundlend.

-~--- .
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upon variable factors, but the essential principle behind
them ell was that or an ad!ninistrati ve dyarchy.

rtherev-er

practicable or forced, internal rule was placed in the hands
of the netives, but British administrators exe.rcised
deal of control over these affairs· even t ·hen.

8

great

As always, they

exercised full control over external affffirs.
Desi:rab.1li ty of non-Caucasian holdings.

To begin with,

in dealing with its non-Caucasians, the United Kingdom was
dealing with groups inferior to its own nationals in material
culture, especially in the tools and techniques of warfare.
These peoples--Burmese, Malayans, Africans, Amerindians, Pecific
Islanders, etc.--were no military match for the British, et
least not by themselves.

None of these groups possessed wea-

pons equal to those of their European overlords who were not
about to supply them in any se·r ious quanti ties.

Almost all or

them, China being the exception,5 6 lacked a sufficient differ·ential tn population with which to offset material de.f ic 1enc1es.
Their desirability as colonies was predicated on their possession
of either ·a s·trategic location or material resource desired by
the British.

5 6 India might here be considered a non~Caucasian unit,
but for the purposes of this st·udy 1 t is in the end, e s anthropologists classify 1 ts people, Cauca·s.ian. In recent years it
has finally received the treatment afforded c·aucasian units •

L.

' ..,.
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Conditions contributing to variations in rule among the
~-Caucasian

colonies.

Had the above conditions alone obtained,

the end result might have been the complete subjugation of all
non-caucasian colonies.

As things worked out, they did not.-

Cert.a in "natural" che-cks appear to have operated to minimize the
total effectiveness of military and other disadvantages.

First

was the limit to the number of individuals who at any· specific
time could be spared from the home population to provide colonial adm1.n1strators w1 thout e.ndangering the efficiency and
security of the home gove.rnment.

Publi.c education could pro-

duce only a limited number of trained administrators, able
though they might be. 57

A aecond check was of a .military nature,

there being rather definite demographic, financial, and industrial limits to t -he number and size. of -armies whtch the British
could at any given time comm1 t to the support of colonial expansion or protection w1 thout, again, endangering home sec.urity or
the stability and success of the colonial movement- itself.

This

is one of the basic reasons that trade-r -colonists often had to
go 1 t alone in the est-ablishment of governmental controls ov-e r

57 ct. Rams·ey Muir, How Britain is Governed (New York:
Houghton, Mifflin Co •• 1935}. One of the prir..cipel these_s of
this work i .s that public education in Britain has had a pronounced
effect upon colonial administration. Muir contends that public
education in the United Kingdom is the key to the Colonial
Office's po_l icies and thereby the key to British colonial compromises-.

IL
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non-Caucasian peopl-es and one of the reasons for the common use
of mercenaries, such as Sepoys, fiuanced by private rather than
governmental interests.

Another ltm1t was the disruptive forces

latent in the imperialistic designs of competing powe-r s.

These

functioned as serious checks, part-i cularly after the advent of
nationalism in non-Caucasian areas because, if British rule
became too arbitrary, th-e attra-ct! v.eness- to native groups ot
revolutiona-r y enterprises financed by Britain's imperial rivals
would increase by leaps and bounds.
the Khyber
ation.

Pa~s

Rueso•Br1tish rela~ions in

area would be an examples

or

this check in oper-

Still another check was the s.heer cost of putting down

rebellion, the cost often being out

~f

all proportion to the

benefits derived from the enterprise to be preserved.

A fur-

ther check arose from the tendency of many natives to adopt
the cultural patterns of their British overlords, a tendency
aided in no small measure by missionary enterprises.
behavior of Gandhi and the recent behavior
cases in point.

or

The early

Krishna Menon are

The adoption of British culture- in their ce ses

and many others generally ca-rried with it a corresponding demand
for goverr.mental privileges commensurate with this cultura-l

pattern in the United Kingdom.

Another check arose fro-z:1 the

machinations or var-ious boards of control which were not too
eager to surrender to the dictates of Parliament c-o lonial
prerogatives which they had won largely -a s a result. of their

•I

I~~,

I

I

II
!

own efforts.

58
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What· might be considered a final, perheps the·

most important check, s.tellllled from the need .of the United
Kingdomts need for the raw materials and food provided by these

'

o.olonies.

f

I

Continuous warfare or civil strire would upset this

r.

flow or necessities and thereby seriously impair home living
standards and, more important, the British geo-political
potential.
Sacerdotalism ~ na t1ona.l1sm.

Counterbalancing the pla.y

of these forces were both sacerdotali.sm and neticnalismt particularly in the Near Ea.st and Asia.

In the early years of Br1 tish

rule, the net effect of sacerdotalism was to meke non-caucasian
colonial.s more docile.

After ell, these people were accustomed

to following the dictates of divine rulers who, in their turn,

1 .

i''

were submitting to the dictates of British administrators •. The

I

net effec.t or nationalism, the curse of later imperial years,
was, on the other hand, ·to unify and intensify all over the
world native struggles

agains~

I:

I';

colonialism and to produce con-

I

Recent African troubles and the conduct of peoples in the

~ear

i

East and Southeast Asia are two of its more startling errects.
Plight of native colonials::

I'
.I

'~

tinuous periods of civil di.s turbance among native peoples.

An impetus to nationalism.

j.,

I

!
I

!

58 The actions of the East India Company would be the
supreme example. £!·Infra, p. 141 r., under the discussion
of the India Office Act (1858).

,
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Part or the emotional fuel behind national! ti
s c reove~ents emcng
non-Caucasian colonials appears to have risen from the
treatment
they have recei v.e d at Bri t ·ish hands. Treated in an indifferent
"_racist" fashion until the advent natio-nalism in the- closing
years of the nineteenth century, these colonials had been paid
their meagre wages and pretty mueh ignored. As
lone as ttey
remained docile, worked for their wages, and left the
Europe en
compounds alone, they were lert to their own devices.

Except

for a few public health programs and periodic femine relief,

! \

British administrators _, until the period when the rumbles or

L

'

'

nationalism could no longer be ignored~ had done little in the

way o:f improving the lot or advancing the cultural level or the

/,

I

native-s , though missionary groups had done much in this regard.
Official policy had generally been a case o:f "let sleeping dogs
lie."
The administrative dyarchy- amo.ng

~-Caucasian

coloni'lls.

There appears little reason to condemn British administrators

.,
I

.
t

for this policy which, 1n the end, fed the flames of

naticnalis~.

Aside from the fact that such a policy left thez:I :free to dep_loy
Britain's strategic forc&s in the troubled European area, the
truth would appear to be that native rulers were as much if net
more responsible than the British for the persi-stence of pr1oit1ve conditions. Colonial adm1ni.streto_rs early learned among nonCaucasians that the most prao ti ca l and Cheapes t method of msintain1ng stable civil co-nditions in which to do business • their

'

I!
I

'

i .

~ ~--- -
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primary concet"'n, was to leave the giving of direct-tons, as
much as possible,, to native rulers who were guided from behind
the scenes by these same administrators.

For the purposes or

this study, this system in its various ramifications is referred
to as the administrative dyerchy.

This is to be distinguished

from the legislative dyarchy in t ·hat admini.s·tretors kept a firm
hand in internal administration though they hid it whenever
possible.

For obvious reasons already considered, t.his we s the

cheapest and most ·p ractical form of rule which I3r1 t1sh ado1n1stra tors· could. devise.

It uti.lized the cultural institutions of

these native peoples to keep civil order and in later imperial
years proved an effective delaying tactic in the

~atter

of denends

for the removal or British controls-.
Na t ·ionalism !!.!!.

~

factor in Brit ish colonie 1 g overr.me nt.

The chief forc-e behind the demands ror the removal of Bri t1 sh
controls in non-Caucasian areas has come fron the emotions of
nationalism.

Nationalism, harking beck to former cultural

glories as its well-spring, has fallen upon the .ide-elisti c,
though perhaps sentimental, economic views of various political
theorists:

men such as Locke, Rousseau, Proudhon, Engels,

Marx, and the "Fabians-:''

to produce the unifying anti-colonial

cry, "exploitation," in non-Cauca.sian areas.

Non-cauca.sians

have latched upon the views of these theorists as justificationsfor their demands for autonomy and the removal of British

controls. 59

110
E~onomlc nationalism has proven a potent d1arup!

tive .force which has more than once canpelled British admini.strators to make ed.I!l1n1strat1ve co~pronrlses they would rather

have done without.

Civil disturbances disrupt indus-try end

trade, and as the nineteenth ce·ntury progressed trade became
a more and more vi tal issue with British planners, and so did

the flow of raw materials from colonial are a s, flows which

might hal.t to a trickle during periods of civil disturbance.
This -possibility appears to have been very effective in compromising British rule in non-Caucasian as well as Cauca.sian
areas.
The demographic-strategic factor.

..

,.

Another fac t or which

l i

I!

helped compromise British rule in colonial areas was the grow-

j

ing population differential between the United Kingdom and subi

~

I

ject territories, particularly those differentials represented
by the enormous populations· of non-Caucasian are-as.

For

exa~ple,

I •
;

I

ll

' .

: t

assuming that the British colonial popul-ation was zero in 1606
and that of Engla·nd 4,000,000 _. the lopsided growth of populatior.. s

throughout the empire produced sorae interesting results.

ij

u
l .

. i'

By

1800 the population of the United Kingdom had grown ·to about
25,000,000 while that of the musbr.oo:cing empire hacl exploded to

59 Cf. Hans Kahn, The Idea of Nationalism .( New York: The
Ma c:n1llan Co., Ul46) for
'()"fthepioneer studies in this area·
Kohn, however, does· not place quite the emphasis upon th·e economic aspects of nationalism that this study does.

" I

'
·l

one

I'

,I

!I

I'

rl
!i

t

!

'"'!
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one-quarter billion.

By 1900 the United Kingdom had grown to

40,000,000 while the empire encompassed some one-half billion
souls t unless comm1 tments in the Chin~ area include the. stabilizing of that population which would run the colonial popu-

lation close to one billion.

Adding European stabilization

to this d1:fferential, 1 t is readily observa·ble why Brit ish

administrators were so willing to compromise in the matter of
imperial rule in order to stabilize the flow of goods so

I

I

.,

necessary to the United Kingdom's survival and to free the
United Kingdom of colonial troubles in event of d.istur·b ances
in the

status~ aoong

the civilized nations of Eurasia.

Serii

ious civil disturbances occurring simultaneously in both Europe

t:

'i i'

and Asia, as later events were to prove, would have forced the

• !

Britain's vaunted two-ocean navy into a dangerously thin
l j

.I

strategic de·p loyment.
Troubled Eurooe:

~

fulcrum of

~

strategic oroblem.

'

' I

~ j

The problem. of stabilizing Europe has had the most profound

:i
;

\

influence upon the compromising of rule over non-Caucasians.
For the best part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
deployment of British strategic forces has been concentrated
in the European area.

This deployment appears to have resulted

from a be·lie:f on the part of British strategists ., quite logi.cal
in the circumstances, that the key to continued British colon.ial

control lay in the maintena·nce of the status quo or balance ·of

'i

-...
'

I
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power in Europe, at least until the rise of the Japanese navy

J

in our own century.

I
I

As strategic potential was distributed

in the European ere.a, Britain had by t'ar the u_p per hand; and,
taking into cons"ideration her two-oce-an navy, she appears to
have expended considerable effort to protect it.

Any sign or

-d isturbances in the distribution of power in Euro pe would ·b ring
British forces into the "thick of it."

From the Polish par-

tition-s through the revolutions in the Ued.1terre-nean area, from
the French Revoltu1on through the "year of revolutions" (1849),

'

from Laibach and Troppau to the Franco--Pruss1en War _, Europe
had to be stabilized by t ·h e threat of Brit ish power.

'

This

meant the concentration of the major part of British naval
strength in the European area where sat Britain's t·echnolop;ical
rivals, those most capable ot waging successful war agAinst
her, and 1 t also meant that Brita-in could not afford to have
to divide this strategic power between maj_or troubles in Europe
and Asia at the same

t1~e.

This strategic difficulty also
'

'

~

'I

helps account f'-or British ac-c eptance of innumerable stre tegic
protectorates f'ollowing World War I, particularly for the feet
that Britain was asserting its predominant interest under
extremely limited political instruments.

She had to protect

her vulnerable areas and keep her life-lines open, but she could
not afford the expense of making protectorates colonies.

60

I
-f

60 Cf. Harold and Margaret Sprout, _Found a tions of, N;t1onal
Power {Princeton: The University- Press. 194::>), PP• l63-.... B.)\for
the changing character of the British strategic picture and ts
central problems.

!

~

J

j
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And this

strat~gio

stalemate also helps account ror the Hood,

Prince of Wales,. and other British nave_l disasters during theearly years of World VIer II.

Had 1 t not again been ror the

timely interference of the United States, Britsin's strategic
quandary might have broken the beck of the British empire.
Administreti ve results of the interplay £f. these nertin-en t influences _upon British

~~~-Ca- ucasians.

The end

admi.nistrati ve result arising from the interplay of these social,_
political,

s~rategic,

economic, end other forces was And is a

stranse series of compromise governments among
units of the empire.

non-CRuc~sie. n

They run the gamut r -r om the al;nost com-

plete subjugation of the Crown colonies to the rather broadened,
bu~

not complete internal autonomy of some of the island and

Afro-Asian colonies.

The eff~ctiveness of the adm1n1stret1ve

dyarc-hy varies from colony to colony a-nd is now often maintained merely as an effect! ve delaying tactic to insure the -c ontinued flow of necessities to the British homeland.

In general,

the administrative dyarchy functioned through the following

governmental instruments:
I.

Self-Governing Quasi-Dominions: i.e., Southern
Rhodesia is a self-governing territory whose
exter.nal affairs are directed by the government
of' the United Kingdom which also has some control
in matters directly effecting ·the government
managed by the native population.
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II.

II.I.

IV.

Condominiums: areas such as the Anelo-Egyotien
Sudan jointly administered by the U.K. and . other
sovereign states. Though no longer applying to
the Sudan, this pattern fits for the Kew Hebrides.
Burma: a type well ad vance·d on the road to internal self-government. Domestic affairs with
certain reservations, are in the hands.or quas1.a·p po1n.t1ve administrators directly responsible
to en elected legislature. (Burma is now free. Ed.)
Colonies: represent a wide range or goverrunenta1
forms exhibiting various pha.ses o.f the administrative dyarchy. They range from Crown colonies
administered by a gove·r nor alone (Hong Kong) up
to administration by a governor who has the assistance or a nominated Executive Council and le~1s

lat1 ve body electe-d by the people (Gambia,. Sierra
Leone, Niger.ia, Basutoland, Malaya, Ceylon, etc.).

V.

VI.

VII.

Protectorates; states possessing internal sovereignty, the members o·r which are "Br1 t1sh protected persons," but not Br~tish subjects~ North
Borneo, Uganda, and the protectorate& in Somal1land
and Central Africa- would be examples falling in
this category.
Mandated T·e rritories: territories administered .b y
e1 ther the United Kingdon or one of the se-lfgoverning dominions under a ma-ndate from the
League Of Nations. Palestine, :r.:esopotamia, New
Guinea,_ a-nd Western Samoa would be examples in
this group, though the mandates now stem from the
United Nations.
British India:* has a central government cor.sist-

ing of a Viceroy, an ~xecutive Council, a Council
of State, and a legislative assembly. In each
province there is an elected legislature enjoying
almost complete self-government in p~ov1ncial
affairs, but 1n certain provincial and larger
matters the Viceroy ·1 s the final word,. he being
responsible to the Parliament of the United Y.in~dom
and the Crown.
Indian States:* ruled by hereditary p~inces who
have treaty relations with the Crown end who
exercise their authority under the suzerainty of
the King-Emperor and his representatives.
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*

Note: India is here treated as a non ... caucas1An
colony, though it will later be treated as a
Caucasian unit. Cf. infra, pp. 179-184, for
India's transition from administrative to legislative dyarchy.

Q.ui te obviously,_ in many of the above cases. nat 1 ve
peoples have been left pretty much in charge of internal governme-n t while British administration has remained -si:aply to protect
British interests, internal and external.

These conpron1 se.s

under the admin_istrat1 ve dyarchy a_p pear to r...ave arisen froc
the 1nterpl.ay of the principal concerns of British administrators contending with the syndrome of forces previously discussed, their concerns being the main tenanc.e of stable c tvil
conditions within the given colony in order to promote trade
and the flow of raw mnte_rials, the checking of the possible
designs of competing powe_rs, and the stabilization of Eurasia
at the same time.

In some areas, British forces have be-en gar-

risoned as much to as act a strategic- check upon the aob1 t ion.s
of competitors as they have been to act as a check upcn the
natives, tho1~h there is a definite element cf the latter in
all cases.
9S

All along the line, however, l3ritish administrators,

the compilation of governments shows, have been forced into

compromises.
The British maritime hegemony:.

Whe_t the British have

developed, then, according to the preli~inary definition given
of p·o li tical hegemonies, is an empire rather than en inpe ri um.
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Only in rare instances does Britain

exer~1se

authority even

remotely approaching absolute prerogatives-, and 1n almost all
cases her controls are in various stages of disintegration.
Britain has developed a rapidly disintegrating political hegemony on a mari tir:le basis in which rule, as much a-s- is pract1cable or forced, as shall be discussed further on, is divided
between the United Kingdom and the subject area.

So~e

measure

I

i

l

I

of internal self-- Government has been g! ven to most of the non-

,I

Caucasian units -because conditions forc-ed this concession upon

, I

·;
!

British administrators-, t .hough Bri ta1n has re-tained varying
degrees of control over their external or strategic affairs.
In the case of Caucasian units, the United Kingdom really has
no

con~rol

at all, conditioLs having forced her into a plea for

voluntary cooperation between herself and the erstwhile colonies
enJoying dominion status.
How this rapidly accelerating disintegration came about,
end Just what effect franchise changes in the United Kingdom
had upon 1 t, t ·he crux of this study-'s special _p roblem, is the
substance

or

the

rerr~ining

discussion.

I
I

I

~

I!
.t

J
l. J

,.,...,.
;

CHAPI'ER IV
FRANCHISE REFORM TII THE UNITED KING001.~

At the opening of the nineteenth century, the go·vernment
of the United Kingdom was organized along the lines of a
constitutional monarchy.

The Crown, however, had no real po11t-

ica·l authority, the extremely 11m1 ted extent of 1 ts prerogatives

having b.een settled by the agreements terminating the "Glorious
Revolution."

Actual governmental author-ity rest-e d in the hands
\ l
.

of a rather non-representative Parliament composed of two del-

I

.

\

.

I

I

1 bera ti ve houses, Lords .and CoiDI:l.ons.

Seats in Lords were hered-

:

;~

itary, residing ei'th.e r in a family title or church office.

seats

in Commons, on the other hand, were subject to the ballot of an

:I

extremely limited electorate because the voting franchises which
co.ntrolled the:c:t rested in parcels of land granted representation

;

:I

by the writs of' former ·tancastrian, Plantagenet, and Tudor

. ,. I
: I
!

monarchs end were continued in this pr1 vi lege by cus·tom.

Delibe-

1

rations in Coi!li!lons were conducted by the recently developed
I;

"party cabinet" system of operation, while those in Lords were
conducted on the basis of pr-ecepts
custaus and practices.

conte1~ed

in long-accepted

Under this system very few citizens,

about one in forty-five, had the right to vote.
the basis

or

· ''

';

Property was

i.

the voting franchise, and, as earlier r -emarked,

there were very few landholders in the United K1ngdom1
1 Cf. supra, p .• 41, Note 8.

\,
\

11-8

Clamor ~ reform.

As the n1neteentc century opened

8

great clamor 'for the reform of this sytem rose up in the Gnited
Kingdom.

The ba-sis of' this and subsequent cries for continued

.reform are quite we 11 known to any student of Brit ish history,
and, because they are of lit.tle use for the purposes of this

study, they shall be almost totally ignored.

Rather, tte

concern here will center upon the changes wrought in the makeup or Commons as these reforms progressed.

Lords will be left

out of the picture because, for ·the most part • until 1911, th1 s
-body was unaffected by the course or r ·r anohise reform, seats

in this body never having been subject to election.
Focus of the ,!ltta-ck upon the existing governmen_t el system.
Because seats in Lords were heredi tery, perha-ps for more then
any other reason, the cry for the

~eform

of the existing struc-

ture centered its attack upon the seats in the House of Commons.
The ends desired by those cla-moring for refo-rm were en extension
Of franchise privileges to more citizens end redistribution of
the seats 1n Commons on both a geographic _a nd demographic bas1s.

2

Those clamoring the loudest and ba.ck1ng t -he rest were the rising
group or industrialists Who were without voice in government end

2 Cf. Indexes for Hansard's Parliamentary Debates
(H. c. Deos.) for the year 1831, particularly the'?etition"of
Uerthyr Tidvill," Vol. 2, p. 206 f., or the discussion of Old
-Serum" in Vol. 2, pp. 1061-1089.

L
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J

j
J

who Wished to make an inroad into the hereditary aristocracy's

I

strangl-ehold upon governmer..t.

I

J

I
I
I

By 1831 their

clamor could r.ot

be ignored ., so Commons took up the subject of reform in the

electorate.
Reform Bill of 1832 and its s1gn1f1cancs.

The first

successful reform of the eleot·orate and inroad into the power
of the hereditary aristoc·racy· was the F.r-anchise Reforn P-111,2

i

I

really the franchise reform bills,

or

1832.

The passage

·this bill a-p peared to accomplish several things.

or

I

.I

First, 1 t

·I

I

I

apparently destroyed once and for all the lended sr1stocrecy's
semi-feudal monopoly of the British government and made the
first sue cessful inroe d in to mercantil1 st p·rtnc tple s in govern-

ment.

Second, it made wealth as well as property a basis for
voting enfranch1sement. 3 Third, while newly enfranchising

many c.itizens, it disfranchised many others; but the for:mer
were by far the larger group.
the

r~ght

One citizen in thirty now had

to vote, which for the most part served to give fren-

chise privileges to the industrialists.

Laborers, because few

could afford homes whose rental value reached en
of ten pounds, were still without the vote,

e~d

anr~al

average

so were· women.

3 Cf. listing of Coz:mi ttee Report.s listed in the Ind·exes
of Vols. ~end 7, Parliamentary Debates (Third Series: H. C.
Debs) for the gradual introduction of this change into the reform
platform.
1.,
I

I.

,
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rtscot and lot" ci t!zens were pretty well disfranchised

88

were many of the artt sans, a bout ten per cent or tt.e lA t te.r
group being left With the right to vote.

Many "rot t ·en bor-

oughs" were destroyed and their seats redistributed, thus
making for a more representative geographic distribution
the seats in Commons.

The principal evil

or

or

th-is bill ley ·tn

the fact that 1 t lacked the secret ba.llot which had been asked

fer.

Lack of such a safeguard left e good deal of the voti~g

open to coercion, particularly in the old and new c-ounty franchises- where weal thy· l -a ndholders could coerce the lesser property holders, or ''leaseholders," a group which before the bill
had in some counties ou·tweighed the power of the gentry.

On

the other hand, the newly arrived indust-rialists also found
the same advantage, though inherently an evil, accessible; so
its effe.cti.veness was somewhat lessened.
end result

or

On the whole, the

the bill was some realignment in political power

among the social class·es of the Unit.ed Kingdom.

The niddle
I'

class rece.ived a substantial increase in representation, and
the upper middle, o-r industrialist, group was elevated to a
post tion about equal to tha·t of the aristocracy.
' ,1

Commons

received recognition as the House which would eventually dominate
the British Parliament and government.

In other words, this

reform, which s.l:rn.ost wholly internal in origin, wes a typically
British :measure; almost every group received a sliver of the
cake, but no one group was permitted to .gorge itself upon it.

l.

l
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Municipal Corporations Act of 1835.4

---

The Reform bill

of 1832 was closely :followed by the Municipal Corporet·tons Act

of 1835, a law which introduced ·some reform 1r1to the adm1nis·...

tretion of boroughs, giving th€ general public a little more
voice in their administration and ttereby further augmenting
the posi.tion

or

the nascent industrialist group.

A~ore !n.por·

tent franchis-e reforms simne.red beneath the surface.
c·hartism.

The :first overt symptom of the determ1net1on

behind this simmering was the explosion on to the British

pol1 tical scene of a sometimes reckless movement known as
Chertism, given considers tion here bece.u.se 1 t represents two

important facets of future political

ref~rm:

1) it represented

the d-emand for fra-nchise privileges on the pert of th.a t vast
group, laborers and ordinary citizens, who had been ignored

by the reforms of 1832; and 2)

~he

fact that five of the six

points in its platform are the sum and substsnce
major franchise reforms.

or

subsequent

Chartism, though. it ultimately petered

out as a political movement and failed directly to im?lement the
reforms its sought, was effe~tive in other areas too.

In com-

bination with Anti-Corn Law League it helped brir.g about the·

-- ---

4 Cf. statutes of the United Kingdon, LXXV, 389f: 5-6
~~~~-

William IV, c. ?6.

I

L•
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repeal of both the Corn Laws {1846} and the Navigation Acts
( 1849}, thu.s cutting into the financial power represented tn
the agricultural wealth of the landed aristocracy and delivering a serious blow to the forces of mercantilism.

The "Peoples

Charter" is their principal contribution to the British franchise reform movement, even though it remained for other political groups to bring its ideas to pass. The six points of this
5
charter are: 1) the institution of universal manhood suffrage
for both men and women (women had not been enfranchised by the
reform of 1832) ; 2) the adoption of the secret, or Aus·tre lia·n,
ballot; 3} the creation of equal electoral districts; 4) the
elimin-ation

or

property qual11'ications for membership in Pa.rlia-

me·nt; 5) the instit·ution

or s-alary payments

for members

or

Commons;. and' 6) the institution of annual elections, the only

measure which has not been adopted .in some fashion.
Renresentat!on of the People Act£! 1867 and its

cance.

si~n1f1-

Except ror a f ·ew minor county and borough measures,

reform., as far as Parliament was concerned,. remained quiescent
until Gladstone's memorable speech6 in the Rouse of Comnons
5 Edward P. Cheyney, .Reeaings in English JI1story (Boston:
Ginn & Co .. , l908),pp. 702-704, contains a copy of the first
Chartist petition which contains the·s·e provisions, end pp. '704'713 contain further docunenta-ry material on this movement.

6 Cf. Gladstone's speech introducing his reform bill,
"On the Advance of" the Working Class,'' in Parliamen·tary Debates
(Official Ed.: H. c. Debs.}, CLXXXII, 1129 .. 1135, and .ensuing
debate.

,:
I

I

i .
L -.J

- - - ·- ··

1~3

in 1867.

Though his introduction, es Prime Hinister, of

8

proposed reform bill ended shortly in the proroguin~ of his
P-arliament·, the Conserve ti ve s who maneuvered ther!lsel ves into
power on the strength of defeating his bill found themselves
having to face up to the passage of reforms, anyway, if they
would stay in power.

The bill introduced by D1srael1 tn re-

sponse to riotous public s-entiment was even more lib-eral than
that previously proposed by Gladstone and became the ''law of
the land" as the Representation of the People Act of 186?. 7
This act extended the franchise in the counties and all
but made suffrage for men universal in the boroughs.
'

I

I'

This

was accomplished by a provision of the act, startling for its
time, that all men who paid direct taxes should vote.

In

essence, this provision had the ef.fec t of shifting th-e balance
of political power toward the working classes and solidly
establishing the middle classes in Parliamentary control.
This was in keeping with the trend instituted in the reform
Of 1832 which had begun to shift the balance Of power in

Co~~ons

and government toward the more numerous popular groups, though
by this time· the upper stratum of the middle classes which the

I

reform of 1832 .had enfranchised were fairly well identified

I

w1 th the erstwhile ·ar1.stooraoy.

!

i

Commons was thereby becoming

more solidly entrenched as the dominant organ of the British

? Cf. Public General Statutes, II, 1082 f.: 30·-31

Victoriae, c. 102,

for

a copy of this act.

-- - ·
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Parliament.

One person in eighteen now had the

women were still left out.

vote~

though

Labo.r received 1 ts enter1 ng wedge

into the Parliamentary arena, thereby liberalizing the views
of Parliament .even more than had the reform of 1832.

One

evil, howev.e-r, remained still untouched; the open ballot
remained to plague the unwary, leaving the laborer or any other
voter open to all sorts or reprisals and leading to such ridiculous situations as employers trooping their employees to the
polls to see to it. that the voting proceeded as they wished.

-The

Secret Ballot Act of 1872. 8

---

As soon as the e~ils or

this si-tuation became apparent, the Secret l:!allot Act ( lR72)
~ollowed

as a logical development.

Gladstone's bill asking

for the -secret ballot was quickly ~ssed in Com.11ons, and Lords,

!

now mindful of the inroad.s into 1 ts power, gave a q uick and final
nod to the measure rather than precipitate en election or
create a basis for the civil disturbances which usually followed
in the wake of refusal of needed reform.

The net effect or this

measure was more solidly to entr-ench the trend of shifting the
balance of political power toward the more numerous popular
groups;

Labor could now develop its own voice because it could

no longer directly be coerced.

8 Cf. Public General Statutes, VII, 193 f. :.35-35 Victoriae,

c. 33, ror-a copy of this act.

- ---·- ···- .
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Representation of' The Peonle Act of 1884.9

For twel"l·e

years rollowing the passage of this act, the clamor for reform
was held pretty well in check ., but, i.n 1883, when thre8 tened
wi t ·h a split in the forces of his Liberal Party, Gladstone

a·gain brought up the issue of' political reform, a subject upon
whic·h all liberals apparently could agree, to heel the breech.
The ministry brought forth a bill proposing to gi"le the agricultural workers in the counties virtually the same franchise
privileges that the bill of 1867 had given to workers in the
cities.

Agricultural workers had only recently been supplanted

as the most numerous group in the population, but they had yet

I
I

;

to win franchise privileges for thems·elves.

S.imple j ustice

demanded that they receive franchise rights at least
those gained by the laboring elements in the cities.

e ~ ual

to

Though

the bill took a bit of forcing, it passed ·rather handily, its
princ.i pal oppos1 tion obviously rising in Lords, the last
stronghold of landed power.

In Cocrmons, the opposition was

not given muah or a cha-nce.

The Liberal whips shuttled the

bill through under something of e "forced draft."

This bill,

however, left still unresolved the question of the distribution or Parliamentary s·ea ts and the women's vote.

9 Cf. Public General Statutes, XXI, 3 f.: 49 V1cto.r1ae,
c. 3, for-a copy of· this act. ££· also the Index of the
Parliamentary Debates, 1883, ~or debates on the issues involved.

l ..
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Redistribution of Seats Act of 1885. 10

One taste of

reform- apparently produc-ed the quest for a little more.

In

less than a year the ouestion of the distribution of the seats

in Commons received 1 t s solution.

According to the bill _, the

remaining rotten boroughs were abolished and the number of
seats in Commons increased to 6.70.

England was g1 ven 465 of

these se-a ts, Ireland 103 _, Scotland 72, and Vla.les 30.

Though

there was some vociferous opposition, the bill passed readily.
Representation in Conmons was now rather evenly distributed

on the basis of population, property rights, and means of

l1vel1hood 1 b-ut for men only.

I

(
!

Ensuing redistribution of
males~

~

vote.

Four out of five

as an end result of the bills of 1884 and 1085, now

had the vote, where one in thirty or forty had this right
in 1832.

Young men still 11 ving at .hoi:J.e, servants, and men

who did not maintain separate households were now about the
only males who did not have the franchise.

Because the in-

crease in the population largely represented births among the
laboring cl-asses in the c ttie s, these bills tended to keep the
balance of power 1n Commons shifting more

an~

more toward the

ideas of laboring groups, the most nunerous elements in the

10 Cf. Public General Statutes, XXI, 128 f.:48-49
V1e: toriae, c. 23, ror a copy of this act.

- ---·-· ·-·--. ..
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total population.

N.ot many years later., in 1896, Labor

SBW

1ts first full-fledged Represents ti ve, Kei.r "Hardie make
Labor's maiden speech in Cot!lillons.

Middle-class ideas, however,

were still dominant in Parliament and would continue to be so
until Labor .c aught up to them in Parliamentary representation

in the third decade of the twentieth century.
Franchise and electorate reforms in the Twentieth Century.
For the twenty-six years following the bill of 1885, the energie·s o-r liberal reformers were pretty directly taken up., as

they had be-en in other franchise reform intervals, with mor-e
I

J

I

I
I

immediate questions of domestic reform such. as poor laws and
soc·i.al secur1 ty, though franchise reform pro :)osals still

hovered in the af1""1ng..

The first new reform i .n the electorate

came in 1911 on the heels of Lords' action in regard to tte
Lloyd George Budget of

Hno.

Twice the issue of tte bud r e.t

went berore the electora~e, and twice Lords refused the budget
which contained measures proposi:r:g to area te social security
for workers. This led to th-e Parliament Act of 1911 11 aime d

specifically at smashing once end for all the power of the
House or Lords.

The prir.c1pal provision of this bill declared

that onc-e a bill had p·a ·ssed. in Coilll'!lons over a second v-eto of

V,

c~

11 Cf~ Public General Statutes, XLIX, 38 f.:l-2 George
13, for a copy of this act.

.----·.
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Lo.rds it automatically became law.

Lords was blackmailed into

the passage of this bill by a threat of flooding the civil list
(and therehy Lords} ·,vi th
of the bill.

enou~!1

new peers to force acceptance

More social reform followed, but as its .b acking

petered out and World

~ar

I approached, the cry for franchise

reform again arose, this time from the women.

"Suffragettes"

bega:n their clamor r-or the introduction of the "feminine
prerogative" into the electorate.

By 1918 the governoent was

ready and willing to grant them the right to vote.

In that

year Parliament passed the Representation of the People Act
whic·h gave voting privileges to women over thirty.

12

The act·

also res,tricted traditional "plural" voting privileges to
people holding university degrees and to businessmen whose
enterprises produced an. aggregate income of ten pounds per year.
~omen

were enraged by the age restriction; so, though they

exercised the franchise privilege granted them, they still kept
In 1919, there·f ore, they received appeasement
Se·x-D1squal1ficat1on Removal Act 13 which granted them

up the tumult.
in the

the rranc.hise on an equal ba-sis with men.
was now nearly- en accooplis·hed fact.

Uni ver.sal

suffrage

That same year, 191.9,

(
!
l

12 Cf. Public General Statutes, LV, 253 f: ?-8 George
V, c. 64, for a copy of this act.

13

cr.

~O· J LVII, 325 f: 9-10 George

v,

c. 71.
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also saw the passage of the Re-election of Ministers Act. 14

This bill put an end to the _nuisance of "by-electicn s" f .o r
oen who accepted paid offices while s.i tting as members of

Parliament.

The bill limited the number of such elections to

three in any one Parliament.

The last step on the road to

universal franchise was taken in 1928 with the passage of the
Eaual Franchise Act • 15 Prope-rty and financial qualifications,

the historical basts of the franchise were removed, end univsrsal suffrage on the basis of person was substituted, thus
giving franchise r!.ghts to all those- men end women -who had

been ignored or overlooked in earlier reform bills.

Universal

suffrage for all adults had becomes reality.
Recapitulation and addenda 2.!!. Franchise Reform.
had been a long road -s trewn with many pitfalls.

Re-f orm

Changes had

been gradual, and the over-nll tendency of the reforms had bee:n
to shift the balance of political power into the- hands of the
:more numerous popul.a r groups-.

The impetus behind the reforms

had been almost wholly internal, though the whole general sweep

of Western civilization had given ideas and strength to it.
All of w·estern civilization had for some ti-:ne been drifting in

14 Ct. Public General Statutes, LVII, 4 f.: 9 George- V,

c-. 2.
1 5 Cf. Public Genera-l~~ 1928, 2·7 f.: 18-19 George

c. 12.

v,
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the general direction of governments representin g a plural!stio basis for all pol1 tical decis.ions, goverrunents generally referred to as republics, or representative democracies.
This. movement was charact·eristic of the whole civilization,

and from its sweep English reformers had borrowed ideas end
arguments with whi.ch to bolste·r their own indigenous trends .•
Still, the particular instrumentation taken by ·the English

·people was pe-culiarly their own and predicated upon influences
rising in the British Isles.

The only foreseeable we·akness

(

in the system the British have developed 11-es in t h e p otential

I

evil inherent in the fact that the less numerous popular groups

are without effective voice 1n government.
J

In moments of

national stress such a condition could lead to ochlocracy,

J

I

government intimidated by mob rule.
problem

or

or

However this may be, the

this study is now to assess the effects, if any,

these major franchise changes upo.n the cour·s e of Bri tain' .s

imperial rule.

---··
CP'..API'ER V
PARLIAMENT Al"lJJ IMPERIAL LEGI~LAT ION

Since the course of. impe.rial rule -orecedina
the .A.-nerican
0
Revolt has already been discussed. it should suffice to review
its trends and then
since that time.

~roceed

with the course of imperial rule

Le gislation or royal writs preceding th.is

period and concerned with imperial rule were issued, for the
mo.st part, under the guidance of the meroant111stica.lly-or1.ented
Privy Council of the Crown •.

True, there had been the Act Creat-

ing The Commonwealth passed by the Interregnun

Parlia~ent

{1.6-49), but this had proved pretty much a dead issue, never

i

having been resorted to for any decision of consequence after

l
j

the Re·atoration ( 1660).

I

Britain's technioue was to superi:npose

imperial order on colonies after they had been established by
her own or· other Caucasian nationals.

Agencies charged with

the successful acconplishoent of this transition had first been
instituted by and in the interests of the Crown.

Tl:!e first to

take up this task was the Crown's own Privy Council.
'

in 1695, the Board of Trade and Plantations

i

Most of its energies were directed toward the rnanegecent and

I
I

I

I

~as

l~ext,

organized.

direction of colonies Caucasian in population, particularly

I

I
I

I

I

those 1n North .America, sin.oe 1 t was during the period

or

its

tenure that England, largely through the efforts of indi v.idual
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oit1zen groups, was carrying on the decisive duel with the

French which spread her control and influence into Asia.
I

(

she cont.inued her expansion in Asia, a colonia secretaryship
was ere a ted , a bol.i shed, and re ere ate d 1 n order to 1 n tegra te
management over the member units of the growing ond far-!lung
colonial system.

(

I
I

As

Direction wes still largely in the hands of

the Crown, but the middle of the eighteenth century began to

see Parliament assert its desire to usurp control.

Parlia-

mentary attempts began w1 th e series of leg1slA ti ve r.-1ensures·

I
'

aimed at making the Thirteen Colonies share in the cost or
their de:tense. 1 Next came Nor·th's compromising India Regulating Act (1773) which a&serted Parliament's authority over

I

I

the government of India but left actual rule and regulation

I

almost wholly in the hands of agents

I
I

or

the East India Company.

This was followed by the equally compromising Quebec Ac·t
0

(1774)~

which bargained tor the quiescence of the Canadians

1n the event of :further troubles in the Thirteen Colon-ies • .liext

came· the series of eo-called "Intolerable Acts" which helped

(

lead to the American Revolt.~

Parliament had not tared very

I
'

i

I

i

i

1 Among these pieces or· 1egisla tion was the Stanp Act
(1765) Statutes at Larfe, XXVI., 179 ff.:5 GeorBe III, c. 12 ,
quickly repealed and fo lowed by the Declaratory Act (1766);
Ibid., XXVII, 19 r.:6 George III, c. 12, asserting e right

Pa.rrtament and Crown had been unable to enforce.
2 Statutes e t Large , XXX, 549 t. :14 George III, c • 83 .•
for a copy of this act.
3 Ct. supra, pp. 74-77 for root of troubles in ~er1ca.
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well as yet in her at t.ernpts to don the "imperial robes," but
the American Revel t appears to have pointed out the· path

I

Parliament might trod

successfully.~

promised not only with the Crown, but with a~enities of stra-

tegic, political, and economic realities as well.

i

I

SELECTED IMPERIAL LEGISLATION PRECEDING

o.

THE FIRST MAJOR FRANCHISE REFORM BILL

j

AND FOLLOWING THE .AMERICAN REVOLT

I

The Irish Appeals

f

It was road which ·com-

~ (~).

The AI!le.rican War was no

.sooner over than Britain donned her "new look'' in colonial
arf·airs.

The year 1 ?83 saw the passage of the Irish .Appeals

Act,4 which asserted the joint tenure of' Crown &nd Parliament
over Ire land and " ..... the e xcl us 1 ve rights of the. par 11 amen t
and courts

or

Ireland in matters of legislation end judicature~ 5

To all intents and purposea Parliament and
assenting to the valid! ty

Cro~n

were thus

or

the claims of the ra.d1cals who
6
had stirred up the revolt in the Thirteen Colonies end, perI

haps hoping to avoid a similar conflict in the face of pending

I

dif f1 cul ties w1 th Fre nee ...

i

Ire land was .given internal autonomy ,

4 Statutes a·t Large, XXXIV, 2·55 f.: 23 George III, c. 2.8,

for e copy of thi-s8ct.

5~.
0

cr.

supra, pp. 56-?8, particularly Note 18, p. 63,

for the roots of the American Troubles •

.

.... --
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but the question of her share in certain tax natters and control or her external affairs renained still unresolved because
she had no representat"ion in Parliament.

I

An

a tteopt was soon

to be made to remedy this situation, but not before Parliament
had give-n further considera-tion to the Canadian question.

-The

Canadian Constitution _..:,...;;;._.;;.
Act (1?91).

Parliament's

-answer to the potentia-lly dangerous Canadian probleo. was the
Canadian Constitution Act (1791) 7 which did several things: 1)
solved a potentially disruptive religious probleo by dividing
Canada into two provinces, ·upper and lower on the basis of
dominant religion; 2} gave the Canadians a great deal of tnterna-1 autonomy, though its legislatures were answerab.le to a
royal legislative counc1.l; 3)

.sugc:~ ested

the Crown's ina bill ty

to legislat·e for the colonies without the adv"ice and c.o nsent
ot Parliament, the Crown's prerogatives being liMited by cer-

tain provisions of this act; 4) adapted the

~nited Kingdo~'s

franchise regulations to the purposes or Canadian

!
I

I

gover~~ent,

property still being the basis of the franchise; 5) asserted
the Crown's prerogative of a two-year legislative veto period
on any piece of internal legislation in Canada_, and 6) t.hus
retained :for Br1 ta1n control of Canada • s external affairs.

The

7 Cf. Statutes at Large, ~CCVII, 2~4 ff.:31 George III,
c. 31, ror a complete c-o py of t ·his act.

---·
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constitution bill also helped ouiet
the cla ~ 0 r r or 1n d epend.
enc~ being raised by certain Can9d1an and outside groups~

(

Parliament's next step was an attenpted solut-1-on of the I-rish
problem.
~ of Union

question

~s

.!!.!..!!! Ireland ( 1800.). Though the Irish

rarely considered a phase of British 1m,er1al

maneuvering during this period of the

~pire,

there appears to

be more than a little basis for considering it in this 11r,ht.

Certainly the Irish have ever viewed it in this manner , end J
by 1922, the British Parliament appears to have been reAdy to
concede the point·.

Though the modern phase of this c:uest1on

really dates from Cromwell's occupation durine the Interregnun,
the real purpose at the ti.:ne under consideration, 18.00, appears
to have been three-fold:

1) an attempt to answer o.nce and for

all the arguments raised by ·the ..tu:ler1csn Revel t; 2} to ouiet
Irish clamor in the face of difficulties with the French, acd
3) to protect the Protestant north of Ireland fran troubles

I

with the Catholic south.

Cronwell's occu~etion haa led to

serious religious problems and the problem

lordism.• "

or

,.absente-e land-

From c·r omwell"' s ti::ne forward the Irish have con-

tinued to scheme and fi ght for independence while English

interests have concerned thenselves with protecting sympath-

etic and Protestant northern Irish groups fron aloost certs1n
reprisals from the

Predomin~ntly
~

Roman C9thol1c re=ainder of
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Ireland should it succeed in breaking free.

At the time under

consideration here, however, c. 1800, the atte~pted legislation was more concerned with satis-fying conse·rvati ve parliamentary interests who wished to consolidate end make uniform the
administration of the empire.
(1800)

8

The Act o:f Uni.on with Ireland

was on the order of a ""trial balloon," conservattve

stimulated, aimed at pointing the way troward a satisfactory
solution of the problem of creating a uniform impe.rial administration tree or troubles stemming from the American argument.
and strategic difficulties.

The "Act or Union" had followed

relatively rapidly on the heels of the "Ap·p eals Act" and would
seem me.rely the next logtca.l step to\lard parliamentary rep-

resentation for colonies.

"Union" legislation attempted to

gain this end by ·uniting the United Kingdom and Ireland under

joint allegiance to the Crown and by giving Ireland a relatively
fair representation in the British Parliament.

Ireland still

preserved her control over internal affairs and was g iven the
added voice of parliamentary representa-tion to preserve 1 ts
interest in its foreign affairs.

Parliffmentary consideration of the Union Bill.

The

someti"!:lles conical union issue began with a join·t resolution ot

8 Cf. Statutes at Large, XLII, 648 ff.:40 George III,
c. 67, ror- a cor.lplete copy of this a at.

~--·-·- ·
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both houses oT the British Parliament proposing the act ot
union.

Uproar followed in Ireland, but Parliament went

blithely -ahead.

Lords quickly i~plemented the resolution by

passing a Bill of Union and sending 1 t to CoM!:lons.

In Cor.m.ons·

the· question .of bringing up the report on tt moved rapidly.
Befor-e too long a somewhat bo·r ed end nearly er.1pty Conn.cns,
sittin-g as a Col!ltlitte·e of the Whole, pa-ssed this amended bill,
dividing 140 to 159 in its fevor, and suboitte·d it to the Irish
for ratification.

Ireland wanted no part of the union and said

so, but Parliam.en t was in a mood to persist despite the re je·ction.

When needled on the issue in Commons, trr. \!. Smith

an:swered for the "Bench" that he " •.• did not think the union
absolut.ely a bad measure, but contended, that having been
rejected by the Irish Parliament, we ought not to fsi~
severe it at present."lO

per-

The question was put to continue

and continuation so ordered:

Ay·es 149, Koes 24.

11

Again the

bill went back to committee whil-e negotiett-ons were undertaken

9

cr.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series,

XXXIV, 32IT 39 George III.
10 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Seres,
1
XXXIV~ 387: 39 r~orge III.
11 Ib.id ,. , 387.

..--, ~
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by imperial authorities to see ~hat could be done about 1n-

st·1 lling in the Irish a measure of the proper attitude requis-ite to presiding over what the Irish considered
national down:rall.

t...~e1r

o'.ttl

As these negotia-tions continued, the

question of bringing up the amended report on union divided.:
Ayes 120, Noes 16. 12 It was shortly after this division that
the Crown, in the person of George III, in an address to a
joint session of both houses indicated the success of negotiations in the follo,"''ing word..s: 13
~zy Lords and Gentlemen; I receive with the greatest
satisfaction, the deliberate opinion or my two Houses
o-r Pa-r liament on this in terest1ng subject; and you may
depend upon my embracing the first favourable opportunity of communicating to my Parliament of Ireland
the propositions which you have laid before me, as
calculat-ed to form the basis of a complete and entire
union between Great Britain and .Ireland. such a settlement established by mutual consen·t, and founded on a
sense of mutual interest and affection, -w ould. I am
persuaded, produce the happiest effects in promoting
the security and happ·iness of both kingdoms, end in ££!!_tainins and aueroenting the stabilityr power, and~
sources of~ empire. T!talics~ Zd.J

Ensuing debate on th.is audress indicates the sub
ment
1

/

o~

~

agree-

the Irish Parliament to countenance an act of union

containing the proper safeguards and representation.

The only

voci:t"erous opposition to the final bill ce·me from the conservative Charles Grey, afterwards the Earl Charles Grey, who did

I

'

I
I

1 2 Ibid .. ,p. 512.

13 Ibid., pp. 978 ff. Address presented on April 26,
1800, to a joint session of both houses of Parliament.

.....--------
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not think that the bill would a.c compli.sh its purpose, " •.• containing and augmenting the· stability, po\'Jer, and resources

the empire," but he was continually voted down. 1 4

or

Grey's

view also indicates that oonse·r vattve opinion was as Viholeheartedly behind suc·h a measure in Commons as 1 t was in Lords.

The first reading of the final bill passed a business-like
Commons:

Ayes 133, Noes 58,1 5 though the· mea gre vote indicates

the issue was a roregone conclusion; most of the members of
Co!l:lnlons considered it not worth debating.

Interest, ·h owever,

picked up enough by the second reading to produc-e a d1v1s1cn:

Ayes 208. Noes 2·6. 1 6

The third r-eading pass·ed a voice vote

without an objection.
Significance of the Ac·t o:f Union with Ireland.

Accord--

ing to ·the Act of Union, England and Ireland were to be
united as the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

Ireland

was to receive ·100 seats in Commons and appropriate repre-

sentation in Lords, but the s1gn1fica:nce of the bill herdly
rested in this

~act.

Rather, in terms of iffiperiel rule, the

bill was significant for far more cogent reasons.

First,

14 Cf . Hansard's Perliementery Debates_, Third Series,
117 ff., et· seqq •

X:X:X:V: 39 George III, pp. 85ff.,

1 5 Ibid., p. 143.
16

~.,

p. 150.

,---- ·
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combined with the ''Appeals Act," it appears to have been a logically developed, but somewhat abortive attempt to avoid the
pitfalls or the American Revolt and to answer the pleas for
representation the t . "radical" elements had used during events
leading up to it.
did not succeed.

As such it wGs never repeated because it
Rather, the kernel of the le g1slat1 ve dyarchy

contained in the principles· of the "App eals .Act" was to prove
to be the key to later maintenance of relative stability in
the imperial structure.
act

or

Second, aside from the little debated

1801 which established the Colonial Cffi·ce, 1 t "nas the

last important piece of imperial le-g islation prior to the
.major rranch1se reforms.

As such it gave some indication or

'

II

the attitude of the English Parliament regarding not only its
own prerogatives 1n imperial affairs, but its· view of then.
The bill appears to have originated from motives of the Crown
and aristocracy, who desired stable control of Ireland, and
Parliament appears to have viewed it as a practical and
necessary experiment.

In fact, Parliament's attitude seens

to have been, "the more quickly implemented t ·h e better;"

1t

was an act which had to be countenanced in order to escape
a repeat of the American debacle tn which dissat.isfied elements had stirred up the populace on the s·ubject of representation and foreign powers had suppo·rted their insurrectionist movement in order to encroach upon British preserves.

-----·-- · .
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French intrigue was again hovering in the background and cay

I

have worried British planners.

Thir·d , the act revealed the

position that the House or Lordst until the

Parl1s~ent

Act

of 19·11, was to take in future imperial legislation concerned
with colonies of Caucasian origin, the area in which British
attempts to establish a unified imperial order were first to
"c.ome a-cropper."

In these areas Bri ta1n was to lose control

or much of her logistical potential and thereby be forced into
retreat· elsewhere.

The fact that Britain never really e.ncour-

aged the development of heavy or finishing 1nd·u str1es in
these a-r eas was to make her stre te gic post t!on even weaker.
II.

DJPERIAL EVENTS SUBSEQ.UENT TO THE FIRST REFCRM BILL

India Office!£! (1858).

Follo~ing

the establishment

of a full-blown Colonial Office {1801), imperial affairs, with
the exception of those concerned with India, appear to have
I

i
i
J

separated the·mselves into two general categories:

Caucasian

i

affairs under the legislative dyarchy and non-Caucasian affairs

I

under the principles of the administrative dyerchy.

J

Parlia-

ment seems to have taken unto itself the general and direct
nanagement of Ca.u .casian affairs, though 1 t did designate the
Crown as symbol of au·thority and executor of its wishes.
Royal prerogatives, however, were directly li~ited by Parliament and the crown would be answerable to that body for the

.- ----
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actions of its agents and emissaries.

Non-Caucasian units,

on the other hand, appear to fall to the lot of the Colonial
uftice, which was little interfered with as long es the 8 ~~1n
istrative dyarchy it set up preserved order over its domain.
The Colonial

Offic~,
~

t oo, was answera bl e to

Parlie~ent

'

but

the Crown en.j_oyed a goodly number of privileges in its domain ..
The one exception to this ceneral d1 v1s1.on of rule was India
which for many years was to be treated as a non-Caucasian unit
and later to be treated as a Caucasian unit.

The year 1784

had witnessed the first example of this separate

treet~ent

or India with the establis.hment of the Board of Control for
its affairs.

This structure had superseded North's India

Regulating Act {1773), which had delivered nominal control
of Indian affairs into the hands of Perl.iament, though actual
executi-on of this control resided symbolically in the Crown
and, perhaps dia-b olically., in the hands of the agents or the
East India Company.

North's regulating act had asserted

Parliament's wish to take a more active part in the direction
of the Indian. eovernment.

The disturbances a·nd dishonest

administration it was intended to curb,

ho~ever,

continued

intermittently until serious disturbances led to the introduction in Parliament of the India Office Act (1858), which,
aside rrom the Ionian question to be taken up momentarily,
i .s the first important piece of colonial leg1sla tion rollowing a major franchise reform.

~uti.ny among the "Sepoys" had:

,---- -···
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initiated Parliament" s acti vi t .Y.

Appr~se
·
d

or

this situaticn,

the East India Company, whose agents had been tryint.: to restore

order· along with Her MaJesty's forces _, petitioned Parliement
to rorego its own wishes until the disturbances had been quelled

and the problen could be considered in a less inflamed li e ht.l7

Conr:::.ons·, pretty well fed up with the activit 1e s of the .:::est
India Company, ordered the re~uest laid on the ta b le and con-

tinued proceedicgs on the India Office Act which had already
sailed through en angered Lords.

In rapid-fire· order t-his

bill whic.h put an end to the East Indi.e Company,

as~er·ted

Parliament's primacy in rule over India, and es-tablished an

administrative dyarchy for India in the nam.e of the Crown
passed three· readings.

Divisions on the first readine, the

only ones ·available, were: Ayes 318, Noes 1?3, pairing .1 ncluded,l8 with the Irish vote dividing:

AYes 36, noes 24,

and comple·te abstentions for absence or other r e asons, 44.

19

i
I

(

1? Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, CXLVlii,
970 ff.: 21 Victoriae, 185?.
18 Ibid.~ pp. 1715-1718.
19 Ibid.~ pp. 1?15-1?18. The Irish vo t e was derived by
compar.ing ~official tabulation of the division with the
official membership list. The vote is indicated as a partial
answer to persistent rumors that Irish menbers of Parliament
were effective in helpin g colonies free thenselves froo British
re s uleticns. .Except on matters of home rule, the IristL do not
appear to have made any attempt, judged on tte basis of avail-

able Parliamentary divisions, to hamstring legislation oinimizing British rule nor have they, on the other hand, shown any
special interest in it. Apparently, it concerr.ed them not at
ell.

,------ ·· - ·
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Thus passed, ignoring the oinor Ionian matter, the first
_;:~ieee

of major imperial legislation foll.o win g the major f .ren-

chise reform of 1832.
~

significance of the India Office Act. The signifi-

cance Of this act lies in the fact that it indicates no
appreciable change in the attitude of Parliament toward imperial legislation following the Franchise Reform Bill of 1832.

I

Parliament still asserted its paramount authority in colonial
affairs and still paid its respects to the

S)~bol

of· authority

repres.ented in the Crown by making the Crown the executor of
its wis-hes, the procedure it had developed in the C5se of the
Irish question in 1783 and 1800 following the American Revolt.
Further, it appears to have adapted the underlying principles
of the legislative dyarchy, division of internal end external
rule. to the purposes of Indian government end stability and
introduced the first real sample of the administrative dyarchy.
Not even the addition of the Irish members to Parliament, as
their attitude in the division available indicates, made any
difference.

The Irish could hardly have been less interested

in the issue~ though they still continued to plaGue Par-liament
on the question of "Hor1e· Rule."

Lords as· usual had first try

at the bill end everyone but the East India Compeny was made
hap?Y·

For those who would argue the contrary, that this bill

,.------ --- ··
'
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did in fact· indicate a change in Parliament, 6 etti tude, there

are several facts to consider.

First, the bill first steru1 ea

from an uprising in the House of Lords.

Second, it was passed

.b y a Conservati.v e Commons and ministry.

Three, it adapted the

principles of a system of colonial rule experimented wt t ·h

berore franchise reform to the purposes of -stable rule in India.
The bill was in ract a beautiful adaptation to circumstances;

it preserved the prerogatives desired by the United J(1ngdom
while freeing it for some time fran two possibilities equally
undesirable:

1) possible full scale war in India, and 2}

civil disturbances which threatened to disrupt needed trede
relations.

Parliament bargained wisely.

j

I

Colonial laws valid! ty act and the Colonial l!arriages
Valid! ty Act· (1865).

The next important piece of colonial

legi.slat1on, foregoing again for the Monent t .he Ionian ques-

tion, were two proposed bills conce-r ning the validity
colonial laws and coloni-al marriages.

or

These laws were formu-

lated and suggested by the Colonial Office as a solut·ton to
certain problems which had ·begun to plat.t;Ue administration
in various parts of the empire.
I

(

They ·\Vere en answer to cer-

tain technical and legal problems ~hich had arisen froo extralegal practices such as "co~on-lawn marriages on colonial

frontiers where no religious auspice.s ~ere aV"'!ilable.

.i:s·tates

left by t -h e deceased ma.le partner in such unions were clutter-.
ing colonial courts, -a nd there seamed to be no legal precedent

··-......-.. .
J

I
J
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available for untangling these estates and settling rights
or questions Of heirs and inheritance.

I
'

For the -p urpose of

solving such problems, t -he Colonial Harri.eges Validity Act
was proposed.

The Colonial Laws Validity Act, on the other

hand, was intended to clarify the legal aspects of the term
"colony~ and to establish the areas of validity for colonial
20

lews.

These bills were first read in Commons on the pe-tition

of' a :Mr. Chichester Fortescue and were apr>roved .ins.tsnter without debate. 21 The bills were passed by a voice vote, the need

(

:for them

having been corn:::lunicated to Cof.ti4lons b:•;r the Colonial

Of':fice.

The seoond and third readings 'vere also passed r.1 th-

out deba-te- by later cornrni ttees of the whole.

Here agsin Parlia-

ment had bowed to necessity, for Lords passed the bills just
as

swiftly, even though 1 t was the stronghold of Lords Spiritual.
Significanoe of the Colonial

~Valid~

Act.

The

true significance of this act lies in its declaration that the 22

i

I

I

".-•• terms- 'legislature' and 'colonial legislature' shall
severa-lly signify the authority, other than the i:n~erial
parliament or her majesty in council, competent to make
,
laws _f or any colony. The term 'representative leeislature

!

20

Statutes of the United_Kingdom, CV ,_ 129 ff.: 28-29
Victor1ae, c. 63.
21 Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, CL~IX, 1042.

22 Statutes of the United Kingdom, CV, 129 ff.: 28-29
Victoriae, c. 63.
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shall signify any colonial legislature which sh:1l.l conprise a legislative body of which one-half are elected
by the inhabitants of the colony. The term 'colonial
law' sha-l l include laws !:lade for any colony e 1 ther by·
such legislatur-e as aforesaid or by her naj esty in
council. .An a·ct of Parliament, or any provision thereof,
shall, in construing this act, be said to extend to any
colony by the express words or necessary inten~~ent of
any act of parliament •
••• no colonial law shall be deemed to ha~e been ~oid
or inoperative on the ground of repugnancy to the ·law
of England ., unless the same shall be repugnant to the·
provisions· of .s ome such act of parliament, order, or
regulat1nn as aforesaid .••• {Ed.: aforesaid being .•. repugnant to the pro~isions of any act of parliament ••• or
repugnant to a·ny orcier or regulation mede under au thority of ..• parliament.).
In .other words, Parliament had openly asserted its

supre~acy

in colonial affairs and indicated that the Crown' s· authority

derived from its deliberations.
i~perial

Thus far the pro·gre ss of

authority had shown no disposition to change in res-

ponse to the reform bill of 1832.

Par·ltament was recop,n1zing

areas or validity for colonial law and finishing off the job

of taking any semblance or royal colonial prerogative awey
from the Crown.

I
~

The Ionian: question ( 1809 -1864).

·It is at this point

that the etiology of the Ionian petition for independenc-e had

be.st be taken up in order that its bases and procedure o.ay be
contrasted with those of the !~orth America .Act, a co:::::.parison
which may serve to expos·e Br1 tain 's basic interests in colonial

The Ionian _p roblem began in 1809 when Eritish forces
se of a strategic
occup1e d most of the I on 1 an I s 1 a nds as One Pha
holdings.

--- ---.
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deployment during the 1\apoleonic ·.-:ars.

land, Gibraltar,

I
\

To g ether w1 th He-ligo-

a~d Malta, they helped provide en effective

blockade to Na-p ol-eon's ambi tio·ns ,_ ens•~ering his e r.:bargoe s and
effectively blocking any rurther designs he mi ght have U?On

!

the Near East,_ Europe, or North Afri.ca.

The c ont 1nua.t1on of

the Napoleonic Wars brought to the Ionians a prosperity theret~for

unheard o.r ; yet, as the war ended, they petitioned Great

Britain f'or the "restoration of the·ir independence.''

Signa-

tories to the peace treaty session at Paris, in 1815, however,

i

overlooked their request, declaring that these islands, in
the interests of peace and prosperity, were to be a "free republic under protection .o f the King of Great Br1 tain."

Some-

one set down a const·i tution for this so -called Se p t insular
Republic, ·but, though the outward aneni ties of the republicen
process were observed, control really rested in the hands of
the- Bri tis·h Lord Hi g h C"o;'TlDissioner, Mai tlend, 1\'ho ke·p t firm
rein on it in order to protect the avera ge citizen from the
''tyrannical and arbitrary control" of the old noble fenilies
in the islands.

Prosperity had ended with the war as quickly

as 1 t had begun and the .British found the:nsel ves saddled with
1mner1al obligations they

~ere

not at all

hap ~ y

to assune;

a portion of the Bri t1sh treasury was rapidly dete·r io.rati.ng
in to an Ionian almshous·e.

As accidents wfll happen, Britain's

interests in the Ionian Sea forced her into a closer associe-

---···149
tio~.

with the forces of the Greek national reviva l and

of independence.

~ar

Once Greece was set f'ree the. ba sis of

the treaty of 1815 was removed and the British protectorate,
therefore, became an anomaly.

British rule over the islands

cont1nue·d for sometime, but when the Ionians, in 185?, petitioned for reunion with their ancestral homeland, Greece, the
~oreign

I

and colonial offices, tired perhaps of the financial

burden they represented, consc.ious perhaps of persona 1 obligations to patriots

o~

the infant Greek republic, or too aware

of the fact that they no longer served any strategic function,
Wldertook negotiations with t ·he signa tory pmvers of 1815 wi t .h
a view toward granting the Ionian's request.

The general

attitude pervading the whole matter s·eems- to .ha.ve been:

"Since

they no longer serve any useful strategic or economic purpose
and ·a ·r e therefore a sooewhat pointles s expense, why· not grant
the islands' request?"

Consequently, by 1864 negotiations

with the signatory powers were brought to fruition and the

I

Ion1ans quietly restored to their ancestral unio.n..

Except

to give its assent to the relief of the treaty, Parliament
had little t ·o do with the problem, most of the work falling
into the hands of e1 ther the Colonia 1 or Ho.n e Offices.

The

value o.f the islands was of so little moment that Parliai!lent

,. . .-- --·-·-
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was not evan interested enough to debate the issue of relief
9r.:.

of the treaty ............
The Ionian ouestion end the t!"orth Ai1ler1ca Act.

This

procedure may be contrasted with that undertaken in the case

of Canada.

French end English in origin> Canada presented

the United Kingdon with a problem vastly diff·e rent frora that
in the case of the Ionian Isla·nds.
~uch

vaster territory.

It was, first of all, a

It was continually beir.g plagued with

insurrectionist movements.

It e.lso represented rapidly

advancing percentage of the United K1nedoM's bread {food)
\

supply.

Canadian wheat and minerals were becoming nore and

}

more vital to a British economy which ·would soon absorb forty

I

per cent of the world's annual grain ·movement.

I

Const 1 t ·u tion Act (s.:.y. supra,. p. 123) he d never proven entirely

i

I

setis-t"actory.

24

The Canadien

Perhaps its worst fault was that it left the

United Kingdom still saddled with the costs of governing and
defending the Canadian area and wi t.h no acceptable r::eans or

I

persuading the Canadians to accept their share of the burden.

2 3 Q!. Carrington,££·~., p. 257 ff., for a fuller
exposition of this problem in its historical context and for
the views and actions of Maitland and Oswald, the two
dominant figures in this issue.

24 cr. Smith and Phillips, oo. cit., PP• 398-428, or
G.e orge T. Renner; Loyal Durand, Jr-:--et al., ·:;or1d Econoo.ic
Geography (New York: Thonas Y. Crowell Co., Hl 51) , PP • 231-42 .•

..------
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Administrative costs coupled with the influences of revolutionary movements and strategic factors led to a number or
imperial coram is sions organ! zed to exa:n.ine. the :problem end

suggest solutions; for example, the Durham

Co~~1ss1on.

In

implementing the recom.menda t1ons of this c or.mi ss·ion, adminis-

trations were far more canny than they hed bee·n in the case
of the Irfgh Union Bill.

coming

Constituti~nal

They apprised ?-a rl1ament of a forth-

Convention in Canada, to which Parlia-

ment had no objection and whi.ch 1 t ,. in feet, encourAged.

This

body, composed largely of Canadians, was convened tor the
purpose of laying down a permanent constitution for the
eovernment of the Canadian colonies.

Avoiding one of the

principal pitfalls of the Irish Union Bill, colonial adminis-

trators allowed the Canadians first to conpose a bill to their
o•.vn liking ber-ore Parliament t.as to act upon it.

The Con-

stitution laid down Ties then sent to the Parliacent of the

United Kingdom for its approval.

I

.Action upon the Canadian Constitution Bill:

America Act of 1867.

---

The l;orth

Parli-ament cou-ld hnve done any number

of things with this constitutional bill subnitted by the

Canadians, but it did very litt.le.

As events turned out,

this bill with a few minor changes turned out to be the sum

and substance of the North .Ar.lerica .Act ( 1867), which set up
what

I ----

was to be the final icpe·r ial government of Canada until

,.------- ~-
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l

l

I

I

1932 when Canada escaped from t ·he reins of British administrators.

The bill in Parliament asking for the acceptance

of this cons-titution originated in the House of Lords and

I'

was introduced by the Enrl of Carnavon on February 12,
25
1867.
After relatively quiet debate had a s certained the
fa~t

that British-desired prerogatives were being protected

in the bill, 1 t passed quite- rapidly and uneventfully on

February 26 and was imnediately sent to Comr.tons. 26

In Con~ons

the bill became the imnediate order of the do.y and was "voice·voted" clause by clause, su-ch anendments as were de-sired by
interested parties being taken up for debate
their introduction.

i~ediately

upon

Those amendments desir ed were largely

a matter of wording. 27

The bil.l was then rewritten to include

such amendments as were passed, and the second reading was
a greed to, again by a clause by clause vo1ce-vote. 28
embossed bill quickly pass-ed

a

third reading end

wa s

The
sent bac-k

to the House of Lords for approval in its amended foro.

"Lords~

25 Cf ... Parliamenta-r y Debates (B. L. Debs .. ), CL~f,

273: 30 Victoriae, 186?.
2.6

Ibid. , 1020.

27 Ibid., (H. C. Debs.}, 1310~1322.
28

Par11amenterl Debates
30 Viotoriae, 1867.

··----- .

.,. c •
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Deb s. )

,

CT~~
·r ~rxv, 132'2:
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quietly nodded its heed, hardly bothering to protest amendI

ments.

29

Embossed copies were Quickly delivered t .o the Crown,

!'lnd the bill rec·e i ved the royal assent on l!arch 29.

f

Truly,

as the "Bench" sagely remarked, there was ttno reel sentiment
against the bill."

In a short matter of forty-five days

Parliament had with good grace swallowed whet @ight turn out
to be a bi t ·ter pill and, what is more rernarkable, had swallowed
1 t at ·1 ts own request as the only practical solution to the

imperiel problem with which 1 t was faced.

Under the lef·: is-

la ti ve dye rchy set up by the bill, Canada VIas to be saddled
with the cos·ts of her own internal governr.:t.ent,

~hich

was

·to be lett pretty much in 1 ts own .hands, the royal veto now
being largely a matter of "window d·r ess:ing" in regard to
int·ernal affairs, while the United Kingdom was precariously

to retain certain governmental prerogatives it desired in
Canada's international dealings.
t
Significance of the North Amer 1 ca A£_.

-

T·he final till,

the North ..Amerioe. .Act {a.v.) i.s highly signiftcant in the
~istory of the empire for

e ntrnber of reasons.

It illus-

trated to the civilized wcrld just how precarious British
colonial tenure had becone.

Strategic, de~o eraphic, end

economic factors were already forcing the United Kingdom into

29 Ibid .• {H. La Debs.}, 1710. The royal assent is
indicated in the order of the day for I.:arch. 29 •

;----- ·.
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a der·e nsive end con cilia tory role, pa rticulerly ir. regard
to the more technologically advanced units of the empire
T.hioh were Caucasian in origin.

Then, too, e number of

Parliamentary precedent·s were set .b y the bill.

Henceforth _,

all bills concerned with legislation upon imperial matters
in the Caucasi-an colonies were to or1.ginate in the House of
Lords.

They would arrive there from the desk of the Colonial

Office which, in its turn, had received them from constitutional
conventions it had instituted in the colonies cor.cerned.
technique of the

constitutior~l

The

convention would serve to

avoid the pitfalls of the Irish experiment, and it would
serve also to produce the successful refinm1ent of the legislative dyarchy· desired by the United Kingdom.

It would serve

to produce for some time the end expressed in the words of
George III, " ••• containing end augmenting the stability,
30
pO\"ler, end resources· of the emp.ire." (Italics, Ed.).
The
~~rth America Act also served to illustr?.te the fact that
i

I

Parliament • s attitude in imperial ma-tters had shown no particular disposition to change in response to the changes in its
makeup introduced by the Frar.:ch.ise Reform Bill of 1832.
the bill was the relatively successful conclusion of the
exp·erimen.t begun by the Irish Appeals Act \":hich preceded

30 cr~ supra, p. 138 f., address of George III.

Rather,

------·
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rrenchise reform.

Controversy ever the Irish Union Dill had

!!lornen tarily sidetracked this experiment, .b ut the Union Bill
itself' had pointed out the pitfalls to be avoided in esta.bl1sh1ng the successful le·gisla ti ve dyar.chy.

The desire

or

the

United Kingdom appears alway.s to have been to preserve rela-

tionships established with those colonies or value to the
imperial structure.

Colonies which did not return enough

profits to the United Kinedom in the form of food or raw
material credits were somewhat quickly dispensed with as was

the case with the Ionian Islands.

Imperiol holdings would

be pointless i:f the United Kingdom

has to return all the bene--

:f1 ts derived in the form of adm1n1strat1 ve or strategic costs .•

Since the bes·t

solution to the problem of these costs would

be compromises which reliev·e d the United

1: 1r~dom

of them

while still insuring the persistence and protection of exist-

ing and expanding economic arrangements with the member units
of the empire, the United Kingdon avidly sought such en event-

uality.

Food and raw ~aterial supplies had to be protected.

The Horth .Anerica Act is the first successful example of such
a compromise, and the road toward it had been pointed out
by the experiments represented 1n the Irish Appeals and

Unio·n Bills.

The "Act" quieted revolutionary clamor in

Canada, pointed out the way to successful com.prorai se in th-e

f'uture, an.d incidentally and rather guardedly pointed out

just how important a factor trade was to become in the United

- ·-·- ·.
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Kingd~'s

grip upon the

em~ire.

As the

follo~inr tr~de

tables- show, trade was to becone the key to imperial rise or

decline_.
Analysis of Br1 ti.sh trade (.1887-1927) based on dAta

---- ----

from the statistica.l_ abstracts of the Un1 ted
1927).

--

Kint~dorn

( 108?-

The trade to.tals of the United Kinc:dom (Cr. Tables

I-IV, PP. 162-165), digr-essine for the mocent from the subject of imperial legislation, prove very
ber of points.

reveRlin~

on a num-

These table.s cover ye-ars in v.-hich -the Un1 ted

Kingdom maintained the "gold s.tandard."

This !!leans the t the

United Kingdom had to balance annual trade deficits thrcugh
money shipments, gold_ or silver bullion or s-pecie.

Because

of this fact, even though for many years the United Kingdom
shows a very large surplus of inports over exports (result
of returns on her extens1 ve "foreign investment-s), actual
trade- losses in a ~;iven year are revealed by a surplus or

money exports over money imports, thoueh in some cases surplus money exports probably indicate unusual activity in the
export of investment capital ra-ther than trcde losses.

The

latter is probably particularlY true of the years 1895-1897,

I

1903-1904, and 1908, years when the Ur.i ted Iar..gdom was pour-

ing tremendous amounts

or

capital into the developwent of

Australia, canada, the prospective dominion of South Africa,

and Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, in the years 1915-

157
1925, the totals available reveal whet are probably not only
tremendous trade losses but t ·he 11 quida tion of the United
Kingdom's investments abroad, particularly in the United ~tates.

These losses- and liquidatior~ had occurred, for the most part,
during the key years of war payments, 1917-1919, years- for

which even the usually unsecreti ve British arc hi ve_s

available records..

h~ve

no

The _rapid ri:s e in the totel of 1mnort-s

in these years not .c oupled with a corre spending increase in
the total of exports, however, givea some indication of just
how tremendous these losses and liquida-tions must have been.

The years 1913-1918 show a rapidly increasing export deficit,

the total f.or- 1913 being 133,914,413 pound::;: -and that for 1918
being 783,?86J825 pounds, sterling at that. 31 Yearly imports,
as the tables reve-a l, increased during these years to -a n annual

average

or

.200 per cent ove_r those of 1913 while experts, at

best, just managed to hold their former levels and, at worst,

show drops in totals during the years 1914-1915.

For the

years prior to 1913, however, export deficits combined with
bullio.n import suroluses serve to provide a rough index to
the total earnings of t ·he United Kingdorn 1 s inves.trn.ents abroad

/

1
1

31 These export deficits are the "invers-es" of the
i~port surnluses shown in Table I. For exa~ple, the import
surnlus fo~ 1913 is 133,914,413 pounds; its inverse, the
export deficit , would be 133,914,413 pounds.

158

as well as a rough index to the investment total itself.

"inverses" of these export

deficits~

The

the import surpluses

shown in the tables, do not rep.rese·nt, as J,ia ck1nder3 2 end
others would have 1 t, "1P.J.perial tribute" nor do the~,. represent
or contain any estimate of the smount of money to be returned
imperial holdings in the form of "imperial costs.''

Costs ere

hidden in the annua.l budget of the United Kingdom .and derived
fron texes, the base of w·hich is only part19.lly made up by
t .rad-e totals.

Short of a detailed year by year analysis or-

the annual budget, any e-stimate of "costs" would re9resent
the sheerest guesswork.

.Any estimate of "imperial tribute''

\

is utter nonsense because the United Kingdom has earned from

}

its investments any ma·terial benefit 1 t has derived from an

f

ir:.peria.l holding; it has never looted a colony.

I'

Import sur-

l

pluses, then, for the purposes of this study, represent,

I

for the years prior to

'

I

~orld

War

I~

return on investments.

As the tables indicate, these import surpluses, for the cost

part, show a steady pattern of rise, t ·hough there are a rew
backv;.ard movements, until the year 1913.

Bullion 1nports

also show a continuous surplus (exceptions have been noted),
now rising now falling, but a continuous p attern of ·s urplus

32 Cf. Sir Halford J • .Mackinder, Britain~ the British
Seas (New York: D• .Ap :) ~eton &. Co., 1902}, Chap. XX, PP· 34 2 352. llackinder a·dmi ts that he is making a comr.1on estimate,
but he has a tendency to regard these estimates as absolute.
The United Ki~gdom has never collected tribute; it has earned
its way.

___..---

1·5 9

nonetheless until the year 1913.

From these surpluse.s soce

ides· of the amount of British ·capital invested abroad can be
gathered by adding together the bullion and trede ii!l!Jort
surpluses :for any given yea.r , o le.ar ing out trans sh 1 pme n t s
fir.st, and then multiplying this to tal by a factor of lb,
thus allowing for a slightly better than six per cent return
en investment.

Obviously, this will produce only an estimate,

but it will serve to give some idea of the grauual rise of
the Uni.ted Kingdom's investn:ent totals abroad, end its use
on the key years 1913-1925 will also serve to give some index
to the amount of British cepi tal 11 q:uida·ted from foreign
investment by the exigencies o.f

~Vorld ~"lar

economic conditions which followed.

(

I end the depressed

Sampling this estimate,

one would find that by the yeer 191.3, in round ficures, the
United Kingdom .must have had some~here between two end twoand one-quarter billion pounds of capital invested abroad.
Also, sampli·ng frco the bullion exp.ort deficits available
ror the years 1915-1925, one can readily see that the United
Kingdom liquidated an observable 150,000,000 pounds of cspital
in order to balance its t.rade books by 1926, but this takes
no account of what must have been tremendously greeter
liquidations of foreign 1nvestme·nt capital during the :,.~ears
1917-1919 for which no bullion figures are ave.ileb"le end dur-

ing which the United Kingdom maintained e large surrlus of

.....

------
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imports over exports.

Certainly the surplus of

to be paid for in some manner, the United

i~norts

Kingdom'~

had

trade

books having- lef't but a sm.all bullion import surplus- oefore
that time to compensate for a tremendous rise in -imports.
The uniform bullion losses between 1915-1925 also attest to
a radical change in the United KiDf;dom' s po.si tion in international financial circles, particularly ,.,hen

th.e~.r

are rela-ted

to the tremendous acceleration of exports frcm the United
Kingdom followi_r..g

~1orld

·.7ar I.

This rapid ri-se in export

totals suggests that the United Kingdom was makinG up its
investment losses by ir:cre"lsing the export trade volume,
particularly when this rise is related to the re-export tr n de
totals • not in the tables given_, which had risen from a ·total

of less than two per cent of the United Kingdom's annual
I

(

trade volume in 1887 to about four per cent in the years
i~ediately preceding \7or-ld r:ar I

and had leaped subsequent

to that time to a total of about t~enty. ?er cent of the

I

annual trade volume. 33

:
:

3 3 Cf statistical .Abstract of the United Kin gdom,
no-s. c1 tedo;low in Hote 34,. for taOI'esof re -expo.rts for the
au~ropriate years. The re-export totals are contain ed in the
·tables on the pages cited but were cleared out for the
purposes of this study.

All these facts attest to the pro-

gress of the United Kingdom's econor:1ic fortunes, t; ood. and bed·
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Statistical Comryilations of Significant ~nnual Tr~de
Volumes of th.e United King dom (1887-192?) .34

34

all figures in the following tables are derived
fran tables in the following sources:

A.

Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom {l R87190l), 49th ~o~ (London: H. E. s tationery 0f f ice,

1902), pp. 28 0 ff.

I
1
I

(
l

B.

Statistical ~bstract of the United Kine dom (1 89 3 1907), 55 th i·jo. (London: '.'lyma n end ~ons, Ltd..,
109 Fetter Lane, E. C., 1908), pp . 69, ?7, 80-8 1,
and 221 f ••

C.

Stat·istical Abstract of the United Lin g dom ( 19081922), 68 th l~o. (London:~. 1.!. Stationery Office,
19 24) , PP. 356 rr ..

D.

Statistical

~~bstract

of the United King d om ( 1913:n . 1.1. t>tationery Office,

?'2nd ito. (London:
1929), pp. 377 ff. ~
1 ~ 27},

It is to be noted that
transshipment of goods
the starred totals for
to provide the figures
1902-1903 there are no

the totals g iven do not include the
under bond which, with the exception of
the years 1902-1903, were clesred out
used in this· study. For the yea.rs
tra ns·s hiument fi g ures available.
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T •.;.BLS I
D!PORT -3XPORT TOTALS OF. ':'HE tnJIT3:D KIKGDO~.~ { 1887-1927)
Yea-r

1!!38?
1988
1889
1890
1991
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
189?
1898
1899
1900
1901

'

I
I

I

I

I

I

!

!iet 'I'ots1

of' Im~orts
302 ,87 , o89

of i!:xoorts
221,9l!j,910

323, 5-g3 ,114
360,980,111
355,970,464
373,562,696
359,370,115
3"45,809,626
350 ,_564 J 580
356,985,497
395,575,241
391 '07"4 , 550
409 ,889 '9 54

234,534,912
248-,935,195
263,530,585
247,235,150
23?,216,389
218,259,?18
216 '005 J 637
226,128,246
240,145,551
234,219,?08
233,359,240
254,492,211
291,191,996
280,022,376
283,423,965
290,800,108
300,?11,040
329,816,614
075,5?5,338
426,035,083
37? ,-1 03, 284
378,-1 80,347
430,384,772
454,119,298
48'7,223,439
52 5 I 2 53 1 59 5
430,721,357
384,868,448
506,279 ,?0?
527,0'79,746
501,418,99-7
?98,638,362
1,334,469,269
?03,399,542
719 '507 ,410
'767,257,771
800 , .9-66 _,839
773,380,702
653,046,909
'709,081,263

31~,993,136

459 ,893,405
454,148 ,::S06
462,576,461
483,026 '?25
480,?34,34?
487,240,004
522,785,020
549,855,858
513,329,'790
533,360,138
574,495,979
577 ,398,39 3
632,902,940
659,168,008
601 '160, 947
752,831,169
850,940,314
994,487,217
1, 285,205 ,B22
1,461,409 ,897
1, 708,895,550
9 7 8 1 580 17 55
899 '404 , 229
977 ,682,409
1,137,469,001
1,166 ,6'78,391
1,115,866,309
1,09 5,388,311

l.i3 .0 2

j

!ret Total

1903
1904
1905
1905
1907
.1 908
1909

uno

1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
191?
1918
191.9
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
192"6
1927

'*

*

Surplus of Imports
Over Ex.norts

80,965:679
89,058,202
112,044,91-6
92,439,8?9
126)327,545
122,_153,?26
126,549,908
154,559,943
130,85?",251
155,429,690
156,854,842
1?6,530,714
165,500,925
168,701,409
174,125,930
1? 9 '152 1 49 5
19 2 _, 2 26 ' 61 7
180,023,307
157 ,423,390
19?,210,-682
123,830,7'75
136,226 t 505
165,1'79,?91
144,111,207
123,279,095
145 ,_689, 501
133,914,413"
1 ?0 ,439, 590
357,9-62,721
344,66.0 ,607
46? ,407 _,47.1
783,786,825
662,7?1,535
3?5,426,281
2?5,181,213
1 ?9 ,89 6,819
209 _,424 '638
336,502,.164
393,297 ,_689
462,819,400
286,30?,048

All Totals are in English pounds.

.
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.;CLO!~liL

nrPORT-3XPCRT TOT..t1.LS OF ~HE 'UNITED KILGDC:.i ( 1AS7 - 1 9 27 )

Year

Net Imports
From Colonies

1887

76,898,857
?9 ,429,357
90,708,960
89,009,128
92,_082,687

1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904

1905
1906
1907
1.9 08
1909
1~10

1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918

1919
1920
1921

I

I

'1 922
1923
19.24
1925
1926
1927

91,303,280

85,336,305
88,114.753
89,655,353
86,694,965
87,738,468
92,939,042
100,177,167
101,886,179
97,243, 7'43 106,916 ,457 *"'
113,570,792**
88 ,0?4 '70492,832,903
102.~133 ,072
114,527,560
89,540,169
100,020,252
120,670,201
121,945,774

r:et Exports
to Colonie-s

75,370,256
83,241,512
83,278,990
8713701383
85,956,088
'74,748,130
7 2 ' 150 ' 1.6 3
72,788t545

70,197,294
84,136,9.3'7
80,675,063
83,426,761

87,597,472
94,.379,596
104,'788,401
117 ,578,862**
119 ,484,189 *..
88,839,804
97,677,09?
90,614,883

103,'844,687
126,765,027
127 1.238, 084
147,302,942
158,844,144

129,799,630

1771092,638

135,355,788
137,983,834
215,052,795

1951311,399
171,629,498
148,419,684
186,175,871

248,914,683

316,794,566
410,882"045
494 ,_376, 562
436,563,563

276,525,148
260,021,561
263,_219 ,077
316,145,178
341,809,349

304,364,967
296,271,569

1721657,8-1 6

178,362,122
205 _, 622 '460
501,470 ,_423
298,616,6.33
285 1 568 t 7 24
'300 '602 ,626
337,454,361

33511.141162
316,851,4-27
326 '650 '2.1 0

*

Surplus of I~oorts
Over ::xrort.s
1 1 528,GOl

-3,5121155
7,429,970
1,6:.-58,745
61126,599
16 1 55·5 t 150
13,186,142
15,226,208
29 ,_45!3 ,059
2,559 ,028
7,063,405
9 J 512 I 2.8 1
1'2 , 579 , 69 5
7,5061581
-7,544,658
-10,662,405
-5,813,397
- -765 '100
-4,844,194
-lll5l8 ,.199
10,682,973
-37,224,856
-27.217,832

-26,632,741
-36,898,370
-4 7 t 29 3 , 008
-59 , g 55 , 611
-3:.-5,645,664
661633,111
62,738.,812
144) 136 1750
232,519,923
'288, 7'54 ,102

-54,926 ,860
-22,091,485
-25,54?,163
-37 t 383 1 549

-21 ,319,193
-6,685,187
-12,486,460

-30,3781651

* All Totals are in English pounds.
•• Thes-e are total figures. For -sor.!le uneccountsble reason,
no transsh1pnent figures are available for these- yeers.

164

TABLE III
!.~CNEY I1PORT -EXPORT TOTALS OF T_P"....C Ln~ITi:D KI!TGDO!J ( 1887 -19 2 7 )

Year

Total Imports
Bullion and Specie
17,774~764

1387
1388

22,001,528
27,099,439
33,953,708
39,591,218
32,3-29,614

1889
1390
lS9l
1892
1B93

36,748,122

1894

38,577,764

1895

45,675,661
38,797,696
48,840,949

1896
1897
1898

Total Exports
Import Surplus
Bullion and Specie
or Deficit
17,131,018
643,746
22,559,571

25,121,630
25,170,072
37,.228,971
28,910 '690

33,092,018
27,812,600
31,726,759
45,172,059
49,589",5:59

-558,043
1,977,809
8,763,636
2,362,247
3 ,4_18, 924

3,656,104
10,76 5,164
14,948,902

-6,374,363
-1,.?38,610

52~213,701

6,18?,0~8

35,491,184

9,770,302
7,341,134
6,202,204

58,400,759
45,261,486
39,513,173
32,217,306

1902

31,393~345

31,97.2,039
26,015.102

190:5

38,96.7 '728

39 ,233,238

45,563,927

46,302,832

63,330,653
73,072,439
56,479,203
6.6, 506 '71.8
?1,422,077

61,482,552

5,268,139
-265,510
-738,905
6,168,390
1,848,101

63,252 '987

- -6 177.3, 784

60,034 '718
64,724,213
57,024,077
64,871 ,488
62,142,038
41,488,125
46l578,689

6 ,4-?2 ,000
6,69?,864
5,953,423
4, 59 5 '697

1899
1900
1901

1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914

51,559~909

62,987,500
69 ,4-67"' 185

74,028,598

45,391,519
~7,736,858

5,285,581

11,886,560
29,106,876
21,388~527
-24,190,162
31,467,952
49,190~254
-17,722,302
Figures for 1917 - 191.9 Unova1lehle
Uo Record Kept of ~hem
-43,457,088
104,058,403
60,601,317
-11,453,090
71,393,580
59,940,490
-13,431,504
58,073,561
44,642,057
-15' 524,359
69,122,069
53,597,710
-12,118,858
61,842,268
49,?23,410
-8,762,571
61,836,021
52,073 ,450
11,659-,589
!38,086,024
49,745,611
3,371,976
"3 6 ,205' 587
39,577,563
70,595,001

1915
Hll6
191?

1918
1919
1920
H~21

1922

1923
1924
1925
l:l26
1927

*
specie.

26,125~206

Totals represent bullion (both gol_d and silver) and

All totals are in English pounds •

*
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TABLE IV
UO~·;EY-ll!PORT EXPORT

t :Cl\'"EY EXCHAI..;G:...;

Year

TOTALS OF THE UNITED

BET ','iE::~l:

Total Imports
Bullion and Specie

188?
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892

1893
1894
1895
1896
189?
1898
1899
1.900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
190-8
1909
1910
1911
1912
'1 913
1914
1915

1916
1917
1918
1919
Hl20
1921

1922
.1 923
1924
1925

1925
1927

specie.

2, 67 3:., 522
6,677,567
7,168,096
5, 718,518
9,382,416
12 '664 ''7'3 1
12,143,792
17,498,473
17,900,735
15,458,562
27 .,001 1125
27,162,509
22,831,863
11,615,267
15,679,651
17,733,275
26,596,608
30,9?7,053
34,031,516
38,543,254
40,913,916
41,057,632
41,157,097
43,095,691
44,280,402
50,302,264
49,382,997
31 J 512,407
7,622,85?

KINGDO~.f (

COLOf:I ;::s Al'!D THE Uli.JTED

Total Exports
Bullion and Specie

1987-1927) •
:i':It~GDC!.:

Inport Sur~lus
or Def1c1 t

7,259 ,2·23
7,930,089
13,167,153
'1 2 ,499 ,884
7,734,355
:10,193,241
13,?88,387
9,139, 591
131249 1 859
9,15'7,864
9,961,94'7
9,259,321
13,426,449
13,92'7,527
11,889,833
11,6?8,762
11,560,226
14,885,838
12,811,1.16
21,945,638
20,551,004
13,800,698
12,995,?60
21,2?0,900
20,432,471
26,724,259
22,643,853
14,065,0?'7
8,699,819

-4,585 '701
-1,252,522
-5,990,05'7
-6,781,366
1,548,061
2,47.1,490
-1 ., 641 '59 5
8,359,882
4,650,8?6
6,300,698
17,039,178
1? ,8·6.7 '188
9,405,414
-2,312,260
~ ' 789 .t 818
6,054,514
15 1 0 3() 1 38 2
26,091,215
21,220,200
16,597,618
20,362,912
2~, ,256,944
28,161,337
21,824,?91
23,847 '931
23,578,005
26,739,144
17,447,330
-1,076,962

Figures for 1916 - 1919 Unsv e ileble
No Record Kept of Then

41,452,988
48 I 762,229
35,846,459
42,884,026

33,448 ., 192
26,139,199
35,224,176
28,240,452

37,683,802
9 ,9 ·2 2 '511
22,851.,108
28 J 402 '9 55
17,661,063
22,244,384
13 , '5 55 , 504
8,513,176

3 '769, 185'
38,839,718
13,.9 95,351
14 ,_481 '071
15,787,129
3,894,815
21,668,672
19,727,276

• · Totals represent bullion (both gold and s-11 ver) and
All totals are in English pounds.

__
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..._
Relati.onsh1o of Colonial trade volumes to 1mnerial

legislation.

Abstractine from these tables a·lso _, one finds

that net imports from colonies, totals most germane to the
issue of imperial legislation, represent a steady percentage
o_f the- total net imports into the United Kingdom in the years
between 1887-1913, varying between twenty-four ADd thirty per
cent of the annual net volume of imports.

Of even more inter-

e.st is the fact that these imports are almost entirely made
up o-r food and raw material shipments. 35

Of further inte_rest

is the ract that in this same period, 1887-1913, colonial
goods climb from about five per cent of the Cnited Kingdom's
re-export business to almost fifty per c-ent. 36

Total colonial

imports during the war years are something of an anomaly. but
the percentage of the United Kingdom's import totals they
represent remains about the same.

Up to 1908, the same may

be said of exports to colonies as is said of imports; they
represent a steady pe-r centage.

But beyond 1908, a high1y

significant fact in 1m,erial relations, colonies begin to

35 Cf. 11 The Statistical Abstracts of the United Kingdom," nos. cited in Hote 34, p. 161, for the detailed analys-is
or these shioments. They are pa ges and pages of "breakdowns''
of colonial shipments of food and raw materials from the
various colonies. These tables are remarkable for the pau~
city of finished goods contained in imports from colonies,
just as the export "breakdowns" are remarkable for the amount
of finished gpods they contain.
36

cr.

Ibid. for- re-exports which have been cleared out.

-·I
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re_present a greater and greater percenta~-::e or t.he t"ni ted
Kinedom's export market.

i-'l here in 1908 colonies had

absorbed about twenty-rive per cent

or

the United Kingdom's

erports, by 19Z8 they were absorbing fifty per cent of them.
This tact suggests three things in terms of irr•TJerial relations

and legislation:

1} that economic competitors were making

successful inroads into the British export ma-rket; 2} that

the United Kingdom's financial relationships with co"lonies
was undergoing a reversal, tha·t · colonies ·were beginning

m

assume a self-determining international economic position;
and 3) that such Inter-imperial Conferences as thoDe of
1926 and 1928 could end in no other way than they did, the
enactment of the Statute of

~estminster

(1931), which merely

served to plac.e the official sanction or· the United Kingdom• s
Parliament on a condition already a fait
devel~ping

acco~oli.

facts the United Kingdom was only teo

All these

~ell

eware

o-r·, a.s the "abstracts·u attest, as the last half of the nineteenth century progressed.

Administrators knew that it was

only a matter of time until the events which took place in
the first half of the twentieth century should come to pass··

They were only too well awsre of the United Kingdon's vulnerable strategic position end precarious economic tenure.
co~unonwealth

ment of New Zealand.
--

-of

Australia Act (1900) and the govern-

-

The general drift of these economic
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trends and the str.ategtc difficulties they present have had
a profound influence on the United Kingdom's

1~' er1al

con-

duct subsequent to the North A.lleric-a Act, especially when
co~pounded

by demographic factors {particularly population

differentials and the food problem), the rise of nationalism
e.mong colonials, end already established legal end Parlia-mentary traditions.

~-!ore

and more the food and rew material

supply problem has loomed large.

The United Kingdom has had

to develop f .ood and raw material sources in areas whose
stability could be depended upon.

L.~any

colonial adrninis-

trators appear to have seen just such a possibility in the
rapidly accelerating Australiam development.

True, Australian

a.d.minist·r ation was pretty well bogged down in feuds and
rivalries among its five colonies, but this did not appear
to be an insuperable problem.

Largely be-cause of the Canadian

precedent the way was already open for federation, and the
Colonial Office took great pain to encourage 1 t.
conferences pointing toward t~e developoent of

A

seve.ral
constitution

uniting Australian colonials, using the Car.ad1an precedent,
bed been called at the behest of the Colonial Office.

~he

first was a oommi ttee appointed. in 1852 to prepare a constitution for New south ~ales.

It was little more than a

deliberative body, and it met annuallY untfl 1899.

It was

able to do very little except publicize the desirability of
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and need for federation or the Austral_ian colonies, and it
died in 1899 with the dawn of the effective federation ~ove

I!:!.ent.

The reel beginning of effective movement toward the

federation of the Australian colonies stemned from Major-

General Edwards' report on the def-enses of Austral_i a, a work
which was brought to public attention in 1889.

The unnerv-

ing nature of this report led Sir Henry Parkes to call an

irrJnediate conference to

ex~lore

its ramifications.

All seven

colonies in the Australian area were invited to the conference,
and its purpose, as events quick ly showed, was to persuade

the Australian colonials of the wisdom of speedily 1mplenentj

I

ing union under the Crown.

This conference led almost

ir.~ed-

iately to a constitutional convention to which the various
Australian administrations

ap~ointed

delegates for the pur-

poses of drafting a federnl const.i tution.

The six resolu-

tions adopted by this body, whose v.ork ultiEately failed,
fortned the basis of the le_ter suc-cessful constitution convention which took place in 1899.
were:

These six resolutions

1) that the pow-ers and rights of existing colontes

~ere to be retained by them under federation so long as they

were concerned with matters not

or

conmon concern to ell

colonies; 2) that without the exuress consent of the ado1nistret1on of a stat.e. in question no liberties \vere to be taken
by the proposed federated government with the structure and

'·
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geography of that state; 3) that

t~ere

were to be no restric-

tions upon trade among the proposed federated colonies; 4)
that excise and tax powers were to be within the province of
the ·proposed federal government and 1 t -s parliament; 5) that
naval and other military defenses were to be broucht under a
single unified command; end 6) that the constitution

1tsel~

should provide that each state should be able to propose such
amendments as it thoueht feasible in order to insure ado?tion
of' the constitution.

Unfortunately, by the time t -hat thi-s

convention had rinished its work, public fears brour,ht on

by

the -" Edwards" report had somewhat abated and its work fell
absolutely dead.

Again, in 1894, another attempt was

to produce an effective federation movement.
was

~ade

This

~~de

a~tempt

by en unofficial convention which net at Corowa

in that year and strongly advocated union, but a :_ ;a1n the
matter died.
of'

l~ew

Then, in 1895, G~ H. Reid (later Sir G. H. Reid)

South -: Jales brought forth the proposal which gave

effective life to the federa-tion movement.

He convened a

neeting of the premiers of all the colonies, co~r l;ew Zealand
excepted, et which it was proposed that all colonies should
draft a legislative bill seeking the eppointoent of ten. rr.en
r ·ron. each colony to a proposed constitutional convention.
There is 1.1 ttle need here to eo into the trials and tribulations of thia constitutional convention and the public refe-

rendums which followed.

171
It should suffice to note tha-t one

or another colony staved off the adoption of this constitution for some t1~e.

Finally, the Enabling Bill which the

Colonial Office had so avidly sought, was passed by en agreement of New South ~ales, Victoria, South Australia~ ~ueens
land, and Tasmania, but it still needed the ap~roval of the
home parliament.

Some areas, particularly- ·, ;estern .nu.stralia

and New Zealand, had chosen to hedge for one reason or another,
so they were temporarily left out of the bill.

~·;estern

.Australia soon made up ·1 ts mind and was included in the :r.:nsbling Bill, but New Zeeland kept procrastinatinb even ·after
the bill had reached the Parliament of ·the United Kingdom.
Consequently, it was only after some hue and cry that she
was amended into the Constitution Bill then undergoing its
second reading in the home Parliament.

I

I~ew

Also, as

A

conseouence,

Zealand was until the Statute or- i".'estmin.ster ouch more

a colony under the legislative dyarchy than was Au.strelia
because the British governor-general under the proclenation
extending dominion privileges to r;ew Zealand could refuse
37
to prorogue an unpopular ParliatJ.ent.
a ri ght the A.ustrelian governor-general could not exercise.

The proclatJ.ation

37 Cf. Statutes of the United King_dom, 15-1.6 "Victoriae,
1852, c. ?z-tor the background of this proclamation. It contains the prec-ede-n t for the governor-general's prerogative •

creating t ·he uominion of New Zealand was issued by -the Crown
on ~eptember 9, 1907,3 8 in accordance with provisions laid
down in the Cor.wonwe al.th of .Australia Act { q. v. ) • 39
Parliame-ntary consideration of the Bill Creetinf the
Coz:nmor..wealth of Austrel.ia.

As e parliame ntary issue, the

consti·tution of the Cornmonweal.th of Australia first rece1 ved
the attention of Cor:u::1.0ns during the re·ferendums of 18 98 and
1899.

The matter was brought to public at·tention by a spokes-

man for the Colonial Office.

In Coomons this led a

~ :r.

Charles

Dilke to question the "Benc.h'' as to whether in the case or
the forthcoming Australian Con.-nonweal th Bill " ••. Her ~~:a jesty t s

government propose [s] to suggest to Parliament t ·o mal::e any
chang es in ·the const1 tution as accepted by the five colonies :t4°
Mr • .Toseph Chambe-rlain, Secretary of otate for the Colonies,
replied for the minist.ry that exactly the same precedent would

be :followed as had been es·tabltshed in previous colonial

legislation and that " .•. delegates from the Australian colonies
are coming to this country to give and receive explanations

as to certain point-s ••• [and] that ... the introduction of the

38 Cf'. Public. General Statutes, A.OQJIII, 63-64 Victorice,
c. 12 ·' fora copy of this proclenation.
39 Cf' ... Ibid., 24 f., par. 2 and 3, for these provisions.

--

40 Parliamentary Debates (.Authorized Ed ... , H. C. Debs.),
Fourth Series, 63 Victoriae, 1900, L~/III, 1051.
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bill will be deferred until they have arrived."41

Cha!lberlein

and Parliame.nt were already well ar.rare of the co nc"iliatory
nature of the bill, but prece:dent ha-d to be paid 1 ts due
respect in such delicate

~otters.

The fate of a strategic

problem, partial amelioration of the food problen, the fate

or

the wool industry, and the fete of certAin other strategic

raw materials hunG in the balance.

Consequently, once the

delegates arrived, the bill received what was
usual QUick trip throUGh Lords.

beco~ing

the

Sent on to Commons it

rece1 ved quick introductio.n by ChambBrlain, guiding lieht
of the Colonial Office, who presented the bill on behalf of

the ministry.

Again,

~s

was beconing the· precedent in

Co~~ons,

i

Cornaons ad.journe·d instanter and re-convened as a

1

of the Phole to consider the bill, subjecting it to a clause

I

by clause voice-vote on e-a ch provision.

42

Co~"li ttee

It c_uickly passed

with minor amendments, and the amended version was so ordered,
ordered printed, and sent back to a coiiliDi ttee set up to
expedite the problem.

There had been little amending to do

since the Colonial Administretion and the colonial governnents

41 Ibid., 1051.

42 Parliamentary Debates (Authorized Sd., H. C. Debs •) ,.
Fourth Series , 63 Vi c·tori a e , 19 00 , LXXXI II , 46 -10 3. t.mendmen t s
here were largely a matter of wording, muc·h of the debate
being given over to impassioned but ineffective ~ratory by
those who would sto_p the destruction of the "enp1.re ·"
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cor.cerned has already ironed out nost or the real parlia43
mentary problems.
~uch of the deb~te was the usual ineffective oratory about the preservation

or

the prerogatives for

which "our ancestors so mightily strived."

On !.~arch 21, a

few days later J the bill was sub j-ecte·d to its second re oa1ng
by voice-vote, clause by clause.
that

~ew

It wes during this reAding

Zealand, now not so coy, was emended into the proc-

lamation provisions of the bill because she had raised a hue
and cry subsequent to the passage of the first reading of the

Bill.

New Zealand's representatives were souewhat chagrined

at being included only in the proclamation provisions of the
bill, but they had to bow to precedent and

I

~ake

what they

could get; Parliament wanted no part of oeihg the a gency of
possible disturbances in New Zealand stemming from the
-exercise of "1uperial author! ty" without a·n Eno.bling Act. 44

I

l

I

This second reading of the bill was actually its final version, and 1 t was ordered printed and cor.ani tted for t.he order
of the day for Uonday, June 18, 1900. 45 Oth-er m.a tters twice
delayed the third reading, but when it was brought up on

4 3 cr. the general tenor of the debate in Ibid.,
LXXXII, pp:-46-103, which st:.ggests· that attempts at any
amending would be largely a waste of tit ~e since the bill
appeared satisfactory to both Australian and United Kingdom
1nt·erests.
44

-c·r.

Ibid., uca::III, pp.
·-

45 ill_£., pp. 805-806.

758-806.

1?5

June 25 it passed a voice vote without a protest.46

Roy-al

essent was thus a matter of course, end the Crown ,
out its share of the responsibility, soon issued

8

prcc-

lamat1on (Septenber 17~ 1900), declaring that on en~ after
the first day of Jenuary, 1901, the people of
Victoria, .South Australia,

~ueansland,

~~ew

south

~Teles,

Tasmania, and :iestern

Australia should be united in a federal coononwealth hencerorth to be knovm as the "Connom-real th of .Australia."
Significance of the .Australian Coranonweal th B.ill.

---

-

The

significance of this bill lay in the fact that it a Ga in
illustrated to the civilized world ho'"' the union of strategic
i'

I
i

necessity and the economic verities of the colonial picture
were stimulating the activity of Parliament on the subject

of· imperial legis1a·tion.

The bill also illustrated the fact

that as long as arraneements could be ~ade which preserved
the interests of the United Kingdom, Perliarnen t was \•rilling
to let imperial prerogatives take whatever course they would.
I

I

Legislators appeared to view the price of any other possible
arrangements as altogether too costly end fraught with d~nger
to the survival of the United Kingdom.

Coi~~ons e~erged during

the de·b ates on this bill es t"he conpletely do!llinant force in
the United K1ngdo~'s inperial maneuvering.

46 Cf. Ibid., LXXXIV, p. 638, P· 923.

Lords was to take
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a back seat, however unwilline::;ly, in tha course of Fri tish
history.

Lords was to be paid the respect due to precedent,

the right to first pass judgnent upon imperial legislation,
but it ·would have little effect upon it.

There also emerg.e d

in t ·be co·nsideration of the bill recognition of the fact

1

.in

the light Of the "~dwards" re_port, that strategic poLicies,
diplomati·c policies _, and colonial policies of the United
Kingdom were e unity.

The suocesss of any one of then was

predicated upon the delicately balanced articulation of all
three end their relations-hips to the Dri tish econo::nic

The Union of South Africa Act (1909).
I

Just

ho~

~)Otential.

aware

Parliament was of this oneness of foreign policies and its
position 1n imperial. affetrs is reflected in the aura surround-

!

ing the enactment of the next important _piece of imoeriel
legislation, the Union of South Africa Act (1909) , 47 a neces-

sity brought on by actions of Cecil Rhodes, prime ninister
and benevolent desoot of the Cgoe Colony who, acting es a
~

~

private citizent involved himself in an insurrectionist move-

me.nt in the Transvea 1.

'l'he ul tinate result of nhcdes' inter-

fe·rence was t.he Boer \i-ar, end once 1 t wes settled Parliament

was only too eager to give the Boers end othe·rs internal
self-government, but 1 t wen ted no part of forc·ing such arrang-e-

vr·r ,

47

cr.

c. 9 ,for

Public General Statutes, XLVIIt 4~ f.: 9 Edward
8 copy of this act.

- ---- ·.
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cents and thereby providing fuel for possible future insur-

rectionist movements.

Parliament had a number of interests

to preserve, among them the developing mineral wealth of
South Africa end the strategic value of the "Cape," and it
could not see ho\v th-ey could be insured if union were forced.
Consequently, the at ti t·ude of the Boers b-eing so::1ewhat
recaloi trent, the somewhat ttmiddle -of-the-road" co.nserveti ve
government of Lord Asquith was hard put to bring the South
Africans to any kind of terms at ell.

Colonial adminis-

trators worked long end hard to persuade the Transvaal and
the Orange Free State to accept British rule and even harder

building up sentime:nt for a contemplated federated uni.on of
the South African states, a task in which they were aided

no end by the encroachment of German interests upon the
reaches of South .A frica.

Finally, after what wa.s now the

usual constitutional convention, an Enablin g Act proposing
a Union of South

~rica

was forwarded to the United Kinedom

and introduced into Parliament.

Lords 1

geve 1t a quick n·nodding" treatment.

ffi

was now usual,

Corm1ons, except on

the matter of "apartheid," gave the bill, if ·possible, an
evEn more cursory trea tmen t -M c·on.ur.ons
and therefore, took what it could get.

k~ew

1 t ·was barge in1ng·

3ven on the matter

of segregation, about which 1 t might have wisr.. ed to do s-oi!l.ething, Parliament did iittle except observe the amenities
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or .idle protest.

".Apartheid • "' or segregation • was taken up

by a somewhat nonplussed special committee formed in response
to considerable pressure froo special interests in the United
Kingdom, but this corn.mi ttee did little.
or the

1~plicat1ons

After a !1U1ck r ·eview

of "apartheid" and a rather frustrated

"shrug of its shoulders," the committee di·vided:
Ayes 55:

Noes 155,

on the subject of removing the segregation clauses

f'rom the. "Union Bill. "48

Its attitude seems to have been

that regardless of the desirability of removing the segregation c1auses nothing could be done about them unless one
wanted the painful .,Boer fiasco" repeated. 49

Otherwise,

the bill quickly passed three readings with little protest,
another important piece of imperial legislation again being
subjeoted to a clause by clause voice-vote. 50 According to
this bill, union was again established symbolically under the
Crown as the e.xec·utor of Parliament's wishes ..

The Un1 ted

Kingdom again retained control of external affairs while the
African states obtained a large measure of 1ntarnal autonomy,

though in this case colonial administrators were to retain

48 Cf. Official. ·Reports, Parliamentary Deb-a·tes (R • C •
Debs.) • .IX:-1063-106&, 9 Edward VII, for the taoulat!on of
t .h is division ...

49 Cf. Ibid., pp. 1059-1063, for the committee report.
50 Cf. ~., pp. 951-1058, 1533-1660, for readings and
debates.

17.9

more than the u-sual mea-sure of authority under the legislative
dyarchy, a rete-n tion related to the unusual potential for
explosiveness in the unsettled

Arri~en

situation.

The way,

however, was left wide-open. for re-negotiation on this point.
In other respects, there was little new or significant in the

action on this bill.

Poli.tical ministries and im-oerial legislation.

Action

on the African Union Bill, however, does serve to focus attent .ion on. an aspect of ii:lperlal legislation not yet considered,
the effect of the "political oa:at" of a ministry upon its
implementation of suggested or needed. imperial legislation.
This question directly relates to franchise changes a.nd the
modifications they introduced into the makeup of commons and
into British government in general.

Among British historians

it appears generally to be conceded that Conservative ministries would be inclined to be and were more imperialistic
than Liberal historians, but is this really the truth of the
matter?

In the face of the actual record, this belief would

hardly appear to be valid.
hardly substantiate it.

Examination

or· the

record would

For example, the sonewhat Liberal

first Pitt ministry passed both the Irish Appeals act {1783)
and the Canadian Constitution Ac·t ( 1 ?91).
the Irish Union Bill ( 1800}.

It also pess.e d

On the othe-r hand, tha India
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Office Act ( 1858) was the produat of the Conservative -second
Derby ministry, though much of the spadework upon it bad been

undertaken by previous ministries both Liber-al and Conserv-

a t1 ve.

Solution of t -he Ionian problem was also a joint

maneuver.

Negotiations attendant upon 1 t were ini t 1at-ed by

the Liberal first Palmerston ministry (1857).

They were

continued by the Conservative second Derby ministry and fini-s hed
by the Liberal second Palmerston ministry (1864).

Two Liberal

ministries, those of Palmerston I and Russell II, account
f'or the passage

or

the Colonial Laws and Marriages Validity

Acts ( 1865) ,_ while the North America Act ( 1867-) was enacted
by the Conservative third Derby ministry on the basis of

recommendations formulated during the previous- Liberal
ministries of' Peel and Melbourne.

Acquisition of the strate-

gic Suez Canal (1875), which circumvented established procedures, and the declaration elevating Victoria to "Kaisar-1-

hind"

or

India (1 January 18?7) took place under the direct

manipulation of Disraeli, a Conservative Prime Minister.
Though the_s e might be termed imperial acts, they were, as

shall be discussed further on, hardly anything or the kind

I

I

nor any more so than the seemingly flagrant violations of
national sovereignty directed by the Liberal, Lord Pel~erston,
particularly his use of the fleet to enforce seemingly

c-ap-ricious, but really vi tal strategic demands upo_n Turkey
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and other areas of the Near East.
by Lord

Conservatives, headed

Salisbury, next turned their backs upon the D1srael1

technique when, but a few short years later, they enacted
the Australian Commonwealth Bill, though in so doing they

were merely carrytng to 1 ts logical fru.i tion the establishment

or

the legislative dyarchy for which previous Liberal

and Conservative ministries unstintingly had strived.

Con-

servative attempts t ·o stabilize the South African situation,
however t we·re not quite as succ·essful, foundering on a wave

or

public sentiment directed against the government for

countenanoing ·the importation of "coolie labor" into south

Africa and foundering upon the stubbornness of the Boers.
Consequently, passage of the Union of South Africa Act (1909)

fell to the lot of a subsequent Liberal ad.min·istration headed
by

Asquith.

Up

·to this point certa 1nly, the continuous

nature· of colonial policy would argue against the influence
of political bias in imperial affairs, which is what the

franchise influence argument amounts to.

Rather, the con-

duct of the· ministries involved would argue for continuous
and intelligent action toward predetermined ends, the ends
in mind being the already· mentioned "containing and augmenting the stabilit.y, power, and resources of the· empire."

British administrato.rs were only too aware of the unity
European policy, other foreign policy, i~perial policy,

or
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strategic policy, and

econo~ic

policy.

The "checkmate"

of one would be the "checkmate" or another.._

They were all

of a piece because of the United Kingdom's seoaration rrom
raw materials and food and because of the vastness of the
colonial enterprise itself.

Trouble in Europe would un-

doubtedly mean trouble in the colonies if the United
became involved.

Ki~gdom

This is the real meaning of Disrseli's

purchase of Suez and the real meaning of Palmerston's conduct in the Near East and Turkey.

They had to contain

Russia and stabilize Europe, prevent trouble before it
started, else the fate which has overtaken Britain since
1900 would have arrived that much_ sooner.

If .franchise

changes have tended to bring more and more Liberal ministries into power, this has apparently had_ 11 ttle effect upon
changing imperial policy becau-se no more than any other group
have they been able to ignore that famous dictum of British
imperial policy which suggests that "Britain has no permanent enemies and no permanent friends; she h3s only permanent interests."

Just how permanent these interest~ were

has been shown again and again since the opening of the
twentiet.h century, and t _h e poli-tical cast of a ministry has
ha-d just as little to do with the matter of how they were
preserved.

Always. the empire perched on a precipice from

which the mos.t seemingly in.si gniticant trouble-s- could fling

-

·- - ·· . .. ..
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it to disaster.

And always, the British have traded their

way out of possible troubles if they could, particularly in
their relations with their colo.nies upon which their strong-hold, the United Kingdom, was becoming more and
ent, almost insupJOrtably

~ore

depend-

so~

The strategic and economic imnact of World War

I·

It remained for World War I to expo.se to the world-at-large
the nea·rly insupportable syndrome of stretegi.c, economic,

demographic, and ·psychological ract.s which the Un1 ted King-

dom was protecting from public view, as it had always done.
and upon which the empire was slowly but surely disintegrating.

World ;Jar I ·was hardly under way r-;he.n the German U-boat

campaigns began to snipe· away at Brttain watery life-line

and seriously reduce food and raw n:at·erial supplies.

The

vulnerability of merchant vessels soon had the beleaguered
islands in a virtual state of siege ., exposing to public
view a fact long known by British administrators but bluffed

into ineffectuality; it was the fact that shipping was the
most vital end weakest link ln the too-thinly-deployed-because -too-widespread British st·r e tegic arnor. Bri t ·ain had
too many geographic areas to protect.

Food and raw material

supplies were soon diminished and rationing was introduced.
In the Orient, fortunately,. Bri tein was abl-e to bargain 1ts
way out ot really serious trouble by persuading th-e nascent
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Japanese power to enter the war on the side or tte Allies
because ~apan probably did not yet feel ready to start upon
its campaign for the subjection of the Orient.
exposure

or

As if the

strategic weakness were not enough, the United

Kingdom soon found 1 t se·lf faced with tt;e 1I!li:l1nent der11se of
1 ts "famous and fortuitous series" of coal and iron depos1 ts.
By 1917 re·ser·ves of high-grade iron ore were depl·eted and t ·he

mines nearly played out, making

t~e

United

Y.ingdo~

even more

dependent upon outside sources for the functioning of her.
ir~dustrial

end strategic machin.e ry, forcing her while the

war was yet in progress to turn more and more to the use of
suo·h ores as she could import from Swedish, Spa-nish, and
Portuguese sources and thereby tying up a g ood deal of her
naval potential in a line stretched :from t ·he Jlorth Sea across

the Atlantic and one through the llediterrenean into As1Bn
waters·.

Coal seams also began thinni.n6 out while Sweden,

the source of "pit props" for the oir.es began to se-em further and rurther away until Geroany realized ttat it. was

similarly dependent upon Swedish resources.

Population

differentials enjoyed by· non-c·aucas1en areas beea~e a fur-

ther source of troubLe, the risinG :forces of nat1cnel1sm
stirring up one disturbence after another· end beine encouraged to do so by agents of the Central Fow-ers.

As a con-

sequence,. in many of these areas colonial ad.mtn·istrators were
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rorced into more precipitate concessions or promises than
they might otherwise have made under other than the United
Kingdom '"s beleaguered c ircul!lstsnces.

Had it not be-en for

the timely intervention of the United States and his coalition with other European powers, ".Tohn Bull" might then a-nd
there have had to pull in his horns and countenance the complete collapse of the empire.

As things worY.ed out, this

eventual! ty dld not quite come to pass, but was staved off
-ror some time.

It was the British economic fortunes- which

su:ffered worst during the war, the war eventually provtng
itself a vital period of transition.

The center of

~orld

f'inanoe began its celebrated shift from London_ to New York.
Caucasian colonies began their inroads into homeland economic
prerogatives, a-n d by war's end they were well on the road
to becoming the real centers of British economic ·power.

Here

the Untted Kingdom was confronted with the maturation of in-rluences she herself had stimulated by her failure to develop
heavy and finishing industries in her colonial areas.

In

all probability, the Untted Kir:gdom could hardly have done

I

otherwise, granted the historical matrix in which the empire

1

developed.

I

J

In this matrix it found itself more and more

confronted with the necessity of garnering profits from
processing raw materials in order to obtain the ~cod credits
-1 -t needed throughout the world.

The- historic gamble on free

186

trade was thus producing the long-feared backlash upon the
exercise of imperial controls and would continue to do so
as the twentieth century progressed.

By war's end Canada,

Aus-t ralia, and India, using their ovm and borrowed capital,
we.r e well on the road toward developing heavy and light

industr-ies of their own, thus freeing them in great meesure
from dependence upon the United K1Lgdom~s finishing industries.

Though percentage-wise they wou1d continue to absorb

the usual portion of the United Kingdom's exports and a great
deal more, the additional arithmetical. amounts were more
than likely absorbed at the expense or the United Kingdom,
p.artioularly in the years .following the war when .British
gold reserves were rapidly· being· depleted to balance trade
ledgers.

As already observed, the United Kingdom had

apparently liquidated a vital percentege of its foreign
investments during the desperate war years and during the
years following the war had displayed an inconplete recovery.
The liQUidation of capital placed the United Kingdol!l in a

position fro= which it has never quite recovered.

It has

led to conferences frankly wooing trade with anybody end
everybody w1 thin and without the empire in a fev·e rish ·effort
to produce the proper export balances which meen the acquisition or food and the continuous operation of the British
economy.

Though not too readily apparent unt·il Wo.rld War II,

this effort appears never quite to have succeeded.

The first

-······
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indication or this failure was the United Kingdom•s discard
of the gold standard, and the second, a continuous indica-

tion, has been the progressive devaluation of the pound,
first in sterling areas and later in the dollar and other
world trad.e areas.

In .regard to this devaluation of the

pound, one must view- with frank admi.ra tion the adro1 tness
with whioh colonial administrators, protecting the United
King-dom's

"per~anent

interests," kep inflated in many areas,

particularly the dollar area, the value of the pound when
th·e economic roundation behind it had long since lost 1 ts
·r elative position.

In this way, apparently, British admin-

i .strators managed to use former prestige. to recover some
o~

·the war losses and offset the cheapening of the pound

in their own backyard, but whether 1 t has ever been enough
is doubtful. 51
~ . Irish~

State

!gree~ent ~

Irish Conseouential Monez Bill (~) ~

--

(1922) and the

These straitened

post-war economic circumstances provide the context in whic·h

the United Kingdom was again confronted with the problem of
home rule tor the Irish.

From the moment of the outbreak

of world War I Ireland had been in a continual state of turmoil, one rebellion after another having to be put down.

51 Cf. Edward H. Carr, The Twent~ Ye·a r' s· Cri 13
1939 (New York: The :Macmillan Co., 1940
312 PP
~ ' ~discussion of Britain's postwar economic ., crisis.·' or 8
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Here again nationalism, harking back to old cultural
traditions, reared its ugly heed in such movements as Sinn
Fein.

Ireland appeared determined upon the freedom it had

·demanded si-nc-e the time of Cromwell, and Irish patriots
apparently felt that there would never be a more opportune
time to gain it th-an during the period of
ties.

post-~ar

diffic-ul-

There is little need here to go into the cont·rov-e r-

sie.s which raged over the question end led to e trea-ty
between the United Kingdon and the Irish guaranteeing home
rule.

What is oi' interes-t, however, is- that the United King-

dom refused to countenance such a treaty unless it provided

for separ-ate treatment of Protestant Ulster, guarantees or
civil rights in the new Irish Free State, end guarantees of
lasting

~free

trade" between Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Consequently, the treaty. having been signed, a constitutional conve-ntion was conven.e d in Ireland, and Parliament
began to

g~ve

official notice to the matter. As the

Ir~sh

convention got under way Lt. Col. Murray questio-ned the
"Benoh" as to whether the Australian and African _precedents
would be followed:

" ••• in the case of the Constitution of

the Irish Free State before His 1!ajesty's government eit-her
assents to or dissents fron the terms of the draft eonstitution."52

It will be- recalled that in bet~ these cases

52 Parliamentary Debates, 152 H.C. Debs., 5s, 1922,
p. 642.

189

the government was somewhat confronted with a fait accornnli
requiring 1 ts si.gnature, so Sir H. Greenwood's reply wa.s not
at all surprising.

"It is

true~"

he remarked, "that the

Draft Bills embodying the Australian and South African Constitutions were submitted by the governoent of tte day for
the consideration of Parliament, and exactly the same procedure will be followed in the case of the Irish Bill." 53
This meant that Lords, though now fallen :rron power, would

f'ir.st stamp 1 ts approval on the measure and then send 1 t to
Commons where it would be introduced by the Secretary of State
ror the Colonies.

Few· words except profound disgust can des-

cribe the attitude of Commons as the Enabling Bill was
introduced. Though Parliament was determined to be rid once
and ror all of the Irish nuisance, it was determined to pro-

tect the Ulsteri tes and "free trade" regardless of the cost-s.

In fact, Parliament did absorb both the costs of the trensi t io.n and what would have been Ireland's share of the

national debt merely to implement its determinet len to be
rid of the Irish who were disrupting governmental processes

at a time of grave national dif'ficult1es.

The.re -was Also

pervading the issue an undercurrent which suggested that
nothing else practical could be done, that the matter ~as
beyond controversy any longer.

53

Ibid., p. 643.

This was reflected in the
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fact that both Agreement Bill and the Consequential Bill were
introduced and considered simultaneously, :Mr. Bonnar Law,
the Prine Uin1s·ter, remarking ·1 mr:1ediately prior to their
introduction that " ••• quick passage of these bills cen be
expected only if they are regarded as al ·together non-controversial. w 5 4

That he ·expected this attitude was only too

well attested by the rapid manner in which the passage of
these bills was implemented.

~lmost

imne·diately after the

Prime Minister's remarks the bills were formally introduced
and the House took a ;1ri"'ileged adJournment _, reconvening
instanter as a Committee of. the lVhole to eonsider them,
Irish members observing tn abstentia.

In rapid fire o..r.der

such clauses of the bills as produced no controver.sy passed
the first reading. while those the subject of any argument
at all were s.ubmitted to a .recess cornni ttee for reworking
and the order of their reading set. 55

~u1ckly they were

brought back from recess and subjected to a second r.e·ading
which they quickly passed, though certai.n financial clauses

of the Consequential Bill and a clause pertinent to the
Governor's duties in the Agreement Bill were held over for

54 Ibid., 159 H. C.Debs., 5s, P· 1?4.
55

Ibid., pp. 174 ff.
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further cons1derat1on.

56

Further discussion cleared up the

reBsons for the United Kingdom's share in the costs and
pension

aspe~ts

of the Consequential Bill and the clauses

concerned were approved, the co·rnm1 ttee d1 v1.d 1ng:.

Noes 100. 57

A:res ·2 25,

Somewhat tardy and recalcitrant approval was

also given the definition of the G<:>vernor•s· duties, a
dertnition whereby his prerogatives were largely hamstrung,
interest on this issue picking up to a division;

Noes 150 .• 58

Ayes 258,

Once these neasures were approved the bills

were subjected to a third reading and passed by a somewhat

subdued but unanimous voice vote. 59

The bills in their

final shape gav·e Ireland a government sharing all the

prerogatives of the dominions, while the United Kingdom was
saddled with most of the costs. 60 The Royal Assent was again
a matter of course.

Significance

of~

Irish Free .G tete Agreement_Act.

The passage of Irish Bill and the Consequential Bill attend-

5 6 Ibid. _, PP .. 350

rr.,

387

·r:t ..

57 Ibid., p. 463.
58 Ib 1 d .. , p • 6 34 •

59 t ·b id. •· p .. 764.
60 Cf. Public General .Statutes, IX, 4 ff.: 12 George V,
c 4, for ecopy Of these measures.
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ant upon it made· obvious to the rest of the e!!lpire and the
world-in-general just how helpless was the position tn which
Britain found itself.

An

overwhelming combination or stra-

tegic, economic, denographic, and :psychological ( 1. e • ., nationalism) dilemnas was strangling the empire and loosening the
United Kingdom's precarious grip upon ·tt.

All that would be

needed was anot·her serious \'.'ar and the empire might well fell
to pieces.

Liberal sentiments directed at Parliament during

the course ot the Irish troubles appeared to have had little

to do wt'th the resolution of the problem.

A Conservative

Parliament revealed the British pliGht when it held out for
guarantees of lasting "free trade" between the United Kingdom and Ireland before it would even consider the measures.

Either the· .remainder o'f the United Kingdom desperately needed

the continuance of the trade relations with Ireland, or there
was no point in hold·ing out for this guarantee..

Obviously,

it must have needed the trade.
Inter-imperial Conferences of

~

end 1930.

Just how

badly B.ri tain needed trade and just how seriously her econon.ic
might have been impaired by the war r.es revealed in th.e conduct of 1:nper1al conferenc-es subsequent to the Irish Free
State Agreement Act.

These conferences were nothing new,

having long been held under the auspices of the Crown and
Colonial Office.

Their purposes had been to resolve inter-

1.9 3

imperial problems relating to judicial and parliamentary
matters and to encourage inter-imperial trade relations and
cooperation.

In conferences previous to 1926,

~he

United

Kingdom had alwa·ys had more than the best o:r 1 t, having had
and preserved its initial advantages 1n the "Technological
Revolution."
cushion.

Capital investments also gave it a further

But in the years following World War I this cushion

disappeared and the United Kingdon's position was considerably weakened.

In this context there arose a growing senti-

ment, directed largely from the United Kingdom, for the
cre.ation of en imperial parliament.

This was ., in feet, -a

last despera·te measure to preserve the empire.

The United

Kingdom also frankly wooed 1nc·reased ·trade relations. with the
colonies, and it is through this gesture and the sentiment
toward the c·r ea tion of an imperial parl.iament that colonies,
particularly the Caucasian units began to see the light.
They observed carefully the fact that the United Kingdom was
now almost totally dependent upon outside sources for the raw
materials upon which 1 ts industries de_p ended and for the food
supplies so vi tel t ·o· the survival of i t .s c1 t iz·enry.

Canada

with her wheat, car.rper, nickel, iron, end asbestos--.Austr·e lie
with her wheat, beef, mutton, and wool--South .Africa wtth
her minerals and potentially vest food sup?ly--Ind1a and Ceylon
with their rubber, tea _, spices, hemp, tin, etc. --:Kew Zeala·nd
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With her beef, mutton, wool, and minerals---all the colonie 5
knew they held the controlling necessities.

They ~ere only

too well aware of the economic and strate gic pli t?, ht
"mother country."

or

the

Is 1 t any wonder the·n that the Inter-

imperial Conferenc-e of 1926 so auspiciously un·jertaken at
the behest· o.t the Colonial O.ffice in the United
end as it did?

K in ~doc

should

Is it any ·wonder that the sentiment for the

cre·at1on of an imperial parliament so carefully nurtured by
the Colonial Office should have been so pre emptorily brus hed
aside

as

it was?

Or is it any wonder that the conference

should have come forth with the
~ny

reco~~end a tion

it

adopt~d?

else should it suggest the adoption of a resolution declar-

ing that " •.• the dominions to gether with Great ·3rito1n are

autonomous

coOL~unities

within the British empire, eoual in

s t .a t us, an d 1 n no way su b or d inate to one ano th er ••• "?61

handwr1 ting was plainly on the wall.

The

The United r:in gdorn

could do what it liked, but the colonies would have tteir way.

In the subsequent conference in 19 30 this

vie~

wa s co= posed

into a formal resolution urging also e union under a

allegiance to a "powerless" Crown.

co~on

This resolution enbody-

inB the proposed Statute of 71estn1nster was to be sub!:li tted

to all dominion parliaments for ratifica tion and to be sent
on the Dominion.s Office for transmission to Parliament·
The legislative dyarchy was to become a deed 1 ssue •

&1 Cf. Parliamentary Papers, 1925, Vol. XI, for the
records of-rhts conference.
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Statute of' Westminster {1931).
acted quickly.

Early in 1931

!~r.

Dominion

parlia~ents

J. H. Thomas, Secretary of

State for Dominion _Af'fairs, notified Conrn.ons thet " .•• resolutions in the sense of the recommendations of the Imperial

Conference of 1930 regarding the proposed Statute of

~estrn1nster

have been passed in al-l the Dominion Parliaments ••• "62
the measure was formally introduced.

and

Conmons could not have

been more bored w1 th the issue, which the_y did not even bother

to debate, but passed rapidly through three reading s by voice

vote.

Their attitude seems- to have been a recognition that

nothing else cou1d be done; the dominions had already called
the turn, so why indulge an empty protest.

So sputtered out

the le g1slat1 ve dyarc-hy over the Caucasian colonies, though
India might chafe for soi!le time.

Though MacDonald and Labor

might ~la1m credit for fulfilling Labor's pledge to decimate

the empire, there wa_s really 11 ttle else they could have done;

the dominions had already stated the case and Parliament had
to accept it or face perhaps more defiant or unpleas9nt
poss-ibilities.

Aside from: the matter of Labor's claim, the

whole subject had been started by Baldwin Conservatives, and

62 Parliamentary Debates, Off. Rep. H. C~ Debs, 5s:
22 George V, v. 255, p:p. 2626-252?. Cf. also t -he H.. C. Debs·
_:for 1930 for what 11 ttle consideration Commons gave to a
discussion of the matter.

Labor was merely lending official sanction to what had already taken place.

Cast or ministry made no difference here.

Rumbles in the administrative dyarchy.

The legis-

lative dyarc_h y was thus no soon.e r written off the books when
the United Kingdom was faced with murmurs of discontent in
the adminis tra ti ve d::;rarchy.

Everywhere 1 t was conf ro_n ted with

the burgeoning demands for autarchy focused by the rampant
rise or nationalism in non-Caucasian

colonies~

There had

already been the Act of 1919 creating the new Council of

State and Legi-slative Assembly for India.

Obstructionist

and India-n ·nationalist movements- following i t .s establishment
in 1921 had led quickly to demands for home rule and t .h e 1nst1tu t _ion of the Simon Comr.J.ission to study 1 t.

This coill!lli ttee

made its report in 1930, and the report appears to have been

poorly recei-ved both in India and the United Kingdom b-ecause
1t

did 11 ttle more than suggest an extremely limited_ re-estab ..

the legislative dyarchy- without many or the
63
privileges of' dol!linion :s tatus.
By 1935 Parl18lllent had passed
lishment

or

a f'ederal constitution bill embodying the principles of the
Simon rep-ort 1 but this served only to inflame- Indian national-

ists sueh as (}andhi even more.

India

'I":Bs

but a samp-le of what

the United Kingdom was having to face everywhere throughout

63 Cf. Renort of the Indian Statutory Conm1ssion
(Simon Com!iii sst oil) ,_ l London: H.:k: • Stationery Gffi c e, T9 30) •
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the

non~Caucasian

reaches of the empire.

Various gradations

or civil disturbance, from mild to serious, were breaking

out in the more advanced segments of the administrative
dyarchy.

serious

Burma, Malaya, and East Africa were displaying
sympto~

of discontent.

Labor ministries as well as

Conservative in ·the United Kingdom were just as nonplussed
and just as severe wit-h these .outbreaks; pol-1 t 1 cal bias made
no difference.

In fact, it had been a Labor ministry which

all but forced the Simon Report down the throats of both
Indian Nationalists and Moderates who were seeking doninian

status.
Prec.is of background for V1orld War II.

As tf these

c .ondi tions were not enough, Dri ti sh diploma tic policies were
going awry all over the world.

The Statute of Westminster

was no sooner on the books than the United Kingdom .had to
face the ambitions of ~apan in Asia. First there was the

Manchurian incident.

Britain did little.

Next came the

reckless advance into China. Britain could no longer even

observe the e~enities with the ~apanese, and British strategists were quaking in their boots for fear

or

where the

Japanese would strike next, pe-rhaps their own backyard.

This

rear stemmed from a possible conbination of strategic difficulties which the United Kingdom had long avoided, the

necessity of full scale war in Asia and Europe at the same
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ti~e.

In Europe the cordon saniteire so carefully nursed

about the "Bolsheviks" at Versailles was coming apart at
the seams ., and 1 t would not be too meny years ·bet'ore the
"protection of permanent interests" would see British forces·
aligned with those of the "Iva-n!t they had so
ostracized.

peinst ~ kingly

Such an "unholy" alliance, unthinkable in 1919,

would come· about in the interests of a national survival
threatened by the paranoid and ruthless careers of o onetime Milan journalist, Benito :Mussolini, a.nd an erstwhile
Vienna "schickelgruber," Adolf Hitler, men whose delusions
of grandeur were forcing Europe to the brink of the "abyss. n
Everywhere the British turned they f ·aced the futile trinity

or

s.trategy, economics, and politics.

Helplessly, al:nost

incredulously, British planners watched the developing
nightmare explode in all its fury.
World War II.

Uorld War II was upon the British in

all 1 ts horror almost before the United Kingdom was a•sare
of what had happened.

Despite all the efforts to st-ave it

o.:t"f--including the grudging accep·tance of Italy's r ~1p 1d or
Ethiopia and the ignominious Munich Pact abjectly accepted
by a frustrat·e d Chamberlain--the war descended upon t ·h e

united Kingdom with disheartening indifference.

Germany

over-rode Europe and pushed the tardy British defenders
France into the. sea.

or

German U-boats began their garroting
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o.f · the merchant life-line, while the Luftwaffe's "Bl1 tz"
turned the islands

the~selves

into a bloody abbatoir.

horrors of the Blitz w-ere not enough, 1 t s-eemed.

The

Suddenly,

but not unexpectedly, Japanese dreams of the "Asiatic Coprosperity Sphere" ran amok and stabbed the British in the
.Asian "back-reaches.""

One hy o.ne, aided by n3tional1stically-

insp1red collaborationist forces, Japan took over the British
strongholds in As1a4

Eong Kong, r,raleya ,_ Singapore ., Burma,

the East Indies (Dutch), New Guinea, and the Solomons fell
to -a dvancing .Tapa.nese hordes.
or Australasia were threatened.

.India, Ceylon, end the whole
Even. worse, the

.Ta~nese

fleet was forcing the retreat .of its British counterpart from
Asian wate·r s.

Germm:y was now advancin g into B.ri tish pre-

serves in Africa and threatening the Near East.

The back of

the empire was actually broken, and had it not been again for
the timely interference of the United States, en event
brought on by the pre-cipitate actions- of the .Japanese in .As-ian
waters, the enpire pr-obebly would have r .emained dismembered.
As it was, before and after the intervention of the United
States, the British had made any number of promises to various elements in the non-Caucasian units dissatisfied with
the Japanese occupation.

They made all sorts of pronises

-ror prospective au·tonomy in exchange for irnr.1ediate war-tin:e
aid.

These promises were to bring the post-~ar deluge.
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~-World \iar II imperial deluge.

~.vo-rld :'lar II was

no sooner over than the deluge of demands for autonomy for
non-Caucasian colonials descended upon the Brit 1.sh ..

Colony

by colony, in the light of war-time pro~ises and the fact that

it really could do little about it, the United Kingdom has
had to give in and watch the adoinistrative dyarchy disin-

tegrate ·tn Asia.

India, Ceylon, and Burma hav·e gone the -w ay

of self-determination.

Nehru put an end to what appeared to

him to be British procrastination in the matter of home rule
for India by calmly announcing at an imperial meeting in

London, a meeting incidentally called to solve Indian constitutional problems, that he "was .going home to form a government for India, that the Moslems could ro.rm one in Pakistan, n
and that, in erfect, the British could go .hang; they would
not delay him longer by arguments about· the preservation or
British or native rig hts and interests.
the British did nothing.

This he did, and

Indian action is but a small sample

o.f what the Br.i tish have had to watch nationalism do to the

administrative dyarchy in the past eleven years since the
ending of the has till ties of Horld liar II.

The British have

watched and been able to do little to stem the tide which
is now rising in Africa and everywhere else through what
remains of the administr-e tive dyarchy.

Is this an ar.gUl!lent

for the effectiveness of franchise changes in the dismemberment of the empire?
this ·p oint of View?

Has anything in this study substantiated

CHAPI'ER VI
COl~CLUSIONS

AlW SL'lJ,L\.RY

On the basis o.:f the select-ed :facts presented, 1 t is the
conclusion of this study that franchise reforms were only
incidentally end contextually related to the disintegration
or the British empire and tha-t they had extremely 11 ttle, if
at all measurable, effect upon it.

The decline of British

imperial rule appears, rather, to have been brought about by
a syndrome of fActors much more practical than political bias
in troduce·d into gov·eril!!lent by franchise changes.

This syn-

drome was composed of a combination of legal, strategic,
economic, demographic, technological, and psychological fa.ctors which eventually proved too much for British plannerB to
handle.

Legal factors combined with strategic end Parliamentary
d.ifficulties brought -about the retreat of Bri tein in North
America.

War with the "Thirtean Colonies, though not generally

viewed so, appears to have ended in a strategic defeat 'l":hich
the British appear never to have for[otten.

The Anerican

revolt ·occurred as a part and parcel of the ccntext of a
strategi-c due·l with France and clean-up operations on Dutch
and Spanish power.

Relative technological inadecuacy--

technology was not yet sufficiently advanced--had made the
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strategic situation involved in invading the Thirteen Colonies
and giving logisti-ca-l support to the army carrying out this
ta-sk_ while c.onfronted with mill tary cornmi tments elsewhere
somewhat insupportable.

The three year siege ot Gibraltar

by French and Spanish forces, shipping difficulties 1n the
West Indies because or French and Spanish marauding, and
similar difficulties in the Far East were all a part of this
strategic complex and materially aided, in fact almost produced, the success of the American colonies, and so did the
:feud between Crown and Parlieme.nt.

The latter was reinforced

by the genera.l drift of Western civilization toi'iard auto-

nomous fo_rms of government.

All combined brought about- the

success of the American insurrectionist movement which broke
up what appears to have been Britain only real attempt at
the establishment of an hegemony containing the prerog8tives
of imperium.

From that time forward one of the major premises

or colonial administration appears to have been the avoidance
or situations that might again lead to such a frustrating
strategic stalemate.

The policies of the Colonial and Home

Offices- developed after this time appear to have been predicated consistently upon this strategic consideration and
preservation or the economic and diplomatic prerogatives
which kept it under control.
Also in the light of this strategic consideration
colonial planners- appear to have predicated their course upon

203

a desire to a-bsorb t .he minimum amounts .necessary or the c·o sts
attendant upon the administration of i~perial holdings and
consistent with their stability.

In the t.hree-quarter cen-

tury period following the American War {1775-1850), this
attitude appears to have been reinforced by the reelization
of British planners that, granted the economic situation in
which they operated, Britain was becoming more and More dependent upon outs.1 de resources for the maintenance of 1 ts
existence:

n~t1onal

-economic attitudes conditioned the minimizing or

costs, while the actual economic situation combined with
strategic· difficulties conditioned the modes of rule worked
out with various colonial areas during the nineteenth century.
All during the nineteenth century, while the economicstrategic relationship

~as

progressively worsening, Britain

round i-tself confronted with the preservation of the status
quo in Europe, .Asia, and the Near East* a stability upon which
the British grip upon the empire depended.

British planners--

strategists, and diplomats--appear early to have reali.zed
that their diplomatic policies had to be total policies, that
European policy was colonial policy, that war in Europe was
one phase of colonial policy, that strategic polic-y had to
predicated upon economic :policy which was colo·nial policy •
Everywhere the British turned they realized tbe totality of
their efforts and planned accordingly.

They knew that as
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long as the United Kingdon was kept ott balance in Europe
by ·civil disturbances colonies would have to be treated
bingerly ·or compromised with.

They never lost sight of the

fact the t eve·ry colony was a potential enemy.
to be the empire's greatest enemy.
Kapoleonic troubles.

Europe proved

First, there were

th~

The Uni te.d Kingdom had no sooner

brought these to a conclusion than a continuous series of
troubles followed in rapi.d fire order.
the

~editerrenean

Re·vol t ·s imr.tered in

and then exploded. Greece revolted and

Europe's "sick man," Turkey, had to be calmed by Codrington
only to raise further difficulties with Russia.

~Vhile

the

Russian problem was just coming to a bo"il, the downfall of
monarchy proceeded apace.

One revolt after another topple·d

eonerchial thrones and led Britain into postures of Euronean
stabilization.

The French Restoration led to adventure in

the Crimea, while Africa and the r-:ear East began to simmer.
Then Prussia fell hungrily on hapless France, a problem no
sooner settled than purchase or Suez, an F.!ppsrent

strc.~tegic

economic necessity, led to further troubles in the Sudan and
Africa.

All these problems occupied a considerable portion

of the British strategic might, and all

~ede

even more

vi~l

the stability of colonial holdings as the situation or the
United Kingdom's dependency upon outside resources pro e ress1 vely wor.sened.

That Britain wa.s only too well aware of
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this fulcrum of the colonial policy is amply attested ·by the
exist-ence, makeup, and progressive modification of the
"Stat"istical A·b stracts," in e x istence since the der1ise of the
Board of Trade and Plantations •
.As· a consequence of these matters, the United King dom,
at the behest of t -he Colonial Cff"ice and faced witt unsettled
Europe, was mor·e t .han willing to conpromise on matters or
colonial rule r ·a ther than f'ac.e the test of again having simultaneously to quell di -sturbances in Europe .and the colonies
which would divide the forces of its strategic power and
attack their industria 1 base.

By 1867, Britain was well aw.are

of its dependency upon colonial areas for food end raw materiels.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close this d-epend-

ency situation grew progressively more perilous to the United
Kingdon and created ·a situation in which efforts to stabilize
colonial arrangements were to run afoul of' an unholy union
of nationalism and economic theory in bot-h Europe and Asia.
More s·nd more • particularly in Asia, nationalist forces
howled about ·"exploitation" and thre-a tened revolt when British
forces were otherwise occupied.

Caucasian colonials also

chafed under similar, but much more lenient feelinGs about
national destiny.

These r-ealities led Britain into msny

concessions, and population differentials further complicated
the problem.

By 1900, some 45rOOO,OOO citizens in the United
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Kingdom found themselves staggered with the problem of stabilizing- government for half a billion colonials and some
250,000,000 Europeans over whom they supposedly had no con-

trols at all.

~y

the end of the nineteenth century the

British were sitting on a powder keg, concerning the contents
of which they were

~nti~ately

aware.

All that was needed was

a major war and the empire would _show the cracks in its s·eans,
the patchwork of legislative and administrative dyarchies
might well fell apart.

Astute British diplomacy combined

with adroit colonial policies had managed to stave off this
eventural1ty and stabilize both colonial and l!:uropean gover-n ments for most of the nineteenth century.

Colonial holdings

had been stabilized by a division of rule between colony and
homeland in assorted grf. dations from colony to colony, the
ps rticular colony being allow-ed to charge "only what the
traffic would bear" at a given time.
by force and conferences.

Europe w9s stabilized

Such economic arrane enents as the

sterling block, inter-imperial conferences, and free trade
also he1ped toward stabilization of the empire as did colonial
dependence upon British manufactures and the ready market
f'or colonial r -o od and raw materials represented in the United
Kingdom.

By 1900, the shaky foundations of the empire so long
hidden from public view were ready for -exposure.

It was only

2.07

a matter of ttme until Germany or some ot~er European power
challenged them.

Germany had rapidly overtaken the British

industrial might and was just about on equal terms ·Ri th it.
The Boer

diffioulti~s

and the subsequent efforts made to

settle them added further fuel to the fires gnawing at the
imperial vitals.
The progress of the twentieth century has seen the
British empire, slowly at first and th.en more precipitately_,
disintegrate as the cumulative and combined effects of strategic problems, economic problems, demographic problens, and
the problem of nationalism tn Europe and colonial areas--a
st·ngle problem in terms or imperial rule--have exacted their
long-feared tolls.

Stability in the empire flashed

ing with the somewhat emotional and
o:f a minor arc-h duke in Serbia.

pointl~ss

World

~7ar

a-gli~ter

assassination

I was no sooner under

way than the United Kingdom had ·to fGce the horror of a technological development, the U-boat, against which it had yet
to develop adequate defenses, and it also had to face the numbing reality of the fact that 1 ts high-grad-e coal and iron
supplies in the Midlands- were all but exhausted.

7lh1le these

troubles had the United Kingdom in a virtual state of siege,
disrupting mov em:ents of a-ll varieties--economic, political r
nationalistic, and strategic--erupted throughout the enpire.
By war's end it was only a matter of time until the major
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segments. of the empire would cast themselves loose r ·rom the
imperial stream because the exigencies of the war had wrenched
them free or many of the old imperial relationships and prerogatives.

Between the ·tw.o wars {World Wars I and II}

Britain was able to do very little to stem the developing
tide because of the known and almost

co~~lete

dependence of

the United Kingdon upon outside resources for the contin.u ance
of its national existence.

Almost as soon as the war was

over. the Caucasian units cast themselves loose, and the nonCaucasian coloni-als began to "champ at the bit."

Such non-

Caucasian units as were held on to were held on to in desperation by the United Kingdom because it feared that it
these areas were cast loose they would fall within the
orbits of hostile powers thereby ending the stream of supplies
:from them.

They were vi tal to the United Kingdom's w·e lfare.

Franchise reforms· have had .little to. do with these
changes.

Regardl e·s s of g-overlli:lent, Conserve t1 ve or Li be.ral,

British colonial policy has been realistic and consistent
since the time of the Irish Appeals Act. The basic process
colonial adm1n1.strators develope-d to manage the empire was
based upon a realistic appraisal o·r the context in which the
empire operated.

The process of dividing rule between

colonials and home government was the most practical which
could have be-en devised, given the context 1n which the
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United Kingdom matured and the e.nd.s toward whicn it strived.
It is this latter context which conditioned the separation
Of raw oaterials and manufactures, thus saddling the United
Ki.ngdom with the major burden of the strategic costs; end
it is this se.p arat1on whic.h materially aided in producing
the principle of divided rule in colonial affairs.
Crown may have started out to inaugurate an

The

1moeriu~,

but

Parliament appears to have preempted and ·ended with a pre.cariously held empire which 'llorld ·,:f ar II all but put an end to.
Regardless of whether or not libera.lis.m of one type
or another were introduced into British government with the
advent of franchise reforms, franchise reforrn appears to have
had lit·tle bearing of the issue of the imperial fate.

For

example, the economic liberals introduced into Pa·r liament
following the Franchise Reform of 1832, could. they have
gotten aw.ay w1 th 1 t--acc.epting the t they were poll t .ically
biased--would more likely have held on to i~per1al holdine s
as such if they could; after ell, as the situation matured,
this type of liberal wa.s to realize more and more his dependence upon colonial holdings for the progress of his industrial
enterprises.

He was caught in a trap froo which there was

no rea·l extrication.

He could not bear the internal expense

of thes·e governments, nor could he bear the loss of their
raw materials and food.

Once in political power, all he

.--··
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could do was use the already devised and practical system of
governmental dyarchies which made it posstble to reel17.e the
maximum utilization of the colonial potential.

.He had to

compromise to profit and continue in business. Unfortunately,
he could not profit forever.

After further maturation or

the historical context, the colonial caught on to the fact
that this economic liberal was the same fellow he .had been
dealing with yesterday, only then he called himself a conservative.

The colonial realized the consistency of col-

onial policy and he also realized that he held the key to
the Un1 ted Kingdom's control, food and raw materials.

Ire

realized also just how badly this weakened the strategic
potential of the United Kingdom.

The consistency of col-·

onial policy had to persist despite governmental bias,. else
the empire would be dismembered.

It is at this point, the

food and raw material nexus, that the non-Caucasian colonial
began the attack which burst int-o flame in the period between the two wars.

Conbined with a strateg ic factor, this

ne:xus also accounted :for the behavior of t.he MacDonald
Labori tes in oost ...world 7lar ·r , India.

They mi ght prate

about the necessity for dismembering the empire while out
of off1ae, but once in office they would have to face the
realities conce.rned with preservation of national existen.c e •
Everywhere Britain was retreating, but t ·he Laborites given
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the chance to augment this mcwement procrastinated; much
more than internal politics was concerned.

It was a Qatter

or life and death realities, the preservation or permanent
interests and protection of national existence.

Indian

demands for national sovereignty were by-passed and compromises proposed.

But this. as always. was only a stop-gap

measure, an attempt to plug a "leak in the

dike~

holding

.b a·ck the flood waters of imperial disintegration.
World War II let loose the :floodgates.

This war and

its aftermath is already writing the final chapter of the
Brit 1 sh emp 1r e.

Unit by unit the a dminis trat 1 ve dy·a r chy 1 s

:falling to pieces.

Much of Asi-a has already escaped the

imperial hold and the rest of administrative dyarchy, particularly Africa and the Near East are growling louder and louder.
British attempts to promote the use of Africa as

A

bread-

basket for both t ·he United Kingdom and the Africans are felling
on deaf ears.

Colonials no longer have to be polite.

It

seems only a matter of time until the United Kingdon will
b·ecome a cooperative world worl~shop totally depend upon the
puissance· of other powers for the continuation of its national
and economic existence.

The United Kingdom is now almost

totally dependent upon outside sources for food and raw
materi·als, and almost totally dependent upon the world market
for· its national survival.

In effect, this means that it .has

r--·- · ·

212

becom-e a-lmost totally dependent upon other powers for the
1'18 intenance

of sta-b le world conditions, the only c ondi t1 ons

in which in the face of atom bombs and other technolog ical
monstrositie-s 1 t can survive as a nation.

Anotr1er war would

ruin the United Kingdom; it ·might even leave it a hopeless
atoi!lic ruin.
Faced with the ominous rumble of Cor.uJunist C.l:ina and
Russ-ia, the present diplomatic position of the United Kingdom,
as the former are only too well aware, is a colossal bluff
al-:nost wholly dependent upon th-e mig ht of the United StRtes
ror its effectiveness.

The Chinese and the Russians both

know why Chamberlain suffered the "indignity at Munich" and

why Hitler was let loose upon Europe.

They also know how

rar Britain can be pushed, and so does India and the rest of
Asia.

This is why they are all pushing •.

It is also, incident-

ally, the reason the empire appears to be almo_s t a dead issue.
SoT'!leone _, perhaps -the United States, will :tave to fill the
.. pow-er vacuum'' being created by the in!linent end total collaps-e
of the imperial structure.
Franchise reform has had little to do with this eventu-s..li ty.

Britain has be.en beaten by her dependency upon out side

resources and technologic3l developments which have created
a stratee;ic situation in which the United Kingdoi!l is totally

vulnerable.
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